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Iraq after American Invasion:
Understanding Power division

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Dedication

From a young age, I called God:

 "Oh God, increase me in knowledge"

I thank God, the Almighty God, who blessed me with the grace of reason, religion and the love of learning.

I dedicated my graduation to a man I did not meet him and whose I bear his name with all pride "my father" I hope that God will mercy him and enter him to paradise, and to "the soul of the soul" my mother, my angel who was there for me in my hardest times, for her infinite support and guidance. To those with whom I knew the meaning of life, "my brothers and sisters", to the secret of success to my precious wife, to my dear children who delighted my life.

To those accompanied by them in the path of happy and sad life. And to those who have been with me on the path of success and strive, "my dear friends", all one by his name,

 To all teachers, especially my first teacher at primary school who taught me the first letter Mr.Bachir Ammari thank you all for your continuous aid and encouragement till this dissertation saw the light. also I do not forget to dedicate this small work to the martyrs of Palestine. *Abdelkader Brahimi*

I dedicate "All praise and thanks are due to Allah, the Most Merciful and Most Compassionate, whose infinite wisdom has guided me through every trial and triumph. May His blessings and mercy continue to shower upon me and my loved ones.

And peace and blessings be upon our beloved Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), whose noble teachings illuminate my path and whose exemplary life serves as a timeless model of compassion, integrity, and perseverance.

Dedicated with profound gratitude to the pillars of my life: To my beloved mother, whose unwavering belief in my potential has been a source of boundless inspiration; to my father, whose steadfast guidance and sacrifices have paved the path to my success; to my brothers and sisters, whose camaraderie and support have fortified me through every challenge.

To my cherished wife, whose overwhelming love and unwavering support has been my anchor amidst the storms of academia, I owe immeasurable gratitude. And to the memory of my Martyr grandfather, whose legacy of resilience and sacrifice serves as a guiding light in my pursuit of knowledge and excellence.

May this dedication serve as a humble tribute to the profound impact each of you has had on my journey, and may your love, support, and the divine blessings of Allah continue to fuel my aspirations and endeavors." *AbderrahmaneTemmam*

Acknowledgements

Abstract

The invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003 had a significant impact on the country's political landscape, resulting in power struggles and fragmentation. This dissertation scrutinizes the power division in Iraq after the invasion, examining the historical roots, external influences, and internal dynamics that have shaped its present and future. By analyzing the power structures before the invasion, the invasion's impact, and post-invasion governance models, we reveal the complex mechanisms driving sectarian conflicts and hindering inclusive governance. This study aims to provide insights into fostering stability, reconciliation, and fair power distribution in Iraq and other regions by dissecting the roles of different actors and the challenges they pose.

Keywords: Invasion, power division, Sectarianism, Quota system, Democratization, Iraq, The US.

Abstract in Arabic ملخص

الغزو الأمريكي للعراق في عام 2003 كان له تأثير كبير على المشهد السياسي في البلاد، مما أدى إلى صراعات السلطة والتشتت. تتناول هذه الأطروحة مفهوم تقسيم السلطة في العراق بعد الغزو، حيث تهدف دراستنا إلى التحقيق في المعايير الأساسية التي تحدد تقسيم السلطة في النظام السياسي العراقي. والتي تعتمد على خليط من الجماعات الدينية و العرقية، بمساهمة القوى الخارجية حيث استعرضنا الجذور التاريخية والتأثيرات الخارجية و الديناميكيّات الداخلية التي شكلت حاضره ومستقبله. من خلال تحليل الهياكل السلطوية قبل الغزو، وتأثير الغزو، ونماذج الحكم بعد الغزو، نكشف عن الآليات المعقدة التي تدفع النزاعات الطائفية وتعيق الحوكمة الشاملة. تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى تقديم رؤى حول تعزيز الاستقرار والمصالحة وتوزيع السلطة العادل في العراق كنموذج من خلال تحليل أدوار الجهات المختلفة والتحديات التي تواجهها.

Contents

Introduction

Through the fight against terrorism, the United States sought to further its beliefs and increase its power. Owing to the conflict, which mostly affected Iraq and other Middle Eastern nations. The political climate of the nation underwent a dramatic change in 2003 with the US invasion of Iraq. After Saddam Hussein's centralized, secular authority system collapsed, a complex new reality with conflicting ethnic and sectarian narratives emerged. This dissertation explores the power division in post-invasion Iraq by examining the intricate interactions between historical legacies, outside factors, and internal dynamics that have shaped the nation's past, present, and future.

Our main question is how the invasion widened already-existing rifts and how these divisions have informed and shaped the distribution of power in the developing Iraqi political system. We carefully dissect the objectives and roles of numerous actors, including political parties, religious organizations, ethnic communities, and foreign powers, whose manoeuvring in the political arena greatly influences the current power structure.

By closely examining four major mechanisms—election processes, resource distribution, security establishments, and historical-political-social variables—we reveal the tactics and approaches used by various actors to either promote or obstruct inclusive and equitable power distribution. We can learn a great deal about the processes that support or threaten the nation's stability, peace, and sound governance by looking at how these mechanisms function.

Our research goes beyond Iraq's boundaries, providing insightful guidance to other fractured and conflict-ridden civilizations facing comparable difficulties.

Understanding the complex structure of power in Iraq following the invasion enables us to comprehend models and frameworks that facilitate inclusive administration, encourage rapprochement, and steer clear of the perilous route towards achieving national unity. In the end, this dissertation seeks to be more than just a scholarly exercise; it hopes to be an effective instrument for comprehending and negotiating the intricacies of power in post-invasion Iraq, hopefully, enlightening and pointing the way toward a more secure and just future for the country and its citizens.

Throughout our study we saw that Sectarian and ethnic divisions continue to dominate power dynamics in Iraq despite the establishment of a democratic political system. This has made politics unstable and made inclusive governance more difficult. This research examines the fundamental standards for power division by examining the ways in which electoral procedures, resource distribution, and outside influences contribute to the pervasive ethnic and sectarian divisions in Iraqi politics.

This thesis focuses on the following questions:

1. To what extent has, the invasion exacerbated existing sectarian and ethnic cleavages?

2. How have these divisions above influenced power-sharing arrangements in the Iraqi political system?

3. What are the roles and influence of various actors in shaping power dynamics within Iraq?

4. What are the factors that have contributed to the shift from a centralized power under Saddam Hussein to decentralize in post invasion?

5. How can understanding the complexities of power division to promote stability and reconciliation?

A hypothesis, which will be put to the test, serves as the basis for this study. The 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States caused significant disruption to the existing power structures and contributed to the emergence of sectarian-based power divisions that continue to dominate the country's political landscape today.

This study is important because it shows the interference of the US in the Middle East and the impact of such intervention on the Iraqi political system after the invasion. It defines some of the most complicated concepts that shape the tapestry political system of Iraq. Moreover, this study can be used as a reference for future students who will do their research on the same topic.

Our study aims to show the criteria on which power division in the Iraqi political system is based; does it rely on religious groups, ethnic communities, external powers, or something hidden. It aims also to understand the complexities of power division. We hope that our study can contribute a great knowledge in the field.

