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The Cuban Missile Crisis

US Perspectives and Political Involvement

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Dedication

To my Dear Parents Toufik and Faten whose prayerful supplications were always
the source of my success.

To my fiancé Kaouther , a special thanks to you for your practical and emotional
support.

To my lovely Brothers Amine and Ramy for their encouragement and support who
have truly waited anxiously and patiently for the moments of my success.

Dedication

To my lovely father, Dad Amar for supporting and encouraging me to believe in myself, and Mum Habiba, a strong and gentle lady for trusting me to achieve this work, and that so much could be done with little.

They greatly shaped my life and always dreamt to see me at this level. To my Dear

Parents whom I owe my success.

To my lovely brothers Walid and Rafik who have truly waited anxiously and

patiently for the moments of my success.

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Abstract

During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union gradually built up their zones of influence, separating the globe into two opposed camps. As a result, the Cold War was not just a fight between the United States and the Soviet Union, but also a worldwide conflict that impacted many countries, particularly in Europe, Asia, and South America, where the conflict reached a head in Cuba (Cuban Missile Crisis), where the Soviets secretly installed missiles after Cuba became a communist country in 1959. President John F. Kennedy was concerned that the Soviet Union would attack the US. It is the confrontation which took place in October 1962 between the United States on one hand and the Soviet Union and Cuba on the other hand. It is among the most serious crises which happened during the Cold War; that's why it is interesting to investigate. The Cuban Missile Crisis directly related to the Containment policy which was a very famous and important strategy for which some United States policymakers were known.

Keywords: Cold War, Containment policy, Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviets, United States

List of Abbreviations

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile

ASBMs Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

DOD Department of Agency

ENDC Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee

EX-Comma Executive Committee

EX-Comma Executive Committee

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GLBM Ground-Launched Ballistic Missile

GLCM Ground-Launched Cruise Missile

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

INF Intermediate Nuclear Forces

IRBMs Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles

JFK John Fitzgerald Kennedy

MAD Mutual –Assured Destruction

MIRVs Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles

MRBMs Medium Range Ballistic Missiles

NNWS Non-Nuclear Weapon States

NPT The Non- Proliferation Treaty

NTM National Technical Means

NWFZ Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones

NWS Nuclear Weapon States

OAS Organization of American State

OST The Outer Space Treaty

PTBT Partial Test Ban Treaty

SALT I The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I

SALT II The Strategic Arms Limitation.

SCC Standing Consultative Commission

SLBMs Submarine Launchers Ballistic Missiles

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

USA The United States of America

USSR The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic




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
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General Introduction

General Introduction

1. Background of the Study

The former Soviet Union and the United States had a long and complicated diplomatic relationship. On November 5th, 1809, the two superpowers established official diplomatic ties (Grow 2008). Until the formation of the Soviet in 1922, ties between the Soviet Union and the United States were calm and amicable, with a particularly communist rule in which the political system was organized as a one-party system (Ornstein, 1989).

In actuality, the Soviet Union developed a dictatorial system in which the Communist Party held and controlled all aspects of the state (Blight 1990).The country's economic structure has shifted toward governmental control and enterprise domination. As a result, it was evident that the USSR's political and economic structure as opposed to the capitalist system that defined the US rule.

Despite their differences, the former Soviets and the United States fought together against the Nazi dictatorship in Germany during World War II (Perkins, 1993). Furthermore, the Soviets profited from the Lend-Lease program, and America offered significant military assistance to its allies (ibid.). After Germany and Japan were destroyed and the War ended, both the United States and the former Soviet Union began to pursue their national interests and agendas(Polkas, 2010).

This political and ideological split between the United States and the Soviet Union quickly escalated into an international confrontation of wills, perspectives and philosophies. With the advent of the Cold War, it became clear that both superpowers were collaborating and

maneuvering over foreign policy, global concerns and crises and extending zones of influence across the world.

During the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis was a crucial event that transformed US-USSR ties and threatened to force them into armed conflict. In October 1962, the United States, Cuba, and the Soviet Union were at odds. Scholars of international relations, military professionals, and political commentators considered the Cuban Missile Crisis to be the pinnacle of the Cold War. The situation had the potential to escalate into a third global war. Fortunately, both the United States and the Soviet Union were able to resolve the problem through diplomatic channels.

2. Motivation

Most people are aware of the myth of John F. Kennedy saving the world from the nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Regardless, a recent re-examination of Cold War history accounts by historians has revealed that the tale of the Cuban Missile Crisis has been greatly inflated. The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 is often regarded as the Cold War's most severe military conflict. While American air, land and naval forces prepared for air attacks on Soviet missile facilities under construction in Cuba and a follow-up invasion, American destroyers deployed along a picket line to intercept Soviet ships delivering missiles and nuclear warheads to Cuba (Boot, 2018). The United States' intervention in Latin America and Cuba in 1962 was not new. The Americans have a few times attempted to meddle and attempted to control the island since the 19th Century. Within the twentieth century and in 1945, the United States became an enemy of the Soviet Union and vice versa. Their struggle began at the end of World War 2 which led to the Cold War and included numerous emergencies. The U.S got into a conflict with Cuba when Fidel

Castro, one of the essential pioneers of the Cuban Transformation, Soviets developed rocket bases in Cuba (Gambone, 2002). The United States attempted to contain the spread of Communism in Cuba, particularly since it was exceptionally near to the United States. The Cuban missile crisis is exceptionally interesting, and that is why we have chosen to work on it.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a turning point. There is no precedent in history to those thirteen days in October 1962, when the United States and the Soviet Union stood on the brink of nuclear war (Perkins, 1993). If the war had broken out, it may have resulted in the deaths of 100 million Americans, more than 100 million Russians, and millions more Europeans (Polkas, 2010).

Other historical disasters and inhumanities would have fallen into insignificance. If we go back 40 years to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, it is possible to observe similar responses to Iraq and the threat to America's security. Among the observations to be drawn from that experience is the one that military intervention is not always necessary despite the need of showing the message of American power will (Boot, 2018).

3. Statement of The Problem

During the Cold War, there were several disputes between the opposite wings. The Cuban missile crisis was one of these conflicts of interest, and it ended with the United States and the Soviet Union applying non-proliferation treaties. From their alliance in WWII until the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union had tenuous relations, with the most recent confrontation occurring during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which was a watershed moment in world history due to the threat of nuclear war, which could result in the world's destruction.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is a case study of how Presidents John F. Kennedy of the United States and Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union almost blundered into nuclear war

due to their advisory systems' crisis management approaches, but were able to avert a nuclear war through personal diplomacy and old-fashioned political horse-trading. They did so without revealing how they defused the crisis to the rest of the world a decision to maintain secrecy with far-reaching implications for future presidential crisis decision-making.

The current paper examines the Cuban Missile Crisis and highlights the important aspects of foreign policy at the time, as well as the underlying decision-making strategies. Furthermore, it tries to investigate and explain the causes of the crisis by analyzing the factors that led to it.

4. Aim of the Study

The purpose of the research is to explain, analyse, and describe the United States and Cuba relations from 1962 until their recent normalization by also focusing on the roles played by Russia, Canada and the Vatican to face their changes. It will explain the relations between the US and Cuba and those of Russia, Canada and the Vatican with the Caribbean Island. The Americans cited the Monroe Doctrine and other reports to legitimize their intervention in Cuba.

5. Research Questions

Still, the Cuban Missile Crisis was the nearest military and nuclear conflict in which both the US and the USSR were to deploy nuclear weapons in combat. As a result, the following research questions are addressed in this dissertation.;

- Whether the United States' application of the Containment policy during the Cuban Missile Crisis was protective or offensive?

- Did the United States have the proper right to intervene in Cuba in 1962 to secure it

from the Soviet Union?

- Was the military force the only way to clear the situation?

6. Research Hypotheses

The following hypotheses can be constructed based on the above-mentioned questions:

- If the Cuban Missile Crisis was a threat of nuclear war, both sides the United States and the Soviet Union were pressured to sign non-proliferation treaties.
- Why did the Soviets place the missiles in Cuba and What could they gain by their deployment?

7. Methodology

The current study used a qualitative research methodology in which we sought to review, and analyses the existing dispute centered on the research issue heading and scope. The wording of non-proliferation treaties will be evaluated and interpreted in this context, and numerous conclusions will be given as a result of this examination. The research will examine if the USSR and the western block represented by the US obey their agreements and whether they have a meaningful influence in promoting world stability and lessening tensions between the two rivalries based on the many articles of these treaties.

8. The Structure of the Dissertation

This work is divided into three chapters. The first one is entitled “the USA and Cuba before the Cold War”, it depicts the roots of the Cold War by shedding light on the primary participants, the United States and the Soviet Union, and how both sides aspire to dominate various locations across the world where they may impose their ideological ideas.

The second chapter which is the case study entitled “The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War”, placed among two disputing powers during the Cold War era to investigate the factors that nearly brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. It also looks at the consequences of the Cuban crisis in terms of international relations and politics during the Cold War. The case study also tries to present the political issues that have arisen as a result of the dramatic crisis, as well as the UN-imposed solutions.

The third chapter entitled “The impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis on the Cuban American relations”, this chapter heavily focuses on the negotiation of peace between the U.S and U.S.S.R leaders to find a root to end up the crisis, and the treaties that have been signed to dismantle the missiles and many others.



Chapter one

The US and Cuba before the Cold War

Introduction

1 The History of Cuban American Relations

1.1 The Florida Issue

1.1.2 The Ostend Manifesto

1.1.3 The United States Entering into a New Imperial Era

1.2 The United States and Cuba from The End of the Spanish-American War to The Cold War

1.2.1 The Policy of the United States Regarding the Occupation in 1892

1.2.2 The Cuban Protest.

1.2.3 Beliefs of Anti-imperialist Movements in the United States

1.3 A Century of Struggle for U.S-Cuban Relations

1.3.1 Failures in US-Cuban Relations

Conclusion

Introduction

Latin America has been and continues to be one of the United States' areas of influence since its independence. Although US politicians did not formally conquer all Latin American countries, they tried everything they could to gain control of them (Ornstein, 1989). They took advantage of the horrible conditions that those countries were in and used them to their advantage. They penned significant and powerful texts that served to define the relationship between the US and those countries, Cuba is one of them.

1 The History of Cuban American Relations

The United States and Cuba have a long history of dealing with each other, dating back to before the latter gained independence. To avoid paying colonial taxes, the North American mainland and Cuba, which was then a Spanish province, began forging illicit trade contracts in the early eighteenth century (Blight, 1990). Cuba became a lucrative place in the region and a hub of tobacco and sugar production as legal and illegal commerce developed (Howard, 2001). During this time, Cuban merchants travelled to North American ports and developed long-term trading agreements (ibid.). The capture of Havana by the British in 1762 paved the way for commerce with the British possessions in North America (Smith, 2005). In November of that year and the island progressively grew reliant on it and vice versa (ibid.).