In this study, we will derive information from the Constitution 2005 and U.S.-Iraq accords as a primary source as well as any material relevant to the field of the study, which is a new and fresh area in our department as far as we are concerned. The research tools used to collect data are library and internet research. We intend to use historicism as an approach to analyse the collected data in this thesis. In addition, we will use descriptive analytical method to feed for both theoretical and practical research. And extracting some U.S.-Iraq accords which will be interpreted to explore the reasons and impacts for the U.S intervention in IRAQ.

The present study aims to examine the consequences of the U.S. intervention in Iraq from 2003 to 2011.because this period is the basic challenge and convert from legacy to the power division. However, this study faced a major challenge due to the vast amount of events and evidence related to the U.S.'s involvement in Iraq's history. It would be unfair to only select a few. Each time we explore the relationship between Iraq and the U.S, and how the U.S. presents itself as a savoir, we find ourselves losing focus on the main topic of this dissertation.

This study investigates the post-invasion power secret. Our research on Iraq is organized into three chapters that chart the intricate interactions between past legacies, outside interventions, and internal dynamics that have shaped the nation's present and future. The first chapter, "Iraq pre-invasion: power dynamics," dig into the historical events leading up to the invasion. It illuminates the background of the Baath Party and the regime of Saddam Hussein. The second chapter, "The American Invasion: Power Vacuum,". We shall focus on the invasion of Iraq, its aftermath, and the ongoing power struggles that are being exacerbated by external factors and sectarian strife. The events following the American invasion are covered in the third chapter, "Post Invasion: Analyses of Power Division", which also provides a brief overview of the nature and consequences of American occupation and governance. We'll examine how power is distributed among various institutions and groups. It also looks at the successes and difficulties of democratization and elections.

There are conflicting narratives in Iraq based on sectarianism and ethnicity, which have emerged after the US invasion of the country in 2003. This dissertation examines the power dynamics in post-invasion Iraq by analyzing internal dynamics, external influences, and historical legacies. It aims to understand the goals and roles

of different actors, including external powers, political parties, ethnic communities, and religious organizations. The analysis also explores how they plan to promote or hinder equitable power division. The study seeks to create models for inclusive governance, national unity, and reconciliation, and it offers valuable lessons for other conflict-ridden societies.

Our study on power division in post-invasion Iraq digs into a complex and critical topic that has attracted significant scholarly attention. This literature review aims to situate our research within the existing body of knowledge and highlight the contributions we can make to the field.

This thesis will employ historicism for data analysis, while a descriptive analytical method will be employed for both theoretical and practical research.

Conceptual Frameworks and Theoretical Underpinnings:

• Sectarianism and Ethno politics: Studies like McGarryand O'Leary's "The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation" and Phebe Marr's " The modern history of Iraq" explore how pre-existing sectarian and ethnic cleavages can be manipulated or exacerbated by conflict and political restructuring, leading to complex power dynamics and challenges in post-conflict societies.

• Power-Sharing and Governance: Works like Kathleen Tracy's "The Evolution of governement and politics in iraq" examine various power-sharing models and their effectiveness in promoting stability and equitable governance in post-conflict environments.

• External Intervention and State Rebuilding : Studies like Michael Rear's "Intervention, Ethnic Conflict and State-Building in Iraq: A Paradigm for the Post-Colonial State" demonstrates how this intervention has contributed to the problems

with democratization experienced in the post-Saddam era and how it can influence power division and the trajectory of conflict resolution

• McFate's "Black Banners: Rise of the Islamic State" and Chulov's "The World We Made: Traves in a Fractured Iraq" offer in-depth accounts of the post-invasion political landscape, sectarian tensions, and the emergence of armed groups, providing valuable context for understanding power dynamics.

• Chohan's "Iraq Divided: Sectarianism, Ethnic Minorities, and Political Change" and O'Kane's "The Routledge Handbook on Iraqi Politics" explore the specific mechanisms of power-sharing in Iraq, the role of political parties and religious groups, and the challenges of building a stable and inclusive political system.

1. While existing scholarship provides valuable insights into power division in post-invasion Iraq, our dissertation can make significant contributions in several ways:

• Deepen the understanding of the evolving criteria for power division: By analyzing how factors like electoral mechanisms, resource allocation, and external pressure influence power division over time, we will offer a nuanced understanding of the shifting sands of power.

• Examining the interplay between internal and external forces: our research discusses deeper into how actors like the US and Iran manipulate or influence power struggles within Iraq, offering a more comprehensive picture of the forces shaping the political landscape.

• Focus on specific mechanisms and their consequences: By focusing on specific elements like the role of militia groups, we provide detailed analysis of how these mechanisms impact stability, governance, and regional security.

• Offering concrete recommendations for improved power-division and conflict resolution: Based on our findings, we will propose evidence-based recommendations for promoting a more equitable and stable political system in Iraq and potentially offering insights for other post-conflict scenarios.

By engaging with existing literature and identifying areas for further research, our study shed new light on the complexities of power division in post-invasion Iraq and contribute to ongoing efforts toward peace and stability in the region.

CHAPTER-I. The Iraq pre-invasion: power dynamics

I.1. Introduction

Understanding Iraq's political climate before the 2003 invasion is crucial for comprehending the power struggles that followed. The Ba'ath Party's beginnings and social transformations during Saddam Hussein's rule shaped the pre-invasion system, which was characterized by a centralized structure, a monopoly of power, and significant power disparities. This history provides valuable insights into the underlying power dynamics, enabling us to navigate the aftermath, overcome obstacles, and work towards stability.

I.2. Background of the Ba'ath party

The Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party, The Ba'ath Party, which means "Renaissance Party" in Arabic, was born during a period of significant social and political turmoil in the Middle East. The Ba'ath Party, founded in Syria in the 1940s, aimed to promote Arab unity through socialism. It merged with the Syrian Socialist Party in 1953 and strongly condemned foreign domination. The party gained popularity in Iraq, leading to a coup against Abd-ul-Karim Qasim[1]. The Ba'ath Party, led by Ali Saleh al-Saadi, seized political power in Iraq and established the National Revolutionary Military Council (NCRC) government (Tracy 22).

There are three main reasons why the Ba'ath Party gained power while the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) lost ground:

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[1]General Abd-ul-Karim Qasim, the first republican leader of Iraq 1958–1963.

➤ **Nationalism Appeal:** General Qassim refused to quickly join Egypt's United Arab Republic (UAR), disappointing many pro-Arab unity Iraqis. This opened the door for the Ba'ath, which strongly supported unification (Isakhan, B., Mako, S., &Dawood, F 127).

➤ **Anti-Communist Sentiment:** The ICP's violent actions in Mosul and Kirkuk scared many people. This made them more supportive of any group opposing the Communists, including the Ba'ath.

➤ **Failed Coup, Gained Popularity:** Even though the Ba'ath's attempt to kill Qassim in 1959 failed miserably, it weirdly made them seem more powerful and daring in the eyes of some Iraqis.

In short, Qassim's policies and the ICP's actions created an opening for the Ba'ath Party to exploit, ultimately helping them rise to power (Anderson et Stansfield 36).

However, it struggled to maintain momentum and split. In 1963, Colonel Abdul Salam Arif[2] and military officers staged a coup, expelling Ba'ath Party members. In 1966, General Abdul Rahman Muhammad Arif[3] died, and Ba'athist groups overthrew his regime. General al-Bakr[4] became president of Iraq, with Saddam Hussein as his deputy. In 1979 he forced al-Bakr to resign and appointed himself president (Tracy 24).

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[2]Abd al-Salam Mohammed ʿArif al-Jumayli(1921 – 1966) was the second president of Iraq from 1963 until his death in a plane crash in 1966. He played a leading role in the 14 July Revolution, in which the Hashemite monarchy was overthrown on 14 July 1958.

[3]Abd al-Rahman Mohammed ʿArif al-Jumayli (1916 – 2007) was an Iraqi military officer and politician who served as the third president of Iraq from 16 April 1966 to 17 July 1968. He supported the military coup in 1958 that overthrew the monarchy. He also supported the coup that brought his brother, Abdul Salam Arif, to power in 1963.

[4]Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr (1914 – 1982)was an Iraqi politician who served as the fourth president of Iraq, from 17 July 1968 to 16 July 1979. He was a leading member of the revolutionary Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party.

I.3. Saddam Hussein's regime

Many academic biographies and analyses have touched on the life and personality of Saddam Hussein, so we won't be rehashing those details. Instead, our focus is on exploring the relationship between the Ba'ath system and its leader's cult of personality, and how this affected governance in the country.

I.3.1. Structure of the political system

The Ba'ath Party in Iraq, like the Soviet Communist Party, played a significant role in decision-making. Its structure was monolithic, with activities run by hierarchies of appointed officials under one command (Sassoon 11), both espoused totalitarian ideologies, seeking complete control over the political, economic, and social spheres of their respective countries. Fitzpatrick argues that the party Soviet Communist's use of violence, repression, and control of the economy was key factors in its rise to power (Fitzpatrick, Shiela, and Michael Geyer 133). As the party grew, bureaucratization became critical for its success. Ba'ath's documents show a detailed division of labor, and goals and decisions were formulated at the top of the pyramid. This was important because Iraq officially became a Ba'athist country after the party came to power in 1968.

> We have to emphasize that this society is led by a party, and that party is the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party . . . which leads [the people] in its values, its organizations, and also leads it in its ideas and its policies... Thus it is necessary that the party's values and ideologies are at the forefrontof these activities, and throughout the country's decision-making apparatus(Sassoon 35).

That means the party controlled every aspect of life in Iraq by occupying most important positions in the country.

The Department for Organizational and Political Affairs was crucial in the organization, preparing material for discussions and following up on political matters with all branches. It also handled admissions to military colleges, higher education institutions, and the Saddam Institute for the Study of the Qur'an, which influenced religious life in the country. Control of admissions was essential for the party to establish and expand its authority at all levels of society and prevent other parties from increasing their influence (Sassoon 35).

The Regional Command, previously the National Command, was the highest authority of the Iraqi party after its 1966 split from the Syrian Ba'ath Party. Its powers became increasingly symbolic, and membership ranged from 19 to 21 members (Sassoon 36).

In early 2001, the six most important members of the Iraqi Nationalist Party were Saddam Hussein, the Quartet (comprising Izzat al-Duri, TahaYasin Ramadan, Tariq _Aziz, and _Ali Hasanal-Majid), and Qusay Saddam Hussein.. The Regional Command had *maktab al-tandhimat,* bureau structures that gathered party activities in one large geographic area.(Helms 83). As the party expanded, the number of these structures increased, from six to seventeen by 2002. Exist Seventeen *tandimat* (structures) were subdivided into *firu*,(branches), which supervised the activities of sections, divisions, and cells, (see figure 1), By late 2002, sixty-nine branches reported on their own activities and those of their subdivisions (Sassoon 36).

The number of sections and divisions varies by province, with new ones created as membership increases. For instance, in Misan province, there were 20 sections and 93 divisions by 2002, with 4,468 party offices and over 32,000 cells in the country (Sassoon 37).

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                    ┌──────────────────────────┐
                    │ Al-qiyadaAlqutriyya       │
                    │ (Regional command)        │
                    └──────────────────────────┘
                    ┌──────────────────────────┐
                    │ Makteb al-tandhimat       │
                    │ (Bereau structures)       │
                    └──────────────────────────┘
                         ┌──────────────────┐
                         │ Fir' (Branch)     │
                         └──────────────────┘
          ┌───────────────────────────────────────────┐
   ┌─────────────────┐                        ┌─────────────────┐
   │ Shu'ba          │                        │ Shu'ba          │
   │ (Section)       │                        │ (Section)       │
   └─────────────────┘                        └─────────────────┘
      ┌──────────────┐                           ┌──────────────┐
      │ firqa        │                           │ firqa        │
      │ (Division)   │                           │ (Division)   │
      └──────────────┘                           └──────────────┘
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 │Khqliya │Khqliya │Khqliya │             │Khqliya │Khqliya │Khqliya │
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Figure 1. The Structure of the Command of the Iraqi Ba'ath party (Matar 203).

I.4. The characteristics of the pre-invasion power period

The pre invasion power period was characterized by:

I.4.1. Single-Party Rule:

Saddam Hussein aimed for a one-party state with centralized control over key institutions, eliminating competition. In 1974, he organized a regional congress, electing a new Regional Command and establishing control over key institutions. Eight new ministers were appointed, and key posts were always occupied by Regional Command members, allowing the party to control policy formation, legislation, and execution(Marr 47).

I.4.2. Dominant Role of the President:

Saddam Hussein persuaded Iraqi President Bakr to consent to his purging and appear on Iraqi television, portraying his purging as a natural transition of power. Bakr admitted to his health issues, which made it difficult for him to assume responsibility. He nominated Saddam as the best candidate for leadership and paid tribute to his protégé, Saddam Hussein, who had been a brave and faithful leader during the years of struggle before the revolution (Coughlin 150).

Despite instability, the state bureaucracy remained functional, with Ba'athists taking over senior management. Saddam Hussein, backed by his personality cult, became the final decision maker, with the party controlling major decisions.

In 1979, six days after his arrival to the presidency of Iraq the ba'ath party purge or comrades massacre also known as *khuld hall* incident comarades massacre was a public purge of Iraqi ba'ath party orchested by then president Saddam Hussein, 21deaths and 68 arrests.

The system of orders developed in Saddam Hussein's regime was primarily based on verbal instructions, primarily for security reasons. This strengthened Hussein's position as subordinates sought clarification from him. Rules and regulations were largely based on presidential orders, with little consultation. Tariq Aziz[5] described the system of orders in a meeting following Hussein Kamil's escape using audiotapes:

> For twenty years, you made it clear to us that if we receive any order from you and we find it objectionable, we can question it and present you with our opinion and facts. If you were convinced, then that would be fine, but if you were not convinced, then the order would remain in effect. . . . We are all here to assist you . . . when you give them [your subordinates] the order, they need to execute it. . . . Yes, it is hard to get in touch with the President, especially in the last few years for security reasons, but you can write a note to _AbdHammud to give it to the President (Sassoon 229).

I.4.3. Centralized Power and Bureaucracy:

The Ba'ath strategy prioritized centralization of power, with the Party Secretariat (*Maktabamanat sir al-qutr*) being the primary authority for major decisions. The Revolutionary command council (RCC) decreed that all correspondence between state ministries and party organizations should be sent through the Secretariat. The Secretariat hierarchy was formulated according to the president's directive. Party secretaries were responsible for fostering member development, promoting education, conducting elections, organizing meetings, implementing decrees, enforcing discipline, and ensuring the party's significant role in military units. The party's primary role was to represent the regime in all sectors of the country, with increasing influence over security forces, army, government

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[5]Tariq Aziz (1936 – 2015) was an Iraqi politician who served as Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and a close advisor of President Saddam Hussein.

bureaucracy, labor unions, and the creation of Saddam Hussein's cult personality. From the 1990s, the party became involved in food distribution, deserter pursuit, and resistance to the 2003 American invasion (Sassoon 39).