Following the United States' independence in 1783 and the island's openness to international trade in 1818, Cuban-American commercial agreements began to take the place of Spanish ones (Polkas, 2010).

Since the breakdown of Spanish rule in America, American officials have been considering Cuba as a potential new state (Polkas, 2010). It was appealing for a variety of reasons, including

its proximity, fertility, mineral riches, and command of the Gulf of Mexico. The acquisition of Louisiana in 1803 and Florida in 1819 bolstered these arguments and proposed additional territorial expansions at Spain's cost (Smith, 2005). In a letter to President James Monroe dated October 24th, 1823, Thomas Jefferson said “I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of States” (QTD in Schlesinger, 1999, p.150). He also informed Secretary of War John C. Calhoun of the United States' intentions. “Ought, at the first possible opportunity to take Cuba” (ibid.).

In a letter to the United States Minister to Spain, Hugh Nelson, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams assessed the likelihood of the United States annexing Cuba in the next fifty years, emphasizing that it would not be simple due to the problems that existed (Polkas, 2010). He said, “But there are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation, and if an apple severed by the tempest from its native tree cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only” (ibid.).

“Towards the North American Union, which by the same law of nature cannot cast her off from its bosom” (QTD in Perkins, 1993, p.25). Many uprisings took place throughout Spain's South American possessions during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, but not in Cuba (Smith, 2005). In 1823, Spanish rule over those nations appeared to be on the verge of crumbling. However, the Holy Alliance (Russia, Austria, France, and Prussia) helped reversed the course of events (ibid.). As a consequence, the Americans' hearts were filled with terror. During James Monroe's presidency, the revolutions persisted (1817-1825) (Perkins, 1993). President Monroe's biographer, Ammon, wrote “the all-absorbing problem in foreign affairs during Monroe's presidency was that created by Spain crumbling American Empire. Nearly, all his major decisions either centered on this issue or had to be closely correlated with the questions it raised” (QTD in

Perkins, 1993, p.155). The United States did not act militarily, preferring instead to serve as “the beacon on the hill”, guiding those who suffered in Latin America” (ibid.). The majority of Americans, on the other hand, did not trust that the people of Latin America would be able to follow this beacon. Miscegenation has made it worse for them as well (ibid.). As a consequence, several American pundits believed that the Latin American peoples with whom they sympathized would be unable to manage themselves if they were victorious. This viewpoint was also shared by American leaders. In 1817, the North American Review cautioned that the victory of an anti-colonial revolution did not imply that the people could progress (Perkins, 1993).

1.1.1 The Florida Issue

The same arguments were used by John Quincy Adams to justify his decision to defer recognition of the new states, at least until the Florida issue was resolved (Perkins, 1993). The time had come for Latin America when Spain handed up Florida to the United States (Gambon, 2002). James Monroe announced the end of New World colonization in his seventh annual State of the Union Address to Congress on December 2ed, 1823, and warned foreign powers that any interference in the Western Hemisphere would be regarded as a danger to the United States (ibid.). Furthermore, the Monroe Doctrine said that the US would not meddle with existing European colonies or European countries' internal affairs and that the latter would do the same. Because they were made up of wholly different and sovereign states, it was recommended that the New World and the Old World should retain separate spheres of influence (ibid.).

Furthermore, it established a zone of influence that would strengthen with the adoption of the Roosevelt Corollary, a document drafted in 1904 that asserted the United States' authority to intervene in Latin American territories if they were experiencing economic or political difficulties

(Perkins, 1993). Although the Monroe Doctrine was overlooked in the international arena at the time due to the United States' lack of a strong fleet and army, its effect would emerge later. The Monroe Doctrine was significant because it was a watershed point in American foreign policy and one of its most prominent ideas. It offered the first ideological foundation for any, directly and indirectly, US action in the region, and it solidified an official American position in the region (Gambone, 2002).

There was an additional cause for the United States to want to annex Cuba in 1845, in addition to the above ones. It happened as a result of Southern statesmen's desire for new slave states (Gambone, 2002). The United States offered nearly \$100 million to acquire Cuba from Spain in 1848, but the Spanish government said that "sooner than see the island transferred to any power they would prefer seeing it sunk in the ocean" (QTD in Latané, 2000, p.92).

Several efforts to bring about a revolution in Cuba were conducted between 1848 and 1850, with expeditions from the United States assisting the campaign. President Zachary Taylor interjected himself, but European countries were not on his side (Gambone, 2002). This was evident when the English and French embassies to the United States joined forces to seek the United States government to join them in forming a tripartite guarantee of Cuba to Spain. On December 1st, 1852, Secretary Everett declined to offer the assurance on behalf of President Millard Fillmore (ibid.). The problem has now become a topic of discussion in Congress (Polkas, 2010).

Pierre Soule, the minister to Spain under President Franklin Pierce (1853-1857), made an offer to the Spanish in 1853 to acquire Cuba for 130 million dollars, but he was unsuccessful (Gambone, 2002). Spain's arbitrary annoyances and seizures made the American ships vulnerable.

The Black Warrior, a United States ship captured in Havana in March 1854, is one example. Unlike Congress, which regarded it as a breach, Spanish officials in Cuba said the ship had broken customs procedures and penalized the owners \$6,000 (Polkas, 2010). The Pierce administration's concern for Cuba continued despite Spain's release of the ship (ibid.).

1.1.2 The Ostend Manifesto

The Ostend Manifesto is the greatest example. Following Soule's failure, Secretary of State William L. Marcy sent James Buchanan, the British minister, and John Y. Mason, the French minister, to meet with Soule at Ostend, Belgium, on October 8th, 1854 (Polkas, 2010). On the 18th of October, however, the document was finalized and published at Aix-la-Chappelle,

Prussia (ibid.). The three ambassadors, who spoke on behalf of a large number of Southern Democrats, said that "Cuba is as necessary to the North American republic as any of its present members, and that it belongs naturally to that great family of states of which the Union is the providential nursery" (QTD in Gambone, 2002, p.80). They also claimed that Spain's rule over Cuba was unnatural. The US offered to acquire Cuba from Spain, but if the latter refused, they threatened to attack. "By every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain" (ibid.). The Ostend Manifesto was instantly rejected since it had not been sanctioned by Franklin Pierce's administration (Polkas, 2010). After it was made public, it sparked widespread outrage both at home (particularly in the North) and abroad. Although the Ostend Manifesto had less of an impact than planned, the Democratic platforms of Breckenridge and Douglas featured proposals for the annexation of Cuba in the late 1860s, particularly after the Civil War (1861-1865) (ibid.).

The Ten Years' War, often known as the Big or Great War (1868–1878), was the first of Cuba's three independence battles against Spain (Polkas, 2010). Cuban independence was not achieved during this conflict. The trade between the United States and Cuba was unaffected by the conflict. For example, in 1877, the United States received 83 per cent of Cuba's entire exports, allowing it to maintain tight pricing and production control as a monopolist (Smith, 2005).

During this time, Anthony Trollope, an English traveler, noticed that “The trade of the country is falling into the hands of foreigners; Havana will soon be as American as New Orleans” (QTD in Perez, 2010, p.3). The island was also home to a large number of North Americans. Between 1878 and 1898, American investors tried to take advantage of the Ten Years' Conflict's poor economic conditions to buy estates that they had sought to secure before the war, while others bought properties at cheaper costs (Smith, 2005). Calisto Garcia commanded the Little War (1879–1880), which was just as ineffective as the first. Spain granted Cuba parliamentary representation, abolished slavery in 1886, and promised additional improvements (ibid.).

1.1.3 The United States Entering into a New Imperial Era

A commercial contract between Cuba and the United States was cancelled by Spain in 1894 (Howard, 2001). More taxation and trade restrictions prompted the Cubans to declare independence in 1895, prompting the United States to enter the imperialist era with the purchase of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam. José Martí, a poet, journalist, and revolutionary intellectual speaker inspired the conflict (ibid.). Under the direction of Maximo Gomez, who adopted a “scorched-earth” policy, and Antonio Maceo, he deployed advanced guerrilla tactics (Franklin, 1997). In September 1895, the revolutionary army seized control of the eastern

provinces, established the Republic of Cuba, and dispatched Macao's men to conquer the western regions (Gould, 2001).

Simultaneous to these events, a dispute arose between Great Britain and Venezuela that same year. The disagreement prompted President Grover Cleveland (1893-1897), via his Secretary of Defense, Richard Olney, to use the Monroe Doctrine and warn the British that if they failed to solve their problem with Venezuela, the Americans would intervene (Hansen, 2010). Despite though Olney Proclamation had nothing to do with Cuba, it reaffirmed the United States' interest in all Latin American countries, "The United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition" (QTD in Tucker, 1996, p.446). This implies that the Americans reminded European nations that the US dominance of the American Continent is not simply a theory or a set of words in a paper, but rather a genuine reality. America also confirmed that the United States' directive should be enforced in Latin America and that any intervention in the continent should be limited by this proclamation (ibid.).

During the Cuban Revolution, rebel forces controlled the majority of the country, and the Spanish government replaced Martinez Campos with General Valerian, who became known as the Butcher. Wyler utilized a ruthless reconcentration scheme to destroy the rebels of the rural support they relied on, forcing many Cubans into prisons in towns and cities, where many perished of malnutrition and illness (Lafeber, 1994). The violence of the Spanish government was widely publicized in the United States. In 1897, Spain summoned Wyler and offered the Cubans some autonomy; however, the Cuban authorities declined and continued to demand total independence (ibid.). The US battleship Maine was dispatched to Havana in January 1898 to safeguard American residents and property. The ship was sunk by a large explosion on the night of February 15th, 1898, killing even though the source of the explosive was never identified, the New York Press,

often known as the Yellow Press, blamed Spain, prompting chants of “Remember the Mail to Hell with Spain” (QTD in Lafeber, 1994, p.376) and demands that the United States engage militarily in Cuba.

President William McKinley (1897–1901) sent a war message to Congress on April 11th, 1898, requesting authority to employ military force to end of the war in Cuba (Lafeber, 1994). “The conflict in Cuba must end in the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, and in the name of threatened American interests that give us the right and duty to speak and act,” he said (QTD in Gambone, 2002, p.120).

He requested permission from Congress to secure a complete and final cessation of hostilities between the Spanish authorities and the individuals of Cuba (Gambon, 2002). To prevent severe harm to our people’s commerce, trade, and enterprise, as well as willful disillusion with private property (ibid.).

The amendment was passed by Congress 42 to 35 on April 19th, 1898, and the House of Representatives accepted 31 to 6. On April 20th, 1898, President McKinley approved the series of resolutions, and the menace was issued to Spain. On April 24th, Spain declared war on the United States, which responded on April 25th by declaring war on Spain (Gould, 2001).

Because the Spanish troops were inferior to the American forces, the Spanish-American War, or “splendid little war”, as John Hay dubbed it, was brief. The Spanish navy in Manila Bay, Philippines, was destroyed by the US Navy under the leadership of Captain George Dewey on May 1st, 1898. On July 3th, US forces launched an assault on the Cuban city of Santiago. Theodore Roosevelt and his First Voluntary Cavalry, the “Rough Riders”, became one of the war's great heroes. The war was virtually finished when the Spanish navy was wrecked on July 3th and

Santiago was taken on July 11th. The armistice agreed on August 12th, put a halt to the fighting and called for a peace meeting in Paris by October. On December 10th, 1898, the countries agreed on the Paris Treaty.

Cuba gained freedom, and Spain accepted to repay Cuba's debt, which was believed to be worth \$400 million, although Spain transferred Porto Rico and Guam to the United States (Gould, 2001). Despite its short duration and low cost in comparison to previous battles, the Spanish-American War is significant because it did only end Spain's colonial dominance in the American West, but also established the United States as a world power as a result of history. It is also significant since it served as the foundation for the establishment of the orthodox or traditional understanding of US foreign policy.

1.2 The United States and Cuba from the End of the Spanish-American War to the Cold War

Because officials of the McKinley administration were fearful of new revolutionary regimes in Cuba, the United States began a formal policy of occupation in 1899, following the fall of the Spanish regime in Cuba (Gould, 2001). To combat this fear, American Defense secretary Elisha Root drafted an amendment to the Military Appropriations Act in 1901, which Connecticut Republican Representative Orville H. Platt proposed to the United States Senate (ibid.). It was passed by a vote of 43 to 20 in the United States Senate. Despite it being first rejected by the Cuban Assembly, it was eventually ratified by a vote of 16 to 11 with four abstentions which was inclined in the Cuban Constitution. The first section of the amendment declared that Cuba may not negotiate any accords with any nation that would either "impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba" or allow "any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion" (QTD in Gambone, 2002, p.131). Article II

declared that Cuba must not take on any foreign debt unless the debt could be paid out of regular income. The Third Article guaranteed that the United States would intervene in Cuban affairs if it deemed it essential (ibid.).

1.2.1 The Policy of the United States Regarding the Occupation in 1899

The Platt amendment provided Cuba with a limited right to manage their finances and debt policy, while also allowing the US to engage in Cuban affairs (Howard, 2001). As a result, the Teller Amendment was repealed by the Platt Amendment (ibid.). Following the amendment's approval, the United States ratified a tariff deal that granted preference to Cuban sugar in the US market and protected select US exports in the Cuban market. As a result, sugar production became the mainstay of the Cuban economy, while household demand became increasingly reliant on American suppliers (Smith, 2005).

1.2.2 The Cuban Protest

In and around the United States, the Platt amendment sparked fierce resistance. Anti-imperialists in the United States utilized their arguments to oppose foreign intervention, and many Cubans protested that the United States was only a proxy for the Spanish dictator. The American critics of the Platt Amendment were described by President Theodore Roosevelt (1901–1909) as “unsung traitors liars, slanderers and scandal-mongers” (QTD in Howard, 2001, p.38).

Furthermore, the minister of War Root attempted to distinguish between “interventionism” and “interference” in the island’s internal affairs. He said that the US participation would be limited to protecting Cuba’s government and preserving the island’s independence, new modelling in the country’s internal affairs (Allison, 1969). His attempt to persuade the anti-imperialists, however, proved fruitless. In 1902, the United States. Cuba’s occupation came to an end. In the same year,

the United States signed the Reciprocity Treaty with Cuba, tightening the link between the two nations by decreasing tariffs on Cuban exports to the United States. The Platt Amendment served as a model for similar moves by the United States in other areas of the hemisphere, as well as a foundation for a new policy, the Roosevelt Corollary (Howard,2001)

Despite the saying that "necessity is the mother of invention," President Theodore Roosevelt demonstrated that "necessity is the mother of intervention" with his Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. All that the country desires are to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Chronic wrongdoing, or impotence that results in a general collapse of the ties of civilized society, may require intervention by some civilized nation in America, as elsewhere, and in the Western hemisphere, the United States' adherence to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United Nations to intervene.

The Roosevelt Corollary emphasized the United States' right and obligation to engage in the economic and political affairs of the minor Caribbean and Central American states if they have been unable to their foreign debts, as happened in Venezuela in 1902 (Lafeber, 1994). The Corollary was created to prevent European intervention in the American Continent. President Roosevelt notified Grover Cleveland after the Venezuela Affair. "We have succeeded in getting England and Germany explicitly to recognize the Monroe Doctrine" (QTD in Gambone, 2002, p.115). The Roosevelt Corollary was used by President Theodore Roosevelt to explain the United States' engagement in Cuba from 1906 through 1909. This occurred when the Liberals campaigned against Estrada Palma, Cuba's first president, who attempted to retain power in the 1905-06 elections while being heavily influenced by the United States. The uprising resulted in a second American Civil War. Estrada Palma resigned after the United States Secretary of Defense, William Howard Taft, struggled to identify a solution to the issue. As a result, the US government appointed

Charles Magoon as a temporary governor. Magoon surrendered the administration to the Liberal President, José Miguel Gomez, in January 1909, after a committee of several consultants altered electoral rule even though US authorities claimed the Roosevelt Corollary was advantageous to Latin America, it was due. That is because the Roosevelt Corollary, together with the Monroe Doctrine, were two of the most egregious manifestations of American imperialism in the region, imperialism that would persist into the twentieth century.

The opponents, Michener and Weihenmayer, were enthusiasts who claimed that the Roosevelt Corollary would benefit tiny countries economically. According to them, the Roosevelt Corollary made Latin American investors feel safe because they believed there was no risk of working in the region. Financial stability, according to detractors, would lead to political stability. Roosevelt, for one, refuted the charge that his goal was to gain additional territory, explaining that the United States' goal was to expand its borders.

Many individuals referred to Theodore Roosevelt's Monroe Doctrine Corollary as “Big Stick Diplomacy”, which is a method of leadership or hegemony. The phrase is derived from a West African proverb that says, "Speak slowly and carry a heavy stick, and you will travel far." Roosevelt originally used the phrase on September 2^{ed}, 1901, in a presentation at the Minnesota State Fair wherein he explained his foreign policy strategy. In the Land of the Big Stick, there is the idea of negotiating peacefully while threatening the “big stick” or military forces, which is closely related to the idea of realpolitik, which is a hypothesis that a single state utilizes its army in a coercive manner to oppress another without considering any moral or ideological notions (Liber, 1994).

After Theodore Roosevelt's second presidential term ended in 1909, the United States attempted to expand its interests in South America, including, of course, Cuba. Roosevelt's successor, President William Howard Taft, intended to achieve the same aim as his predecessor, but through different tactics. The new leader and his Secretary of Defense, Philander C. Knox, pursued a foreign policy dubbed "Dollar Diplomacy". They realized that economic power, rather than military power, could be used to dominate Latin American enterprises. President Taft also agreed with Knox that the purpose of diplomacy should have been to foster international stability, which would benefit American business interests. Furthermore, Knox believed that diplomacy was intended to use private finance to advance US interests outside of the country's borders. Diplomacy allowed the United States to gain economically from Cuba as well as other countries. However, it also stopped other various countries from following suit. Dollar diplomacy was obvious in substantial US involvement in Cuba, as it was in Honduras, Nicaragua, Colombia, and Haiti. This occurred under the Gomez administration (1909-1913), which was marked by graft, corruption, mismanagement, financial irresponsibility, and social irresponsibility (Smith, 2005).

1.2.3 Beliefs of Anti-imperialist Movements in the United States

Many anti-imperialist movements in the United States believed that military involvement in Latin American countries bred anger and anti-Americanism in the area. They also believed that the United States' conduct of foreign affairs without regard for Latin American interests was excessively imperialistic. Furthermore, they were opposed to the expenditures that were utilized to raise armies to aid Latin American governments. During the Great Depression, especially, their opposition developed quickly. As a result, military action in the United States was extremely unpopular. In his inauguration address on March 4th, 1933, the new president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, outlined his Good Neighbor Policy, which intended to maintain US presence in Latin

America while remaining peaceful. In the field of world policy. I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor – the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does respect the rights of others” (QTD in Gambone, 2002, p.80).In December 1933, during a convention of American States in Montevideo, Roosevelt's Minister of State, Cordell Hull, reinforced this view when he said: “No country has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another” (QTD in LaFeber,1994, p.376). Roosevelt mentioned the following in the same month: “The definite policy of the United States from now is one opposed to armed intervention” (QTD in Edgar, 1997, p.559-60). The Good Neighbor policy was designed by the Americans to replace military involvement as a way of resolving internal problems in Latin American countries with a new approach. Roosevelt had mixed feelings towards Cuba and the Good Neighbor Policy. On the one hand, when internal conflicts between Gerardo Machado’s administration and the political opposition resulted in a military takeover by Cuban insurgents in 1933, he dispatched 29 warships to the island. On the other hand, when his Cuban counterpart, Ramon Gray, removed the Platt Amendment from the Cuban Law in 1934, he abrogated it.(Lafeber, 1994).

The US certainly has a strong connection with Cuba, which is regarded as one of the most significant and closest countries in the Western Hemisphere to the US. From the Ostend Manifesto (1854) through the Spanish-American War, the Americans tried all they could to gain possession of the island (1898). In the Teller Amendment (1898), they swore not to annex Cuba since they recognized that under the Monroe Doctrine (1823), no foreign force could dare to decolonize the island (Franklin, 1997).

When the Colonial War ended, the Americans asserted their right to participate in the country's internal affairs by the Platt amendment (1901). As a result, they kept control of the island until 1902, when they granted Cubans formal independence. President Theodore Roosevelt

established his Monroe Doctrine Corollary in 1904, which is regarded as a manner of implementing the president's Big Stick Diplomacy. In the Corollary, he said that the United States had the right and responsibility to interfere in Latin American nations when they disobeyed politically, as happened in Cuba between 1906 and 1909. Following Roosevelt, William Howard Taft instituted the Dollar Diplomacy, which aimed to boost American investments in Latin America, particularly Cuba, to achieve economic success.