The party cadre was responsible for arresting the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) agents, monitoring their activities outside Iraq, reporting on tribes, recruiting informers, and encouraging locals to report regime enemies. They also actively participated in remote areas, providing food and literacy campaigns to reduce KDP influence.

Saddam Hussein, an economic advisor to the RCC, decided to retain 5% of Iraq's oil revenues from the Gulbenkian Foundation[6] in Ba'ath coffers, as per Jawad Hashim, the minister of planning. This decision was made during a meeting attended by finance ministers and Central Bank governors. Saddam Hussein said:

> The Ba'ath Party came to Iraq to govern for 300 years, and in order to continue in that role, and in case it would be removed in a military coup d'état, it has to have serious financial resources outside Iraq. . . . We do not want to repeat the mistakes of 1963 when our regime fell and we faced serious financial difficulties. . . . Thus, I am asking you men of finance and economy to figure out how to earmark the share of the nationalized Gulbenkian for the party (Hashim 148–49).

The quote by Saddam Hussein offers a chilling glimpse into his mindset and motivations regarding the Ba'ath Party's grip on power in Iraq.

I.4.4. Sunni Dominance

Iraq's borders are home to a diverse mix of peoples who have not yet been united into a single political community with a common sense of identity. The search

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[6]Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian (1869 – 1955), nicknamed "Mr. Five Per Cent", was a British-Armenian businessman and philanthropist. He played a major role in making the petroleum reserves of the Middle East available to Western development and is credited with being the first person to exploit Iraqi oil.

for this identity has been a shared project of all Iraqi governments since 2003. Integration and assimilation have taken place since the mandate's inception, but there have been setbacks in recent years, revealing the fragility of the demographic mosaic and the state itself.

The first and most serious demographic division is ethnic or linguistic. Arabic speakers constitute 75 to 80 percent of the population, while Kurdish speakers make up 15 to 20 percent. The Arabs dominate the western steppe and Tigris and Euphrates valleys, while the Kurds have their stronghold in the rugged mountain terrain (Marr 13).

The Iraqi Kurds are only a portion of a larger Kurdish population with whom they identify on linguistic, cultural, and nationalistic grounds. In 2011, there were over 6 million Kurds in Iraq, about 13 million in Turkey, 9 million in Iran, and between 1 and 2 million in Syria. There are smaller numbers in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Europe.

The population divides into three distinct communities: Arab Shia, Arab Sunnis, and Kurds, (See Figure 2) primarily due to the Sunni majority of the majority of Kurds, primarily affecting Arabs, and primarily affecting the majority of Kurds (Marr 14).

Ethnoreligious Groups

Ethnic and religious groups
by percent of population

Other 3

Sunni
Kurd
17

Sunni
Arab
20

Shia
Arab
60

Dahūk

Sinjār

Tall
'Afar

Mosul

Irbīl

Karkūk

Iraq

★ BAGHDAD

An Najaf

Al 'Amārah

An Nāşirīyah

Al Başrah

Sunni Kurd

Sunni Arab / Sunni Kurd

Sunni Arab

Shia Arab / Sunni Arab

Shia Arab

Turkoman

Yezidi

| 0 | 50 | 100 Kilometers |

| 0 | 50 | 100 Miles |

725881 (B01274) 8-92

Figure 2 Map Ethnoreligious Groups

Arab Sunnis, despite their minority status, have historically dominated Iraq's political and social life. They represent 15-20% of the population, primarily concentrated in the northern part of the country. The majority of the Sunni community is urban, with significant numbers living in cities like Basra. Despite the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, Sunni dominance has remained, with political control becoming more pronounced at the end of the 20th century. This political dominance has given the Sunni community a closer association with the emerging Iraqi state and a vested interest in the emerging Iraqi state. Arab Sunnis also have a strong affinity for secular philosophies of Arab nationalism. The displacement of Sunnis by Shia leadership after 2003 has been a significant social and political change (Al-Jalili 239–242).Other Minorities:

Beyond the major Arab and Kurdish populations, Iraq boasts a rich tapestry of smaller minorities. One such group is the Turkmen (3-13% of the population) who primarily reside in northern Iraq near the borders with Turkey and Iran. They are ethnically Turkic and speak a Turkic dialect, distinct from Arabic and Kurdish.

The Assyrians, a minority group with a long history in the region, are predominantly Christians and have a cultural heritage linked to ancient Mesopotamia. The Yazidis, another ethno religious group in northern Iraq, combine elements of Mesopotamian, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Both groups have faced historical marginalization and ongoing challenges, adding complexity to Iraq's social fabric (Marr 17).

Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq (1979-2003) was characterized by **Sunni dominance**, meaning that the Sunni minority held a disproportionate share of power and resources compared to the majority Shia and Kurdish populations.

This dominance manifested in various aspects of Iraqi society, including:

 ✓ **Sunni Control of Government:**

The Ba'ath Party, led by Saddam, was a secular party but dominated by Sunnis. Key leadership positions, including the presidency, ministries, and military leadership, were overwhelmingly held by Sunnis.

 ✓ **Marginalization of Shias:**

Shias, who constitute roughly 60% of the Iraqi population, were largely excluded from positions of power and influence. They faced discrimination in areas like employment, education, and political participation (Tripp 229).

 ✓ **Kurdish Autonomy Denied:**

Kurds, another significant minority group, were denied their aspirations for autonomy despite facing persecution and brutal crackdowns under Saddam's regime.

I.5. **Impact of Sunni Dominance:**

I.5.1. Sectarian Tensions:

The systematic marginalization of Shias and Kurds fostered deep-seated resentment and contributed to sectarian tensions that continue to plague Iraq today.

I.5.2. Instability and Conflict:

The unequal distribution of power and resources fuelled instability and ultimately contributed to the 2003 US invasion and subsequent insurgency. Despite the regime's survival in the centre, Saddam Husain continued to face opposition from inside and outside Iraq.

Conclusion

Pre-invasion Iraq was a complex society with a rigid political hierarchy, Sunni dominance, and a strong central authority. This structure brought stability but also created discontent and fragmentation. Human rights abuses, economic problems, internal resentments, and external pressures created a volatile environment. Understanding these power dynamics is crucial for understanding the ongoing struggles for power, stability, and unity in the post-invasion era, as the legacy of these systems continues to shape the country's trajectory.

CHAPTER-II. The American invasion: power vacuum

Introduction

In 2003, the American-led invasion marked a significant turning point in Iraqi history, which continues to impact the nation today. This chapter will examine the complex circumstances that led to the invasion and its immediate and long-term consequences.

The power vacuum created by the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime paved the way for the emergence of diverse new players vying for influence, shaping a tumultuous and dynamic power struggle.