When Franklin D. Roosevelt took the desk, he instituted a new program known as the Good Neighbor policy. Even though he repealed the Platt amendment in 1934, he had already dispatched the American troops to Cuba a year before. The preceding events are critical to understanding the US response to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis since they demonstrated that the US engagement in the nation was nothing new.

1.3 A Century of Struggle for U.S.-Cuban Relations

On Monday, October 22th, 1962, the basis for war had been laid only seven days after picture specialists determined that U-2 spy aircraft images depicted Soviet-installed nuclear missiles in Cuba. Planes, trains, and trucks bringing thousands of troops and supplies poured into South Florida as President John F. Kennedy planned to reveal the problem to the American people. Virtually all of the emphasis was focused on converting Key West into a military post. Meanwhile, the US Navy and Marine Corps increased their strength and added to the nation's forces at Guantanamo, Cuba. The US military raised its DEFCON (Defense Condition) level from DEFCON 5 to DEFCON 3 during normal peacetime operations (Smith, 2005).

Similarly, the Soviet Union and Cuba raised their powers' alert status. Despite this, they did not publish a broad alarm, perhaps for fear of triggering a US preemptive strike. Officials in

the United States were unaware that atomic warheads for medium-range ballistic missiles had already arrived in Cuba. The Voice of America began planning for eleven southern radio stations to stop usual programming and broadcast Kennedy's speech to Cuba one hour before it was delivered at 19:00 (Franklin, 1997).

1.3.1 The Important failures in US-Cuban Relations

The background of American-Cuban relations was already marked by economic oppression, military aggression, and cultural arrogance on both sides. Probably one of the most significant failures in American-Cuban relations was the ineptness of economic policy and the failure to worry about or understand the Cuban revolution (Franklin, 1997).

Cuba has been acknowledged as a crucial core interest of the US for many years. The question of why the US has been unable to function as a first-class force in the Caribbean requires to be answered objectively. Unlike other Cold War battle zones, Cuba is geographically close, and traditionally, the area has been judged so crucial to the United States' security that a danger to that area has been regarded as a threat to its security. For more than a century, the Monroe Doctrine governed the United States diplomatic relations with the Western Hemisphere. The Kennedy administration was certain that no foreign power should be allowed to expand into the Western Hemisphere; the United States would keep hold of its backyard. At the same time, the US was dedicated to the idea of "non-interference" in other countries domestic affairs.

President Kennedy maintained the idea that keeping Cuba out of Communist orbit was the country's foreign policy goal. If this was the US government's stance, it certainly displayed it unusually. While campaigning for the presidency, Kennedy argued that the failure of US foreign policy in Cuba was due to the absence of awareness and perspective. He continued by saying, "The

story of the transformation of Cuba from a friendly ally to a Communist base is— in large measure—the story of a government in Washington which lacked the imagination and compassion to understand the needs of the Cuban people— which lacked the leadership and vigor to move forward to meet those needs— and which lacked the foresight and vision to see the inevitable result of its failure” (QTD in Edgar, 1997, p.60).

According to Kennedy, the United States' reluctance to provide adequate economic aid to Cuba enraged the people, preparing the path for Cuba's conversion to Communism's first Caribbean base. According to Kennedy,

Conclusion

The Cold War had an influence all over the world and transformed the character of international relations; the world's bipolar system provided the world with a certain level of instability, primarily due to the fear of communism spreading. The nuclear danger was ever-present, and events could have unfolded differently, with terrible consequences. Furthermore, Asia and Europe were cast into the darkness at this time and had to rely on their block's ideological leader for economic and general survival reasons. The most dangerous moments were the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Crisis of 1962 when the risk of a direct military conflict with nuclear weapons was at its peak.



Chapter two

The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War

Introduction

2.1 Cuba in the 1950s and the Cold War

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Conclusion

Introduction

This chapter explains the causes of the Cuban Missile Crisis, a 13-day standoff between the United States and the former Soviet Union on the Caribbean Island. It also looks into the leaders of both sides' poor decision-making and the UN's involvement in resolving the conflict.

2.1 Cuba in the 1950s and the Cold War

As a result of the repressive measures used against the Cuban economy, the Cuban Revolution began in 1956. During Batista's reign, Cuba's per-capita profit was double that of other nations. As a result, the Cuban economy was directly supervised by the US government; the US government held 50% of Cuba's railways, 90% of Cuba's electrical and telephone businesses, and 40% of Cuba's sugar output. Furthermore, the United States had great control over Cuban import quotas, land distribution, and agricultural output. Against the desire of the Cuban people, the US administration began dividing Cuban territories by establishing estates. However, when Batista's regime came to an end, the Cuban economy was the strongest and had the highest per capita income, thanks to major US investments in the region. However, income was unequally distributed, and the majority of citizens were uneducated and destitute. The Cuban healthcare system was challenging, as death rates were high due to a lack of health facilities in areas where impoverished people lived (Perkins, 1993).

Fidel Castro led a revolution against the US's economic and political oppression and interference in Cuba, as well as the dictatorship of its leader, Batista. Fidel Castro led the Cuban Revolution alongside his brother Raul and his friend Ernesto Chee Guevara. The Cuban Revolution used guerrilla warfare methods to combat Batista's army on Mt. Sierra Maestra. From 1956 through 1959, he had the overwhelming support of the inhabitants. Fortunately, guerrilla warfare proved effective. When Fidel Castro and his comrades ousted Batista's government in 1959, they were victorious (Gambone, 2002).

2.1.1 The Two Superpowers the USA and the USSR at the End of World War II

Following the end of World War II in 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the world's only two superpowers. During the war, they were allies in combat against the Axis powers, but this was no longer the case when the conflict ended. This was particularly evident at the 1945 Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, where they could not agree on Germany's and Eastern Europe's future growth. The Cold War is the name given to the post-World War II confrontation between the two countries. Many Americans believed that the Soviet Union's desire to spread throughout the globe, which began with the formation of the Eastern Bloc, was a threat to their country's security. Containment was a policy that defined the Cold War. Its purpose was to halt the Soviet Union's expansion. The US State Department asked George F. Kennan, a US diplomat and historian, in the US Embassy in Moscow in February 1946 why the Russians opposed the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. He responded on February 22th, 1946, with a comprehensive analysis of Russian policy known as the Long Telegram. According to him, unlike Hitlerism Germany, Soviet authority is neither schematic nor adventurist. It avoids taking excessive risks. It is impervious to the logic of reason

and extremely sensitive to force logic. As a result, it may readily retire — and does so most of the time when heavy resistance is encountered (Gambone, 2002).

Kennan provided a memo to Defense Secretary James Forrestal in January 1947 titled, “the sources of Soviet Conduct”(Howard, 2001). The term “containment” is borrowed from this report “In these circumstances, it is clear that the main element of any U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long – term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian tendencies” (QTD in Gambone, 2002, p. 306). Under the alias “X”, Forrestal gave authorization for the paper to be published in the journal *Foreign Affairs*. In 1962, 90 miles off the Florida coast, on the island of Cuba, the Cold War doctrine of containment was put to the test.

To resist Communism, the US began assisting European countries that were deemed to be the most vulnerable to the threat of Communism. The Truman Doctrine¹ (March 12, 1947) and the Marshall Plan² (June 5, 1947) were designed to achieve this goal in the 1950s, Americans' perceptions of Latin Americans were similar to those of their forefathers. They realized that their stupidity and inefficiency were to blame for the region's economic woes.

2.1.2 The Cuban Government from 1952 to 1959

From 1952 to 1959, Cuba was governed by Fulgencio Batista, whose rise ushered in a period of cooperation between the Cuban and American governments (Howard, 2001). Batista's second tenure began with a planned military coup in Florida (ibid.). President Harry Truman of the United States swiftly recognized Batista's return to power and aided him militarily and economically (Blight, 1999). Because of an expansion of American firms under his reign, the United States dominated practically all of Cuba's economy. This occurred during a period of pervasive corruption, particularly in Havana, which had become a favorite hideaway for

American organized crime figures (Howard, 2001). During Batista's second tenure as president, Arthur Gardner, United States Ambassador to Cuba, later described the relationship between the US and Batista as “always leaning toward the US” (ibid.).

Nevertheless, the majority of the Cubans suffered from poverty (especially in the countryside). The situation was very catastrophic. There was a terrible lack of public services and unemployment. The United States and other foreign investors controlled the economy. They controlled around 75% of the agricultural land, 90% of the basic services, and 40% of the sugar production. Batista's total control over the political system exacerbated the situation (Howard, 2001). Batista's downfall was caused by more than just weak economic conditions. Fidel Castro's 26th of July Movement, the Federation of University Students, and other organizations resisted the president's government. Fidel Castro ran for Congress in the 1952 elections, but President Carlos Prío Socarras' government was overthrown, and the polls were cancelled. Castro tried several times to overthrow Batista's new government, but he was unsuccessful. Fidel Castro was a revolutionary. As a result, in 1953, he began to form a rebel force.

He led roughly 160 men in a suicidal attack on the Moncada military barracks in Santiago, Cuba on July 26th, the same year, in an attempt to stir a popular insurrection. Men were killed in the attack, and Castro was apprehended. He was condemned to 15 years in prison by the government. Castro and his brother Raul were released as a result of the political amnesty of 1955. Their release encouraged them to continue their battle against the Batista administration in Mexico, where Castro recruited Cuban exiles into the 26th of July Movement, a revolutionary organization. Castro and an armed expedition of 81 men arrived on the coast of Oriented province in Cuba on December 2nd, 1956, from the yacht Granma. Except for Castro, Raul, Argentine revolutionary Ernesto Che Guevara, and nine other men who headed to the Sierra

Maestra in southwestern Orient province to continue their guerrilla battle against Batista's soldiers, they were all dead or arrested. They drew hundreds of Cuban volunteers over the next two years, won several engagements against Batista's depleted armed forces, and moved westward. At the same time, urban strikes and attacks were organized by communist groups and extreme members of the Federation of University Students. Manuel Urrutia Leo, the incoming Cuban president, has urged the US to halt its weaponry sales to Batista. The United States blocked the sale of arms to Batista's regime in March 1958. Furthermore, several Cuban military commanders sympathized with or joined the uprising. Batista departed the nation on January 1st, 1959 (Smith, 2005). About 800 Castro supporters marched in Havana, thrilled to have defeated 30.000 Batista forces (ibid.).

2.2 The Castro Regime and the United States

Castro was educated in Santiago de Cuba and Havana and engaged in revolutionary movements throughout Latin America while still a student. In 1950, he graduated from the University of Havana with a law degree and began practicing law. He ran for the Cuban People's Party in 1952, but Batista's coup prevented him from running, and Castro quickly found another way to challenge the regime. On July 26th, 1953, he led a group of around 160 men in a desperate and failed attack on a Santiago army barracks. He believed the attempt would spark a broad insurrection against Batista, but most of the assailants were slain, and Castro and his brother Raul were caught and imprisoned. On December 2^{ed}, 1956, Castro arrived in eastern Cuba with a squad of 81 men on board the yacht Granma, but the majority of the squad was soon slain or captured. Among the twelve men who escaped were the Castro brothers and Ernesto Che Guevara. In remembrance of the 1953^s attack, this small group started a guerilla campaign

against Batista in the Sierra Maestra mountains, designating themselves the 26th of July Movement (Backewell, 2000).

Cuba has been in a state of near civil conflict since Castro's arrival. On March 13th, 1957, the Revolutionary Directorate (Directory Revolutionaries), a mostly student-led insurgency, launched a brutal and ultimately unsuccessful attack on Havana's presidential palace. The violence claimed the lives of dozens of people. Throughout Santiago de Cuba and central Cuba, there were severe disruptions. Trade unions sought to incite a national strike, but support among labor leaders dwindled after the government declared that anybody who participated in the strike would be denied re-employment elsewhere. Batista abolished constitutional rights such as freedom of assembly and expression on August 1st, 1957 (Blight, 1990).

As the unrest began to have a serious impact on the Cuban economy, the revolution continued into 1958 with raids and massive property destruction. Sugar mills and plantations were devastated, Havana was attacked, and the mining industry was impacted by rebel operations in the Oriented province. In reaction to the unrest, the United States imposed a weapons embargo on Cuba in mid-March, halting the delivery of around 2,000 Garand rifles to the Cuban government. Batista utilized the unrest to force a postponement of the presidential election in June 1958, which was rescheduled for November 3th to March 26th. In response, Communist parties led by Juan Maranello declared a nationwide strike for April 9. Even though the walkout did not occur, communists (Gould, 2001).

2.2.1 The New Cuban Government

Following the 1959's Cuban Revolution, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961) acknowledged the new Cuban government, but relations between the two countries

swiftly deteriorated. Within days, United States Ambassador to Cuba Earl T. Smith said, “Until Castro, the United States was so overwhelmingly influential in Cuba that the American Ambassador was the second most important man, sometimes even more important than the Cuban president”(QTD in Kellner, 1989, p. 66), Philip Bonsall was appointed in his place after he resigned. The United States government was enraged by Cuba's agrarian reforms, particularly the nationalizations of US-owned companies. Castro and a party of representatives visited the United States as guests of the Press Club from April 15th to April 26th, 1959. He met with Vice President Richard Nixon during his tour and discussed his reform ideas for Cuba. Following the conference, the US began gradually imposing commercial restrictions on the island. Ambassador Bonsall met with Cuban Premier Fidel Castro on September 4th, 1959, to express grave concern about the nationalizations of American private industries (Smith, 2005).

Cuba has resurfaced as a key issue not only in American foreign policy but also in American political discussion, as it has in the past. Consider the presidential election of 1960, when the Republican nominee, Richard Nixon, faced off against the Democratic contender, John F. Kennedy. Both candidates competed in warning the American public about the dangers posed by the new Cuban government. Kennedy stated, “In 1952 the Republicans ran on a program of rolling back the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe, and added. Today the Iron Curtain is 90 miles off the coast of the United States”. (QTD in Smith, 2005, p.127). He also chastised the Republicans for enabling such a thing to happen “communist satellite” at “our very doorstep”, and he declared that the Americans would not be “pushed around any longer” (QTD in Howard, 2001, p.328). Nixon condemned Kennedy’s “defeatist talk” and was confident that

“Cuba is not lost”(QTD in Smith, 2005, p.180). The discussion between the two candidates revealed that the American public is undecided about Fidel Castro.

Trade limitations on Cuba have expanded as a result of continued state interference and nationalization. Castro's trade agreement with Soviet Deputy Premier Anastasi Mikoyan in February 1960 exacerbated the lack of trust. Castro nationalized American oil plants because they refused to process Soviet fuel after four months. Eisenhower stopped buying Cuban sugar and refused to supply the island with oil, badly impacting the country's economy. Castro was enraged by Eisenhower's actions and protested about them. “The repeated threats, harassments, intrigues, reprisals, and aggressive acts” of the United States (QTD in sober, 1996, p.144). Tensions rose further in March 1960 when the French Ship La Coober exploded in Havana harbor, killing more than 75 people. Fidel Castro accused the US and connected the occurrence to the one that occurred in Maine. President Eisenhower authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to recruit, train, and equip Cuban refugees as a guerrilla army to destroy Castro in the same month. During Kennedy's administration, the preparations persisted and culminated in the Bay of Pigs invasion.

2.2.2 The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)

Even though Arkansas Senator William Fulbright, a powerful chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, told Kennedy that the Castro dictatorship was ineffective, “a thorn in the flesh, and not a dagger in the heart “(QTD in Howard, 2001, p.328) Despite even though dictatorship was not nearly as deadly as the Americans believed, the new administration continued to see the new regime as a direct threat to US security. The C.I.A. informed Kennedy after he became president. About the invasion plans, and was also assured that, as in Guatemala in 1954, the attack would end in a huge victory for the US. President Kennedy was also aware

that the invasion took place in the Bay of Pigs, which is located on the island's southwest side, and that the date was April 17th, 1961.

Kennedy initially approved the invasion plan merely as a contingency operation, meaning it might be scrapped at any time. He commissioned Arthur Schlesinger, an American historian, social critic, and former John F. Kennedy aide, to write a White Paper outlining the case for US action in Cuba. At the same time, the State Department released a brochure titled “Cuba” in which it was claimed that Castro had failed to implement the reforms he had pledged. Castro’s rule was also referred to in the pamphlet as “a fateful challenge to the inter-American system” (QTD in Howard, 2001, p.329). In achieving the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the Kennedy administration did not try to negotiate with Castro and did not engage Congress. The invasion plan was supposed to be kept a secret, however that did not happen.

When Castro learned of the invasion, he kept effective personal control over the army and dispatched all available troops, tanks, and planes to the invasion zone. Furthermore, his demand for vigorous resistance to the invaders included Cuban nationalism and anti-Americanism rather than Communist philosophy, he explained, “Forward Cubans! Answer with steel and with fire the barbarians who despise us and want to make us return to slavery “(QTD in Smith, 2005, p.129). Guevara went on to say, “all the Cuban people must become a guerrilla army, every Cuban must learn to handle and if necessary, use firearms in defense our country” (QTD in Kellner, 1989, p.112).

Philip Bonsall, the US Ambassador to Cuba, attempted to persuade Americans that Castro’s rule turned communist as a result of US policy toward Cuba. Castro’s goal, according to him, is to “was really and exclusively nationalistic; it became oriented toward dependence on the Soviet Union only when the United States, QTD in Kellner, 1989, p.112).

2.2.3 The End of the Cuban Invasion

On April 19th 1961, the invasion came to a conclusion when the remaining holdout and over 1100 soldiers were taken. Despite accepting full responsibility for the invasion's failure incompetents to the rest (QTD in Howard, 2001, p.329). Many people denounced the invasion like the Latin Americans and the U.N. Ambassador Adele Stevenson, who did not know about the attack and who denied, two days before, the rumors of the invasion (Howard, 2001).

If the invasion's failure humiliated President Kennedy, it propelled Castro forward. It was viewed by the latter as a major success for the Cuban Revolution versus American imperialism. The failure of "Operation Zapata", "will not abandon the Cuban people" (QTD in Smith, 2005, p.130), as it was dubbed, solidified Cuba's ties with the Soviet Union. Nikita Khrushchev, "the Soviet leader, swore to back Castro and announced that the Soviet Union, Leninist and will be one until the day I die" (QTD in Howard, 2001, p.330). He allied Cuba with the communist countries. As a result, the Kennedy administration sought to politically and economically isolate Castro. Dean Rusk, Kennedy's Secretary of State, contacted the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) 3 and issued a warning, "It has supplied communism with a bridgehead in the Americas" (QTD in Smith, 2005, p.131). After considerable hesitation, Latin American countries agreed in January 1962 to adopt American plans to expel Cuba from the O.A.S., but not to penalize it economically.

After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, a special committee was formed to explore ways to depose Castro. The Kennedy administration aimed to eradicate communism through this group, particularly in Cuba, which was the closest communist country to the United States. The American government saw that Castro's regime functioned as a model for other communist movements in the Americas (Grow, 2008).

Furthermore, they considered that the failure of the government's socialist economic policies, as well as the persecution of the Cuban people, created an environment conducive to a resistance effort. As a result, the US devised a covert strategy to incite anti-regime sentiment. The project's main goal, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Department of Defense, was to provide an acceptable rationale for military involvement in Cuba. They requested that the Secretary of Defense Delegate project management to them, but Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy maintained effective authority. The Cuban Project (also known as Operation Mongoose or the Special Group) was clandestine propaganda, psychological warfare, and sabotage campaign against Cuba aimed at deposing communists. Edward Lansdale of the Defense Department and William King Harvey of the Central Intelligence Agency led the charge.

CIA, US army and military forces, Department of Commerce, Immigration, Treasury, and God know who else — everyone was in Mongoose, according to Samuel Halpern, a C.I.A. co-organizer. “It was a government-wide operation run out of Bobby Kennedy’s office with Ed Lansdale as the mastermind” (QTD in Blight and Kornbluth, 1999, p.125). This suggests that everyone was involved in Operation Mongoose in some way.

More than 30 plans were included in the Cuban Project. The employment of American Green Berets, the destruction of Cuban sugar plantations, and assassination attempts was among them. The poisoning of a box of Castro’s favorite cigars with botulinum toxin and the planting of explosive seashells in his favorite diving spots are two examples of the latter. The United States Senate’s Church Committee said in 1975 that it had confirmed at least eight separate C.I.A. plots to assassinate Castro, however, Fabian Escalante, who was in charge of Castro’s protection, claimed that there were 638 unique C.I.A. attempts (Keller, 1989).

Operation Northwood was developed to make the United States publicly support the

military intervention against the Cuban regime. The latter was a 1962 proposal endorsed by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara after being signed by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. False flag operations were used to justify intervention in Cuba. Artificial attacks on Cuban exiles and US military objectives were part of the program. Although the Cuban Project was terminated on October 30th, 1962, three of the ten sabotage teams had already been dispatched to Cuba. The Cuban Project, like the Bay of Pigs invasion, is seen as an American policy failure in Cuba. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 brought the deteriorating relationship between the US and Cuba to a head. The conflict between the United States and Cuba began during Eisenhower's presidency, but it worsened after Kennedy took office, as Paterson indicated “Kennedy inherited the Cuban problem – and he made it worse”.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and Cuba on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and Cuba on the other. By doing so, he would also react to the United States' placement of Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles in April 1962 in Turkey (Franklin, 1997). Makarova was the Russian term for the Soviet Union's meticulous denial and deceit from the start. The entire process of transporting and deploying the missiles was carried out in secret.