II.1. The main reasons for the invasion:

The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime was caused by external forces, the main cause was the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which led President Bush to declare a "war on terrorism" and make pre-emptive military strikes against regimes that posed a threat to the United States. The United States initially focused on Afghanistan, where they removed the Taliban regime that had been protecting Usama bin Ladin. Later, they turned their attention to Iraq due to the potential threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of a hostile dictator like Saddam Hussein (Marr 259), In September 2002, President Bush brought up the issue of Iraq's possible possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to the UN General Assembly. In November of the same year, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441, which demanded that Iraq allow rigorous WMD inspections. Meanwhile, the United States, along with the United Kingdom, began quietly building up military forces in the Gulf. To avoid military conflict, Iraq accepted Resolution 1441 and a new inspections regime began in November 2002.

Iraq cooperated with inspectors but did not provide any new information. Despite disagreements within the international community, the United States decided to take action based on UNSC Resolution 1441. On March 18th, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave the country, making it clear that war would follow if he did not comply (Marr 261). President Bush emphasized Saddam Hussein's relationship with Al-Qaeda and his threat of mass destruction. He justified military action against Saddam, citing his weapons of mass destruction. Despite opposition, Bush and Blair launched Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 20, 2003, resulting in the invasion of Iraq by the US.

> "My fellow citizens at this hour American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger on my orders coalition forces have began striking selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein's ability to wage war". "President Bush Announces Start of Iraq War." VIDEO(C-SPAN00:14-00:38)

Speech by President George W. Bush on March 19, 2003, announcing the invasion of Iraq. This event, known as the Iraq War, was a highly controversial and complex conflict that had a significant impact. The invasion was primarily justified by Saddam's possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and his alleged connections with international Islamist terrorists, such as Al-Qaeda. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated in 2003 that Saddam was producing WMDs, posing a serious threat to the American people. However, the absence of WMDs and credible Iraqi ties to Al-Qaeda undermined the American assertion (Dawisha 242).

II.2. The Occupation of Iraq from an Arab Perspective*:*

The Arab governments at the summit of the Arab League on March 1, 2003, limited themselves to a verbal exercise in which they scarcely dared declare that they did not consider Iraq a threat and therefore did not want a war, and the rejection of Syria's proposal to adopt a declaration against any support of military action. The summit was held to decide in the face of the impending American invasion. The US military was already providing security for the Persian Gulf countries, so how could they pass such a resolution? How could Egypt jeopardize the US's 2,000 million annual grant, which allows them to sustain an economy beset by unproductiveness and corruption? (Martín Muñoz 4§).

Facing public opposition and internal divisions, Arab governments at the March 1, 2003, Arab League summit resisted the imminent US invasion of Iraq. However, their ability to take a strong stance was limited by their dependence on US military protection and, in some cases, financial aid.

II.3. Disintegration o*f Ba'athist* Institutions*:*

On March 20, 2003, the ground invasion of Iraq, led by the U.S. Army General Tommy Franks, began under the code name "Operation Iraqi Liberation" and was later renamed "Operation Iraqi Freedom." The "coalition of the willing," led by the United States, included the U.S., U.K., and Australian Forces, along with forty other nations. The invasion force was supported by Iraqi Kurdish militia troops, estimated to number around 70,000. The invasion was staged in Kuwait on D-Day(L. WRIGHT 46).

II.3.1. Sudden Collapse and Loss of Control:

In under three weeks, Saddam Hussein was compelled to flee and hide. Coalition forces entered Baghdad, where jubilant Iraqis marked Hussein's removal by toppling a statue. Nevertheless, violence persisted in Baghdad and other Iraqi regions, especially in the north where many stayed loyal to the dictator (Tracy 08). Despite Saddam's capture, trial, and execution, the nation remains deeply wounded by conflict, plagued by economic ruin and political turmoil, and under the influence of Iran and the US. The Iraq invasion has caused over 200,000 civilian fatalities and 4,500 US military deaths, resulting in disorder and instability in the area(Ibrahim 3§).

II.4. The main Events And Battles Of The US Invasion Of Iraq:

March 19, 2003:

➢ The invasion began with airstrikes on Baghdad and other targets throughout Iraq.

➢ The US and British forces crossed the border from Kuwait.

March 20, 2003:

➢ The city of Basra in southern Iraq fell.

➢ The Battle of Karbala began a fierce battle between US forces and Iraqi Republican Guard forces.

March 21, 2003:

➢ The city of Nasiriyah in southern Iraq fell.

March 23, 2003:

➢ The Battle of Baghdad began, a decisive battle for control of the Iraqi capital.

March 26, 2003:

➤ Iraqi forces withdrew from central Baghdad.

➤ US forces entered Baghdad and raised the American flag over Firdous Square.

March 30, 2003:

➤ US President George W. Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq.

May 1, 2003:

➤ US President George W. Bush declared the "end of the Baathist regime."

After May 2003:

➤ An insurgency began against US forces and new Iraqi forces.

➤ Violence and unrest continued throughout Iraq for many years.

Major Battles during the Invasion:

➤ Battle of Karbala (March 20-23, 2003): A fierce battle between US forces and Iraqi Republican Guard forces.

➤ Battle of Baghdad (March 20-April 9, 2003): A decisive battle for control of the Iraqi capital.

➤ Battle of Fallujah (April 2004 and November 2004) (two separate battles): A fierce battle between US forces and insurgent forces in the city of Fallujah.

On April 9, 2003, the Iraqi resistance in Baghdad surrendered, and the U.S. army assumed control. At the same time, British forces secured Basra. Plans to open another front were thwarted when the Turkish government denied permission for the deployment of U.S. Army units in northern Iraq. However, U.S. Special Forces soldiers and Kurdish peshmerga fighters successfully seized Kirkuk and Mosul. Saddam Hussein went into hiding, prompting an intensive search by U.S. forces.

Finally, on December 13, 2003, he was captured, five months after his sons were killed in a shoot-out with American troops(Marr 345).

II.5. The Impact of the Invasion:

➢ Fall of Saddam Hussein's regime.

➢ Death of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis.

➢ Displacement of millions of Iraqis.

➢ Destabilization of the region.

➢ Rise of ISIS.

II.5.1. Emergence of New Actors :

After Saddam's regime fell, power dynamics favored Sunni Muslims, marginalizing Shiites. Sunnis aimed to uphold their status, prompting Shiite resistance. Insurgents supported Sunnis, driven by anti-Western sentiment and anti-Shiite grievances, sparking violent clashes. Kurds, long at odds with Iraq's central leadership, advocated for increased autonomy. Simultaneously, Shiites controlled governance, straining relations with other factions. These complexities underscore Iraq's governance and credibility challenges(y.Ismael et S.Ismael 111).

II.5.2. Religious Groups:

Shia groups such as the Sadrist movement and the Dawa Party rose to political power. Meanwhile, Sunni groups like the Muslim Brotherhood also emerged. These groups often aligned themselves with specific communities, contributing to sectarianism.

II.5.3. Militias:

Armed groups affiliated with religious factions or ethnicities filled the security vacuum, often challenging state authority and fuelling conflicts.

Since the US invasion of Iraq, several militias, (e.g., Mahdi Army, Badr Organization, Sunni Awakening Councils), commanded by political parties and organizations, have entered the country, gaining prominence after the dismantling of the Iraqi army and security forces. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was obligated to recognize these militias, rather than clash with them, and thus, found a legal framework to regulate them. No militias were found to have contributed to the overthrow of the former regime (y.Ismael et S.Ismael 81).