Only a few people were informed of the details. Even the troops who were preparing for the mission were given misleading information; they were ordered to dress in winter-appropriate clothing. The operation's Soviet code name was ANADYR, which was also the name of a river that flowed into the Bering Sea and the city of Chukotka. All this was done to keep the program secret from both internal and external audiences (Hansen, 2010).

In early 1962, a delegation of Soviet military experts in missile construction travelled to Havana with an agricultural delegation. They met with Fidel Castro because the Cuban officials

expected the United States to attack Cuba, especially after the Bay of Pigs invasion and Operation Mongoose, and they enthusiastically agreed to the installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev, like Castro, believed that a US invasion of Cuba was imminent. They believed that losing Cuba would be detrimental to the communist movement, particularly in Latin America. He declared his intention to confront the Americans “with more than words...the logical answer was missiles” (QTD in Welds, 1999, p.29).

Confident person after he failed in the Bay of Pigs invasion. On September 7th, Dobrygin confirmed to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson that the U.S.S.R. was supplying only defensive weapons to Cuba. The first R-12 missiles were launched on September 8th night, followed by a second on September 16th. The Soviet Union was constructing nine sites: six for R-12 medium-range missiles with a range of 2.000 kilometers and three for R-14 intermediate-range ballistic missiles with a range of 4.500 kilometers. On September 11th, the United States issued a public warning that an attack on Cuba or Soviet ships transporting supplies to the island would result in war (QTD in Franklin, 1997, p.166).

On the 7th of October, Cuban President Osvaldo Porticos addressed the United Nations General Assembly “If we are attacked, we will defend ourselves. I repeat, we have sufficient means with which to defend ourselves, we have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons, which we would have preferred not to acquire, and which we do not wish to employ” (QTD in Howard, 2001, p.325). Even though the Americans were aware of the weapons in Cuba, no U-2 flights were undertaken over the island between September 5th and October 14th. The government agreed on October 12th to hand over the Cuban U-2 reconnaissance missions to the Air Force.

They reasoned that involving Air Force flights would be less complicated than involving C.I.A. flights. The reconnaissance missions were re-authorized on October 8th, but the

preparations were cancelled due to inclement weather. On October 14th, a U-2 flight piloted by Major Richard Heyse snapped 928 images of the missiles in six minutes, providing the first photographic confirmation of the weapons. The Cuban Missile Crisis began on October 16th, 1962, when President John F. Kennedy and his aides learned of the U-2 reconnaissance images of missile locations in Cuba taken two days before (Blight, 1990). Kennedy convened the Executive Committee (Ex Com) from October 16th to 22th, which met every day to deliberate on how to deal with the crisis. The committee was pressed for time to decide before the missiles went live. The Ex Com discussed the impact on the political and military-strategic balance of power.

According to Ball, the “one question in dispute was whether the emplacement of the missiles would in any way change the power balance”. The Joint Chiefs of Staff thought the missiles would significantly alter the military balance, but Defense Secretary Robert McNamara disagreed (Ornstein, 1989). He was certain the missiles would have little impact on the strategic balance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff thought the missiles would significantly alter the military balance, but Defense Secretary Robert McNamara disagreed. He was certain the missiles would have little impact on the strategic balance.

He concluded that if the Soviets had 340; this would not change the strategic balance to a great extent (Ornstein, 1989). In 1990, he repeated that “it made no difference. “The military balance wasn’t changed. I didn’t believe it then, and I don’t believe it now.” (QTD in Blight, 1999, p.85). The EXCOMM, on the other hand, concurred that the missiles would disrupt the political equilibrium. First, before the crisis, Kennedy had told the American people that, “if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive actions against the United States...the United States would act” (Blight, 1999). Second, allowing the Soviet Union to compensate for the

strategic imbalance by stationing missiles in Cuba would harm US credibility in the eyes of the American people and allies. Following the crisis, Kennedy stated: “it would have politically changed the balance of power. It would have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality” (ibid.).

The issue split the Executive Committee into two camps: hawks and doves. The former desired an air strike on the missile installations, as well as a possible invasion, while the latter desired a naval blockade that would prohibit ships from entering or leaving Cuba (Ornstein, 1989). The naval blockade, according to Robert McNamara, was a robust but limited military effort that left the US in command. A blockade is an act of war under international law.

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Anderson, wrote a position paper that helped Kennedy distinguish between a quarantine of offensive weapons and a blockade of all materials, demonstrating that a traditional blockade was not the original goal. Because the action would take place on international seas, President Kennedy sought clearance from the Organization of American States (O.A.S.), for military action under the Rio Treaty's hemispheric defense provisions⁴. Separate working groups were constituted by the EXCOMM on October 19th to investigate the air strike and blockade alternatives. The EXCOMM had backed the blockade option by the afternoon (Ornstein, 1989).

President John F. Kennedy formed the EXCOMM on October 22th, 1963, at 3:00 p.m., with National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 196 (Hansen, 2010). At 5:00 p.m., he met with members of Congress who were opposed to the blockade and demanded immediate action (Hansen, 2010). Ambassador Kohler notified Chairman Khrushchev about the blockade and Kennedy's national address in Moscow. The American delegates met with Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan, West German Chancellor

Konrad Adenauer, and French President Charles de Gaulle before the speech to brief them on US intelligence and their suggested response. They were all in favor of the US position (ibid.). At 7:00 p.m., President John F. Kennedy gave a broadcast address in which he reported the missiles “It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union”.

He also discussed the administration’s strategy, “To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine of all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated.” Kennedy’s speech was not well received in the United Kingdom. On October 23th, the British press cast doubt on the presence of Soviet bases in Cuba, speculating that Kennedy did so to ensure his reelection (Hansen, 2010).

A total of 20 ships were on their way to Cuba (Hansen, 2010). The first Russian oil ship arrived at the naval quarantine on October 24th and was authorized to enter Cuba (ibid.). The same could not be said for the other missile-carrying ships. The Chinese People Daily reported on the same day that 650,000,000 Chinese men and women backed the Cuban people (Liber, 1994). Newspapers in Germany backed the US response and expressed concern about Soviet retribution in Berlin (ibid.). In France, the legitimacy of the CIA shot graphic proof was questioned in an editorial in *Le Monde* (Gould, 2001). After a disagreement with Soviet U.N. Ambassador Zoran about whether the missile sites existed or not, Adlai Stevenson showed images to the United Nations Security Council on October 25th (ibid.).

On October 26th, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a telegraph proposing that the missiles be dismantled if Kennedy agreed to end the blockade and vow not to invade Cuba (Hansen, 2010). On the same day, Castro sent Khrushchev a letter in which he attempted to persuade him that the

US would invade Cuba and that he should respond by launching a nuclear strike against the US (ibid.). Before Kennedy could respond, Khrushchev wrote another letter on October 27th (). He also suggested that Kennedy eliminate American missile facilities in Turkey (Latané, 2000). A U2 plane crashed in Cuba on the same day. Kennedy seemed unconcerned with the incident, replying that he agreed to the provisions of the first letter as well as the terms of the second letter, but only in secret (Gambone, 2002). Khrushchev agreed on October 28th (ibid.).

The situation came to an end as a result of this. Kennedy lifted the blockade on November 20th, 1962, and the Jupiter missiles were evacuated from Turkey on April 25th, 1963 (Smith, 2005). They signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963 (ibid.). The Cuban Missile Crisis shifted the United States and Soviet Union's foreign policies from hostility to cohabitation. In an address at American University, Kennedy stated, "We can seek a relaxation of tensions without relaxing our guard we labor on- not toward a strategy of annihilation, but a strategy of peace." (QTD in White, 1997, p.150). The killing of John F. Kennedy on November 22th, 1963, added a dramatic dimension to the Cuban Missile Crisis, The United States, Cuba, and the Soviet Union should all be held responsible (Gambone, 2002).

As part of its Containment policy, the United States attempted to restrict communism in Cuba. The United States had the right under the Monroe Doctrine to do so to protect itself from the Soviet Union's danger, particularly in Cuba (Smith,2005), a Latin American republic. However, without considering the Monroe Doctrine, the US had no right to intervene in Cuba, which was an autonomous entity with the ability to negotiate any arrangement with any country. The Cubans agreed to the missiles being installed by the Soviet Union because they wanted to defend themselves against US aggression. Cuba was diplomatically isolated by the United States, which expelled it from the Organization of American States, imposed an economic blockade,

aided anti-Castro rebels in the Bay of Pigs invasion, and attempted to assassinate Castro in Operation Mongoose (ibid.). In response to the United States' deployment of missiles in Turkey, the Soviet Union had the authority to deploy missiles in Cuba (Grow, 2008).

The Cuban Missile Crisis did not occur in a political vacuum rather, it occurred at a moment when the US had turned against Cuba and the Soviet Union. Following 1945, the Cold War began, bringing with it the Containment Doctrine, which the United States used to defend itself against the Soviet Union

2.3 Bay of Pigs Invasion

The Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 was a failed CIA operation initiated during the Kennedy administration to depose Cuban leader Fidel Castro (1926-2016) (Lafeber, 1994). On January 1st, 1959, a young Cuban nationalist called Fidel Castro led his guerilla force into Havana and deposed the country's American-backed ruler, General Fulgencio Batista (1901-1973). The US State Department and the CIA sought to depose Castro over the following two years. Finally, on April 17th, 1961, the CIA launched what its officials hoped would be the last strike: a full-scale invasion of Cuba by 1,400 American-trained Cubans who had left their homes after Castro gained power. However, the invasion did not proceed as planned: Castro's army vastly outnumbered the invaders.

Many Cubans cheered Fidel Castro's toppling of despotic President Fulgencio Batista in 1959, but the new order on the island roughly 100 miles from the US-made American authorities concerned. Batista was a corrupt and cruel tyrant, yet he was seen as pro-American and an ally of American businesses. Almost half of Cuba's sugar plantations and the bulk of its cattle ranches, mines, and utilities were controlled by American firms and affluent individuals at the time. Batista did little to limit their activities. He was also unwaveringly anticommunist. Castro,

on the other hand, was critical of the American approach to their business and interests in Cuba. He thought it was time for Cubans to take more control of their country.

Castro made attempts to diminish American influence on the island almost immediately after taking control. He nationalized American-dominated industries including sugar and mining, implemented land reform plans, and urged other Latin American nations to exercise greater autonomy. In response, President Eisenhower directed the CIA to recruit 1,400 Cuban exiles living in Miami and begin preparing them to topple Castro in early 1960.

Castro established diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union in May 1960, and the US retaliated by blocking the shipment of Cuban sugar. To save the Cuban economy from collapsing (sugar exports to the US accounted for 80% of overall exports), the USSR promised to buy the sugar. In January 1961, the United States broke diplomatic relations with Cuba and increased its preparations for an attack. Some State Department and other advisors to John F. Kennedy, the new American president, maintained that Castro posed no real threat to America, but the new president believed that masterminding Castro's removal would demonstrate to Russia, China, and skeptical Americans that he was serious about winning the Cold War.

Kennedy inherited Eisenhower's CIA attempt to train and equip a guerilla force of Cuban exiles, but he questioned the plan's wisdom. The last thing he wanted was "direct, overt" American military participation in Cuba, he declared because the Soviets would surely perceive it as an act of war and would counterattack. However, CIA operatives persuaded him that they could keep the US role in the invasion hidden and that if all went as planned, the operation would provoke an anti-Castro insurrection on the island.

2.3.1 The Plan for the Bay of Pigs

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exiles, but he questioned the plan's wisdom. The last thing he wanted was "direct, overt" American military participation in Cuba, he declared because the Soviets would surely perceive it as an act of war and would counterattack. However, CIA operatives persuaded him that they could keep the US role in the invasion hidden and that if all went as planned, the operation would provoke an anti-Castro insurrection on the island.

2.3.2 The Bay of Pigs a Failure

The primary step of the strategy was to eliminate Castro's little air force, rendering his forces incapable of repelling the invaders. On April 15th, 1961, a squadron of American B-26 bombers painted to look like stolen Cuban planes took off from Nicaragua and attacked Cuban airfields. However, it was later revealed that Castro and his aides were aware of the raid and had relocated his jets out of harm's path. Frustrated, Kennedy began to think that the CIA's claimed the secretive and effective strategy was, in fact, too huge to be clandestine and too little to be successful (Hansen, 2010).

But it was too late to put the brakes on. On April 17th, the Cuban exile brigade launched its assault from the isolated Bay of Pigs on the island's southern shore. The invasion was a fiasco almost immediately. The CIA had hoped to keep the operation a secret for as long as possible, but a radio station on the beach (which the agency's reconnaissance team had missed) aired every detail of the operation to listeners throughout Cuba. Some of the exiles' ships were sunk as they approached land due to unexpected coral hazards. The backup paratroopers landed in the wrong location. After less than a day of action, Castro's army had cornered the attackers on the shore, and the exiles surrendered (Grow, 2008).

Many historians think that the CIA and the Cuban exile brigade hoped that President John F. Kennedy would eventually enable the American military to intervene in Cuba on their behalf.

The president, on the other hand, was adamant: as much as he did not want to cede Cuba to the communists, he would not initiate a conflict that may lead to World War III. His efforts to destabilize Castro never waned—in November 1961, the authorized Operation Mongoose, an espionage and sabotage campaign—but he never went so far as to spark a full-fledged war. The Cuban missile crisis heightened American-Cuban-Soviet tensions even further in 1962 (Howard, 2001).

Conclusion

Americans in the 1950s viewed Latin American countries, especially Cuba, as primitive and inferior to them, this is a perspective that is not new for a country whose people have believed in their superiority throughout history. Cuba experienced several internal challenges during the 1950s, and Fidel Castro's dictatorship began after the decade. The relationship between the US and Cuba began to deteriorate after this had occurred. The Americans tried everything they could to get rid of Castro, including the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, the Cuban Project in 1962, and most importantly, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Even though the deployment of the Containment policy by the United States in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was seen as either defensive or offensive, it was both defensive and offensive.



Chapter Three

The Impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis on the Cuban American Relations

Introduction

3.1 The Cuban Missile Crisis' Consequences

3.1.1 The Removal of the Missiles Negotiations between Kennedy and Khrushchev

3.1.2 Creating a Line of Communication between Moscow and Washington

3.2 The United States and the Soviet Union Treaties

3.2.1 Hot Line Negotiations (1963)

3.2.2 The Agreement on a Partial Test Temporary suspension (1963)

3.3 The Role of the CIA

Conclusion

Introduction

The current chapter examines the consequences of the Cuban Missile Crisis following the deal struck between the two superpowers, the United States and the former Soviet Union, particularly through the United Nations' intervention and the vital role it played during the crisis. It also demonstrates how the United States and the former Soviet Union worked out a solution to end the crisis by agreeing to withdraw missiles and signing a slew of treaties.

3.1 The Cuban Missile Crisis's Consequences

Amid the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev, Kennedy, and Castro attempted to achieve a positive outcome (Perkins, 1993). During the Cold War, each leader portrayed himself as triumphant. However, many stories and judgments may have been skewed to demonstrate control and dominance. In reality, it had both beneficial and bad consequences on the reputations of both leaders and countries. The Cuban Missile Crisis exacerbated the deterioration of ties between the two superpowers, perhaps leading to nuclear war (ibid.). "The crisis between the Soviet Union and The United States, or the Cuban crisis, ended with tremendous relief from both presidents and governments, realizing that they had been dangerously near to starting a nuclear war (Grow, 2008).

Furthermore, relations between Khrushchev and Kennedy, or between the United States and the Soviets in general, improved (Perkins, 1993). However, this may only be true when contrasted with the level of stress experienced on those days. During this period, their initial conflicts were not addressed or resolved. A major subject on which the two nations agreed was the use of nuclear weapons. To prevent such harmful incidents, a hotline was established. Furthermore, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 placed restrictions on the employment of nuclear weapons. As a result, whenever it turned to nuclear weapons (Gambone, 2002), they were able to reach a peaceful settlement (ibid.). The US triumph was based on information recorded among leaders and

information provided to the public, according to US President J. F. Kennedy (Smith, 2005). After the Cuban Missile Issue, a large portion of the American people believed that J. F. Kennedy handled the crisis properly (ibid.). When the case of the Jupiter missiles became public, however, people began to doubt Kennedy's competence, portraying him as a weak leader (Mitchel, 1999). The withdrawal of America's missiles from Turkey helped the Soviets feel triumphant, noted in this context as a result, the United States began to exhibit dread of the Soviet Union (ibid.). On Khrushchev's part, it was remarked that his decisions were unexpected and that he acted quickly, ignoring the repercussions, particularly the most significant one, nuclear war. Patterson argued that Khrushchev's actions were influenced by both his international and domestic policies (Lafeber, 1994).

Because his policies were seen as a danger to national security, Khrushchev resigned from the administration (Smith, 2005). Khrushchev's resignation was a daring measure, especially at the moment, in preparation for the issues that would come during that period. The politburo had opted to tolerate his last action with the Cuban Missile Crisis, which used to be a highly risky decision. Furthermore, Khrushchev's crisis actions were exceptionally well-coordinated to put pressure on the United States administration. He saw the Jupiter Missiles in Turkey as a major threat, therefore stationing missiles alongside the United States was a well-thought-out strategic response (ibid.). Even though the conflict between the two superpowers was unexpected, they achieved superior achievements. The removal of the Jupiter Missiles from Turkey was a significant step toward victory (Ornstein, 1999). For Castro, the goal was to feel more secure (ibid.).

3.1.1 The Removal of the Missiles Negotiations between Kennedy and Khrushchev

United States President, J. F. Kennedy, was aware of the Soviets' threats and sought to restrain them (Polkas, 2010). In 1962, he held press conferences in which he stated that the United

States would not accept any further military actions from the Soviet bloc and that the United States would do everything possible to ensure its national security (ibid.). Khrushchev wanted to change the balance of power to gain more authority in the international arena, but he also tried to deny United States policy over time (Allison, 1969), stated that the power balance had unquestionably shifted in favor of the United States. The Soviets didn't stand a chance with their limited military capabilities, which Khrushchev became well conscious of (ibid.).

In addition, if President Kennedy refused to react to Soviet missiles launched from Cuba, Khrushchev would have far more leeway to move against Berlin or threaten America in other fields of global competition. Had Kennedy accepted the weapons in Cuba, he would have shifted the power between the western and eastern worlds he continued. As a result, the United States was aware of the gravity of the threat (Polkas, 2010). In this approach, Kennedy addressed the world on television about the situation, emphasizing that the USSR's missiles along the coastline will not be permitted and that mediation in Cuba would be required if fundamental issues were to be resolved (ibid.). After several days of fighting, the crisis came to an end when both sides reached an agreement. The United States promised not to attack Cuba and therefore would later remove the Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey under a secret arrangement with the Soviets (Edgar, 1997). As a result, Khrushchev would dismantle all missiles stationed in Cuba (ibid.).

On October 28th, 1962, Khrushchev conducted a radio broadcast from Moscow announcing that, in addition to removing all armaments from the island, he would stop developing missile sites (Gambone, 2002). President Kennedy, on the other hand, quickly responded, saying that the United States would respect Cuba's sovereignty and would not intervene in its internal affairs, and would also detain any group or individuals attempting to attack the island, whether from US territory or a neighboring country (Howard, 2001). On the other side, Khrushchev was

willing to take a risk because he knew that the outcome of his actions and decisions, as well as Kennedy's, could lead to a destructive nuclear war between the two superpowers (ibid.). Both Kennedy and Khrushchev eventually desired a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Even though some of Kennedy's decisions prompted Khrushchev to station missiles in Cuba to ensure Soviet presence in the region, his decision to do so was not questioned as a security precaution (Gould, 2001).

Without allowing anybody else to dominate the conversation or make recommendations, President Kennedy made informed and cautious judgments (Howard, 2001). Rather than acting unilaterally, John F Kennedy insisted on establishing an agreement as a result, effective flexible communications, mutuality, and openness between powerful poles like the United States and the Soviet Union are crucial parts of every negotiation (Lafeber, 1994).

3.1.2 Creating a Line of Communication between Moscow and Washington

Following the Cuban missile crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union discovered that nuclear war between the major powers had already been barely averted (Liber, 1994). To avoid a replay of this scenario, when the smallest mistake of a decision, move or declaration from the opposing side could have shifted the balance, Washington and Moscow established a direct communication channel in 1963 to resolve the crisis in the future before they became too serious (ibid.). Furthermore, the Kremlin and Washington have established a direct and secure channel of contact between the US national coordinator for cyber security and the Russian Security Council deputy secretary to immediately manage a crisis scenario coming from a computer security issue (Grow, 2008).