II.5.4. New Political Parties:

The development of new political parties in Iraq has resulted in parties that align themselves with specific religious or ethnic identities, which has further perpetuated sectarian divisions in the country. A lack of effective communication between the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Iraqi society due to a shortage of Arabic speakers and experts on Iraq has exacerbated the sense of incoherence and political division. As a result, the CPA has had to rely on Iraqi political parties formed in exile to act as intermediaries, which has only increased the divide between THE U.S. forces and Iraqis (Dodge 11).

II.5.5. Sectarian Tensions :

Sectarian tensions in Iraq refer to the ongoing disagreements and conflicts between different religious groups, primarily Shias and Sunnis. These tensions are a result of various historical, political, and economic factors, which were further exacerbated by the US invasion and subsequent power vacuum. While the Samarra

mosque bombing on 22 February 2006 is often cited as the catalyst for sectarian conflict in Iraq, the root cause is more complex. Sectarian tensions had been building up since 2004 due to extremist activity, such as the Sunni insurgency in Falluja and Sadrist forces in Najaf. The 2005 elections and marginalization of the Sunni community in the constitution further intensified these tensions, leading to fear of a Shi'i sectarian government and exclusion from politics (Marr 299).

Causes:

➢ Pre-existing sectarian divisions under Saddam Hussein's regime

➢ Competition for power and resources after the invasion

➢ The US policies perceived as favoring specific groups

➢ Rise of religious militias and political parties

➢ Spill over effects from regional conflicts

·   **Consequences:**

➢ Sectarian violence, including bombings, assassinations, and targeted killings.

➢ Displacement of populations

➢ Increased mistrust and fear between communities

➢ Difficulty in establishing inclusive and stable governance.

II.5.6. The US intervention:

The US used sectarian violence to subdue an anti-occupation insurgency in Iraq, exploiting tensions through Shia and Kurdish paramilitary forces. In 2004, the US command dispatched 2000 Kurdish Peshmerga militia men to Mosul, and five battalions of Shia troops to police Ramadi, Al-Anbar Province. The presence of sectarian-motivated paramilitaries expanded to Samara and Fallujah (Porter 11§).

In 2004, Iraq's sovereignty was transferred to an interim government. However, the United States retained power over them due to opposition from within the country and the lack of influence of the appointed Prime Minister, Iyâd 'Allâw'. He relied on US protection and had a negligible power base in Iraq (y.Ismael et S.Ismael 22). Despite being aware of the serious risks, the US military and embassy relied on Shia police commandos to track down Sunnis. This strategy aggravated sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shia and increased the likelihood of civil strife. US military analysts confirmed that the strategy only served to deepen the existing fault lines in Iraqi society.

Impact:

➢ Increased sectarian tensions due to perceived favoritism towards Shias

➢ Power vacuum leading to the rise of militias and sectarian violence

➢ Anti-American sentiment fuelled by civilian casualties and prolonged occupation

➢ Challenges in establishing a stable and inclusive government

· **Current Situation:**

➢ US troops have largely withdrawn from Iraq since 2011

➢ Continued US military presence in support of Iraqi forces

➢ Ongoing political and economic tensions in Iraq

II.5.7. Regional Actors:

The political class was designed to establish a highly controlled, externally dependent Iraqi regime, but regional actors like Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia pursued their allies aggressively (y.Ismael et S.Ismael 114).

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In 2004, King Abdullah of Jordan referred to a "Shia crescent" in the Middle East, a Shia-dominated government taking power from Damascus to Tehran and Baghdad. This led to sectarian politics that spread across the region. The divide between Sunni and Shia Muslims is expected to be a major theme in 2007, as both face the chaos in Iraq, Iran's rise, and the potential consequences of armed confrontation with the Islamic Republic (Black 01§). While Saudi King Abdullah has repeatedly urged the US to launch military strikes to destroy Iran's nuclear program, as per leaked the U.S. diplomatic cables. The communication, dated April 20, 2008, revealed Saudi Arabia's fear of Shi'ite Iran's increasing influence in the region, particularly in Iraq (Colvin 01§).

Impact:

➢ Exacerbating sectarian tensions through support for specific groups

➢ Hindering national reconciliation and unity

➢ Complicating efforts to establish stable governance

Conclusion

The US invasion of Iraq was a crucial event with unintended consequences. The removal of the Ba'ath Party regime created a power vacuum, fueling sectarian tensions and violence. The US maintains influence in Iraq amid competition from regional players. Iraq faces challenges in achieving stability and rebuilding, as the legacy of the invasion remains complex and uncertain.

CHAPTER-III. Post Invasion: Analysis of Power Division

Introduction

In Iraq's political history. The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime brought about a new era of political reconstruction, with efforts to establish a more democratic system and power division more evenly among various political factions. However, the transition was far from smooth, as various groups vied for power and influence in the post-invasion landscape. This chapter examines governance models during the US occupation of Iraq and analyzes the key agreements that shaped its structure. It explores power struggles, new political factions and the challenges of building a stable and inclusive political system. The analysis helps to understand the power division , the complexity of post-invasion Iraq, and the ongoing efforts to create a more democratic and unified society.

III.1. Under US Occupation: The American Model of Governance

Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States assumed the role of the dominant power in the country and was tasked with the responsibility of governance. For over a year, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by experienced diplomat L. Paul Bremer[7] , oversaw the administration of Iraq, with significant input from the British. The transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi people on June 28, 2004 marked a significant moment in the country's history. During this time, the United States played a vital role in shaping the future of Iraq and ensuring its stability (Dawisha 243). The CPA faced numerous challenges in the post-war

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[7]Louis Paul Bremer III, also known as Paul Bremer, is an American diplomat who was tasked with overseeing Iraq's administrative government. In May 2003, US President George W. Bush appointed him to lead the reconstruction efforts of Iraq after the US invasion. Bremer became the director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Aid, succeeding retired General Jay Garner in this role.

occupation, including the collapse of military and civil society structures, which, according to Colin Luther Powell [8], was unexpected and left a significant problem for American troops to handle. The majority of the trouble came from Sunni areas, highlighting the need for a comprehensive approach to managing these challenges (Dawisha 244).

The escalating resistance to the occupation was largely due to major policy blunders by Bremer and the CPA. Bremer issued two orders, dissolving regular Iraqi military forces and banning Ba'th Party members from public life. These actions were costly mistakes, as Saddam's bloated army was the mainstay of his coercive rule, and the Ba'th Party functioned as an intimidation instrument to demonize Iraqi society (Dawisha 244). And devolving power to the twenty-five-member governing council he appointed in July 2003. This led to a country filled with anger and unrest.

III.1.1. The creation of the Interim Governing Council

The CPA faced the challenge of replacing the Ba'th, with the Iraq Liberation Council (ILC) expanding to address this issue. Bremer wanted more insiders, but developing a broader leadership base was difficult. The CPA had to face the ILC and emerging political forces post-occupation (Marr 271).

Bremer attempted to establish the Interim Governing Council (IGC), but faced challenges from the Kurdish parties who wanted to consolidate power in their autonomous region, leading to the formation of one Kurdish administration on 12 June (Marr 272). Although Bremer and the CPA have been accused by many Iraqis of introducing the concept of a government based on ethnic and sectarian divisions, this was no innovation; it had been an operating principle of the opposition,

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[8]Colin Luther Powell (1937 – 2021) was an American politician, statesman,diplomat, and United States Army officer who was the 65th United States secretary of state from 2001 to 2005. He was the first Black secretary of state

especially the Iraqi National Congress (INC), for years. Even though Bremer clearly held to Iraq's ethnic and sectarian divisions, his search for diversity was broader and included political parties and gender as well. However, the CPA's explicit recognition of the idea unquestionably helped solidify it.

Further the growing strength of Shi'i forces and political consciousness highlighting past discrimination against Shia in government and the need for a united Shi'i majority. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) was one component of this trend, with leader Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim returning to Iraq and envisioning a religious-political role and a Shi'i-dominated Islamic republic.(tripp 280). Additional The Da'wa (led by Ibrahim al-Ja'fari) and Sadrist movement in exile, along with the *Fadila* 'Virtue' Party, a subdued version of Sadr's movement, contributed to the strengthening of a diverse political movement that supported Shi'i communal identity (Marr 271).

During the Ba'th regime, Sunnis remained largely independent from sectarian politics. However, with the rise of Kurdish and Shi'i identities and Sunnis' marginalization, identity politics within the Sunni community became prevalent. Some secular, Western-oriented exiles, like the Iraqi Islamic Party, (IIP), eventually accepted this reality. While the majority, including those displaced by the Bremer administration, refused to join and engaged in insurgency (Isakhan, MAKO et al. 244).lastly, in May and June 2003, Bremer's team searched all eighteen provinces in Iraq to find Iraqis to represent their communities on the IGC. The interim Governing Council was announced on 13 July, tasked with advising the CPA, drafting a constitution, and serving as a nominal Iraqi government.

III.1.2. Sectarian representation

Bremer and his advisers implemented a policy of sectarian representation in Iraq's national and local councils. In September 2003, thirteen of the 25 ministries were led by Shi'i members, five Sunnis and Kurds, one Turkoman, and one Christian. This led to sixteen new political parties, with the majority formed on religious or ethnic basis. The formula suggested future political arrangements would follow this pattern, encouraging sectarian militia development and discouraging non-sectarian alliances (OWEN 229).

III.2. A new Framework -Power division: Rooted in the Constitution 2005 of Iraq

The Constitutions are born from needs, which vary from one state to another. In many countries, there is a need to establish a constitution to regulate the powers of authorities and protect rights and freedoms.

The 2005 Iraqi Constitution established a power-division framework to ensure representation for Iraq's diverse population.

The Iraqi constitution contains 144 articles. We will address those articles that fall within our interest subject:

III.2.1. Ethno Sectarian perspective

III.2.1.1. Federal system

Article 1 of the Iraqi Constitution states that "Iraq is a unitary, federal, independent and fully sovereign state. The system of government is republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic in nature. The Constitution serves as a guarantee for the unity of Iraq''(Section 01. Fundamental Principles 1§ Art1,Iraqconst 2005).

Article 117 of the Iraqi Constitution states that

First: This Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the region of

Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region.

Second: This Constitution shall affirm new regions established in accordance with its

provisions (section 05. Powers of the region chapter 01. 'Regions' 1§ art 117, Iraq

const 2005).

A federal state is a state that has a division of power between different levels of

government. The United States of America, Australia, Brazil, Germany, and

India are examples of federal states.

The case of Iraq, Undoubtedly, "Federalism" was the most hotly-debated topic

during the deliberations, alongside the establishment of "regions" and the allocation

of power and authority to the central government. The Kurds emerged victorious in

almost all of their arguments on this matter. They stood firm on their demand for a

power-sharing arrangement between the central government and regions, with

greater emphasis on the latter.

During the negotiations for the establishment of "regions" and the distribution

of power between the central government and regions, the Kurds played a significant

role. Their main objective was to reduce the central government's authority on

taxation, health, and education. Although their ultimate goal was to form a virtually

independent state in the north and be a confederation with Iraq with the right to

secede, they were not able to achieve it. However, they did manage to attain a weak

central government and a highly decentralized polity(Marr 293). According to

O'Leary, when a federacy exists within a federation, neither side has the authority to

independently modify the allocation of powers between the units and the federation,

as outlined in the constitution. This implies that there is neither federal constitutional supremacy as in a federal state nor the right of secession as in a confederation(Arato 180).

III.2.1.2. Unified vs. Regionalized

There were differing opinions on whether Iraq should be divided into strong regions or remain a unified state with a professional army and bureaucracy. Secular Arabs and Sunnis preferred a unified Iraq, fearing that regionalization would lead to the country's breakup. Meanwhile, the Shi'i group was divided on this issue. The Sadrists and the Da'wa did not support the creation of new regions, but SCIRI did. In August, SCIRI proposed the formation of a region in the centre and south, which would include all nine governorates south of Baghdad, as they were under their control. SCIRI believed that it could control a new "Shi'astan," which would include Basra with its oil reserves (Marr 293).The draft constitution confirms Iraqi federalism's three levels: central, regional, and provincial governments, with Kurdistan as the existing regional government (Article 117).Other regions may also be formed in accordance with federal law (J. Brown 13).

The administration of the federal government in the new Iraq should only be responsible for the matters that are assigned to it. Federal Iraqi states should be created based more on geography rather than ethnicity. Since minorities will also be included in these states, it is important to protect individual and group rights for intergroup relations. Decentralization should allow local governments to have the authority to enact laws that follow regional traditions. Iraqi women should not only be eligible to vote, but also have one-third of the seats in the National Assembly. The southern and central provinces including Basra, Dhiqar, Maysan, al-Muthanna,

Najaf, Wasit, Babil, Karbala, and Qadisyah should be separated into at least three governorates to improve the sense of administration among Iraqis(Phillips 02).

III.2.1.3. Islam as a Foundation Source

During the first debate, there was a discussion on whether to use the indefinite article "a" instead of the definite article "the" when describing the role of Islam in shaping future laws. (The) stated that Islam should be considered a source of legislation(Arato 168).AT the early stages of negotiations, some *Shi'a* Islamists from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) proposed that Islam should be the fundamental source of legislation. However, other negotiators, including the Kurds, believed that it should only be one of several sources. As a result, the appropriate article for the draft Constitution was "a" instead of "the." In a set of Kurdish proposals published in the *Al Taakhi* newspaper on July 28, the equivalent provision states that "Islam... is considered a source of legislation"(Deeks, et al09).

It is important to understand that 'a' source or principal source differs from 'the' source in that there are other sources that must also be respected and taken into account. This is in line with the principles of democracy and human rights, as they do not want to establish a hierarchy of sources. Ultimately, the answer will be 'a', not 'the', and these other sources must also be recognized as crucial sources of laws in modern Iraq. The constitution of Iraq states that Islam is the official religion of the State and a foundation source of legislation. Therefore, no law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam can be enacted. Additionally, no law that contradicts the principles of democracy or the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in the constitution can be enacted. However, the emphasis on Islam in the constitution may

raise concerns about the rights of non-Muslims in Iraq, particularly related to their minority rights.

> Constitution of July 22 version stated, "This Constitution shall preserve the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people (by its Shiite majority and its Sunnis) and shall respect all other religions' rights."Iraq const. § 1, art. 2 (July 22, 2005 draft).

On August 6, the main draft became even more detailed, focusing both on religions and on the ethnic identities of groups commonly affiliated with those religions:

> "This Constitution shall preserve the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people by its Shiite majority and its Sunnis from the Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and [Shabak], and shall respect the rights of all other religions, including Christians, among them the [Chaldeans], Assyrians, Syriacs, Armenians, [Yazidis], and [Mandean Sabeans]. " Iraq const. § 1, art. 2 (Aug. 6, 2005 draft).