The 'hotline', which allowed direct contact between the two presidents, was installed, and the September 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was the first step toward weapons control (Liber,

1994). As a result, the two presidents' arms are eventually held together by their fear of a disaster (ibid.). The Soviets eventually backed down, pledging to remove their missiles (Grow, 2008). By taking theirs from Turkey, the Americans are making a statement. After jumping over the gap, the two nations decide to put up a "red hotline" so that they may communicate directly (ibid.). With Moscow, Washington decided to play the game of leisure. A time of "peaceful cohabitation" may begin (Gambone, 2002).

Both the United States and the Soviet Union had adopted the red telephone concept and applied it to the computer field (Smith, 2005). The reconciliation of the American CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) and its Russian counterpart was announced on the White House website to promote the frequent sharing of technical and practical information on dangers in cyber security, which has an impact on vital systems (ibid.).

3.2 The United States and the Soviet Union Treaties

The Cuban Missile Crisis came to an end on October 28th, 1962, when United States President John F. Kennedy and Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev reached an agreement in which Khrushchev promised to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba (Howard, 2001). The United States, on the other hand, renounced any further hostilities against Cuba and agreed to remove United States nuclear-capable missiles from Turkey and Italy, which represented a direct threat to Soviet national security (ibid.).

On November 5th, 1962, the Soviet Union withdrew its missiles from Cuba as a consequence of this deal United States removed the embargo on Cuba on November 20th, 1962 (Perkins, 1993). The United States defused its missiles in Turkey and Italy in September 1963 (ibid.). As a result, the conditions of the US-Soviet agreement had been completely executed, and

following the crisis, both the United States and the Soviet Union created a hotline so that their leaders could contact directly in the future to handle such situations (Howard, 2001).

3.2.1 Hot Line Negotiations (1963)

Just after the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, the famous red telephone connecting Washington and Moscow was installed (Polkas, 2010). This system was supposed to make it easier for the American president and his Soviet counterpart to communicate and reduce diplomatic tensions (ibid.). In the event of a crisis, this system allowed the leaders of the two countries to talk directly and more quickly, avoiding war. Later, more advanced communications equipment will be installed. However, the nickname “red phone” has stuck (Howard, 2001).

3.2.2 The Agreement on a Partial Test Temporary Suspension (1963)

In 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT, sometimes known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) (Howard, 2001). It had been in the works since 1954 and was originally intended to be a complete test prohibition agreement. Finally, a compromise was reached to prohibit nuclear weapons test explosions, as well as any other type of nuclear explosion conducted in the air, outside of its borders, including outer space, or underwater (ibid.).

It also had another obligation: it could not test in any other location if the explosion resulted in radioactive debris being released outside the state's boundaries. As a result, it could be considered more of an environmental protection measure than an arms control deal. The Soviets, the United Kingdom, and the United States were the first to sign, but most countries throughout the world followed suit. There were no authentication materials on hand at the PTBT, and it was assumed that national technological means would suffice for verification. When the Cold War

ended, Russia relinquished some of its nuclear weapons, and it came out that only a very few have avoided electronic discovery by the whole scientific world (Howard, 2001).

3.3 The Role of the CIA

During the Cold War, the Western bloc established an espionage network, with the CIA allocating the majority of assets and time to spying frameworks to assess Soviet capabilities. For a long period, the intensity of containing the Soviets influenced global intelligence. As a result, it is critical to push the commitment of espionage accumulation during the Cold War. The standard account of the Cuban missile crisis goes somewhat like this. A U-2 spy plane obtained hazy photographs of what seemed to be a Soviet missile facility under construction during a routine flyover of western Cuba in October 1962. President John F. Kennedy needed conclusive confirmation that medium and intermediate-range nuclear missiles capable of reaching US cities were present before blasting the Soviet Union for putting up nuclear missiles roughly 90 miles off the coast of the US in violation of international accords. So, on October 23th, 1962, a Navy RF-8 Crusader outfitted with five reconnaissance cameras flew low over the island country, gathering intelligence on the installation (Ornstein, 1989).

Eventually, the spy community and government leaders realized the need of controlling Stalin's expansionist desires and the socialist convention. In addition, Stalin had stated in his speech in February 1946 that communism and free enterprise were opposed, and he blamed capitalists for past conflicts (Ornstein, 1989). The Soviet Union attempted to test their first nuclear weapon on August 29th, 1949 (ibid.). Furthermore, the Chinese Socialist Gathering assumed authority under the command of Mao Zedong, causing the Cold War to escalate. These events pushed Truman to accept the top-secret report NSC-68, which allowed for the militarization of the Cold War and the increase of reconnaissance operations (Franklin, 1997).


The paper also predicted that nuclear weapons would be used only in specific situations. The Chinese civil war began in the spring of 1946 (Franklin, 1997). The Socialists, led by Mao Tso-Tung and bolstered by Japanese protection, promised to redistribute land to farmers. Despite US support, which had begun to focus more on Europe at this point, General Chiang Kai-National Sheik's Legislature was forced to flee the region in 1950 and seek refuge on the island of Formosa (Hansen, 2010).

Conclusion

The Cuban Missile Crisis, which occurred in the Caribbean Sea, was primarily a showdown between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. It grew to the point that it was on the verge of escalating into a worldwide nuclear war that would devastate both sides. However, it was necessary to comment on the usage of diplomatic channels during a crisis inside a political process involving superpowers.

The ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the United States, the USSR's meddling in Cuba's domestic affairs, the military bases constructed in Turkey and Italy, and the discovery of missiles in Cuba were all crucial factors in the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, both superpowers were able to satisfactorily resolve the crisis, and they took care to avoid similar situations in the future.

Finally, based on the reality that negotiating peace is far more difficult than fighting a war, the two powers displayed their capacity to resolve a crisis that threatened to push the world into a third global war with disastrous repercussions.



General Conclusion

General Conclusion

During the Cold War, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were stressful; the allied powers not only distrusted one another but also strove to mould the world to promote their own goals, which were based on opposing philosophies about how society should be structured. The armaments race and the creation of a new sphere of influence were two of the most important elements of the Cold War, which drove both sides to engage in the foreign affairs of other countries to win support.

The confrontation between both western and eastern power centers peaked in the 1960s, specifically on October 16th, 1962, in Cuba. After the US discovered that the Soviet Union had deployed a nuclear warhead missile, which was seen as a threat to the US dream of unipolarity, the Cuban Missile Crisis had the potential to turn the world into a third world war due to the risk of nuclear war. The Cuban Revolution, as seen in Chapter 2, was one of the key causes of the crisis; another factor was the rise of Communism in Cuba, as Castro was a Marxist Leninist. Furthermore, the Soviets seek to respond to the United States' missile deployments in Turkey and Italy by deploying missiles in Cuba to threaten the United States and balance power.

The deployment of missiles on Cuban soil by the Soviets was supposed to protect Cuba and recover the financial benefit that the US had gained from Cuba under Batista's presidency, as well as to utilize missiles as a diplomatic pressure tactic. Furthermore, the missiles provided a shield for the Soviet Union against any attack from the United States. After the US government saw Soviet Missiles on Cuban soil by U-2 flights, it was deemed a threat to US national security, prompting the US to respond by imposing a blockade on Cuba and deploying DEFCON 2 for the first time in history. Fortunately, the United Nations stepped in and proposed a solution to the

crisis, thanks to the efforts of U Thant, who sent numerous texts to the leaders including both Camps and Castro, as well as numerous meetings, keeping in mind the refusal of the peace proposals he proposed, but in the end, the representatives found a solution to the situation. And the situation culminates in a closed-door meeting between Khrushchev and JFK to dismantle Soviet missiles in Cuba as well as American missiles in Turkey and Italy. Following that, both parties signed treaties agreeing to refrain from using nuclear weapons and establishing a red line to negotiate any future crisis to resolve it peacefully.

To conclude, ties between the United States and the Soviet Union were never particularly amicable during the Cold War, even though they did find a way to resolve the Cuban missile crisis without resorting to war. In spite of the fact this study attempted to shed light on one essential topic in a meticulously organized manner, it fell short of perfection due to various constraints. The absence of data collection was a key challenge during this project, as was the unavailability of primary materials such as books, which forced us to discover an alternative approach in the form of downloading hacked books. Second, the study's focus was constrained, and several factors were left out. Third, the approach used may not be appropriate for all aspects of the investigation.

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ملخص :

خلال الحرب الباردة، قامت الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد السوفيتي ببناء مناطق نفوذهما تدريجياً، وفصل العالم إلى معسكرين متعارضين. نتيجة لذلك، لم تكن الحرب الباردة مجرد معركة بين الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد السوفيتي، بل كانت أيضاً صراعاً عالمياً أثر على العديد من البلدان. خاصة في أوروبا وآسيا وأمريكا الجنوبية ، حيث بلغ الصراع ذروته في كوبا (أزمة الصواريخ الكوبية) ، حيث قام السوفييت بتركيب صواريخ سراً بعد أن أصبحت كوبا دولة شيوعية في عام 1959. كان الرئيس جون كينيدي قلقاً من أن الاتحاد السوفيتي سيهاجم الولايات المتحدة. هي المواجهة التي حدثت في أكتوبر 1962 بين الولايات المتحدة من جهة والاتحاد السوفيتي وكوبا من جهة أخرى تعتبر من أخطر الأزمات التي حدثت خلال الحرب الباردة ، ولهذا السبب لها أهمية كبيرة في أزمة الصواريخ الكوبية و التي لها دور في تطبيق سياسة الاحتواء التي كانت إستراتيجية مشهورة اشتهر بها بعض صانعي السياسة في الولايات المتحدة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الحرب الباردة ، سياسة الاحتواء ، أزمة الصواريخ الكوبية

Résumé

Pendant la guerre froide, les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique ont progressivement construit leurs sphères d'influence, séparant le monde en deux camps opposés. En conséquence, la guerre froide n'était pas seulement une bataille entre les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique, mais aussi un conflit mondial qui a touché de nombreux pays. Surtout en Europe, en Asie et en Amérique du Sud, le conflit a culminé à Cuba (la crise des missiles de Cuba), où les Soviétiques ont secrètement installé des missiles après que Cuba soit devenu un pays communiste en 1959. Le président John F. Kennedy craignait que l'Union soviétique n'attaque les États-Unis. États. C'est la confrontation qui s'est produite en octobre 1962 entre les États-Unis d'une part et l'Union soviétique et Cuba d'autre part. Elle est considérée comme l'une des crises les plus dangereuses survenues pendant la guerre froide, et pour cette raison il est d'une grande importance dans la crise des missiles de Cuba, qui a joué un rôle dans la mise en œuvre de la politique d'endiguement, qui était une stratégie bien connue, et qui compte des décideurs politiques aux États-Unis.

Mots-clés : Guerre froide, politique de confinement, crise des missiles cubains