This excerpt from Article 2 of the 2005 draft Constitution of Iraq. It outlines the commitment to protecting the Islamic identity of the country, while acknowledging the two major branches of Islam within Iraq: Shiite and Sunni. Here are the key points:

➤ Islamic Identity Preservation: The constitution aims to uphold the Islamic character of Iraq, which reflects the majority religion of the nation.

➤ Shia and Sunni Muslims: The text recognizes the presence of the two main Islamic denominations in Iraq - Shia and Sunni - among various ethnic groups such as Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and Shabak.

➢ Respect for Minorities: The excerpt assures respect for the rights of all other religions, including Christianity. It specifically mentions Chaldean, Assyrian, Syriac, Armenian, Yazidi, and MandeanSabean communities.

III.2.2. Economic perspective

According to Rajiv Chandrasekaran, an Indian journalist: Upon his arrival in Iraq, Bremer aimed to establish a free market and promote economic and political reform. He organized the largest liquidation sale of state-owned enterprises since the fall of the USSR. In September 2003, while opening the borders to unrestricted imports, a set of laws was introduced to bring in transnational corporations. Order 37 reduced corporate tax from almost 40 to 15 percent; Order 39 allowed foreign companies to own 100 percent of Iraqi assets; and Order 49 exempted corporations working with the CPA from taxation altogether. Foreign companies were also entitled to leases or contracts that could remain in effect for 40 years. Order 40 was created for foreign banks with the same favorable terms (Y. Ismael and S. Ismael 83).

➢ **Distribution of Authorities:**

Section 4 of the Iraqi Constitution is a source of contention between the Shia Alliance and the Kurdish Alliance. It deals with the control and distribution of natural resources such as oil, gas, water, and their revenues.

Article 110 of the Iraqi Constitution states that

"Planning policies relating to water sources from outside Iraq and guaranteeing the rate of water flow to Iraq and it's just distribution inside Iraq in accordance with international laws and conventions"(sec 04. Powers of the federal government; 8§, art110, Iraqi const 2005).

Article 111of the Iraqi Constitution states that

"Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates."

Article 112of the Iraqi Constitution states that "The federal government, with the producing governorates and regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country, specifying an allotment for a specified period for the damaged regions which were unjustly deprived of them by the former regime, and the regions that were damaged afterwards in a way that ensures balanced development in different areas of the country, and this shall be regulated by a law"(sec 04. Powers of the federal government;1§ art112 Iraqi const 2005).

The federal government, with the producing regional and governorate governments, shall together formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most advanced techniques of the market principles and encouraging investment" (sec 04. Powers of the federal government;2§ art112 Iraqi const 2005).

The section also reflects the broader power struggle between the Shia and the Kurds regarding the strength of the national government.

During negotiations, the Kurds were able to secure significant concessions from the Shia Alliance, both on individual issues and on the Section's overall shape. Regarding oil and gas, the Kurds achieved almost precisely what they set out to accomplish and arguably expanded their authority beyond what the TAL, or Transitional Administrative Law, provided for concerning natural resources.

On August 11, negotiations between parties involved in the issue of oil and gas ownership and management reached a stalemate. In response, the U.S. Government proposed a solution that would involve ownership by the people, management by the federal government in consultation with regional authorities and governorates, and revenue distribution in a fair and equitable manner to be determined by law (Deeks and Burton 55).

The federal government is responsible for managing resources in partnership with the regions and governorates. The revenue generated from these resources should be distributed fairly, in proportion to the population distribution across the country. This includes an allotment of a specified time to regions that were damaged or deprived of income by the former regime (IRAQ CONST. § 5, art. 2(eighth) (Aug. 14, 2005 draft).The Kurds had requested a greater role in managing oil and gas resources in their region. This was probably to ensure that they wouldn't be ignored by future federal governments and to legitimize contracts that the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) had previously made with foreign companies for extracting natural resources, including oil (Senanayake).

III.3. Democratization and elections in Iraq

After the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, numerous political movements and organizations emerged in the country's political sphere. These included both secular and Islamic parties, institutions, and other entities. While some of these were newly formed after 2003, others had already been involved in political work and opposition for a long time. Two rounds of parliamentary elections were held between 2005 and 2010, with varying levels of participation, electoral systems, and political representation distributions. It is worth noting that some of these organizations have a long history of political activism and opposition..

III.3.1. The December 2005 Election

The election of a permanent Iraqi government, which would have a major influence on Iraq's future and last for four years, was outlined in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The next stage of the process was the referendum, which was held prior to the start of the December election campaign.

There was a spike in armed attacks and assassinations in Baghdad and other cities as the campaign rhetoric intensified; these attacks primarily targeted Sunni politicians (Marr 296). A two-tier system that allowed political parties and coalitions to run in each province rather than the entire nation was implemented for the elections that took place in December as a result of revised legislation. This was carried out in order to rectify the imbalance that emerged from the election in January.(See table 1).

Table 1: The December 2005 Parliamentary Election Results (Kirmanj 263).

Alliance /party	Number of votes	Percentage of Votes	Number of seats	Ethnic or sectarian
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA)	5,021,137	41.2	128	Shiite Islamist
Kurdistani Alliance (KA)	2,642,172	21.7	53	Kurdish Secular
Iraqi accord Front (tawafuq)	1,840,216	15.1	44	Sunni Islamist
Iraqi National list (iraqiya)	977,325	8,0	25	Iraqi Secular
National Dialogue Front	499,963	4.1	11	Sunni Secular
Kurdistan Islamic Union	157,688	1.3	5	Kurdish Islamist
Al-Risaliyun	145,028	1.2	2	Shiite Islamist
Reconciliation and Liberation	129,847	1.1	3	Sunni Secular
Turkmen Front	87,993	0.7	1	Kurdish Secular
Rafidain List	47,263	0.4	1	Chado –Assyrian

Iraqi Nation	32,245	0.3	1	Iraqi Secular
Yazidi Movement	21,908	0.2	1	Yazidi Kurd
Total (turnout 79.6%)	12,396,631		275	SHIITES (130,47.3%) Kurds (58,21.1%) Sunnis (58,21.1) Cross-sectarian (26,945%) Minority groups (3,1.05%)

In post-conflict settings like Iraq, elections are crucial for promoting unity and democracy. However, the December 2005 elections in Iraq worsened ethnic and sectarian divisions that were already heightened by the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime and the resulting power vacuum. Various ethnic and sectarian groups were represented by major parties and blocs such as the United Iraqi Alliance, Kurdish Alliance, and Iraqi Accord Front, which competed for power and influence often along ethnic and sectarian lines, further polarizing Iraqi society. The dominance of these parties over the following four years highlighted the difficulties in constructing a unified and inclusive political system in post-Saddam Iraq. Failure to address the underlying grievances contributed to ongoing instability and violence.

III.3.2. The March 2010 Elections

The 2010 legislative elections in Iraq, the second since Saddam Hussein's downfall, represented a major step towards a more stable democracy. The elections produced a diverse parliament with members from a range of ethnic and sectarian

groups, despite security concerns, political rivalries, and tensions between sectarian groups. Following the election results, coalition building and negotiations were necessary for the formation of the government. (See Table 2).

Table 2 (Union, Inter-Parliamentary: *Elections March 2010*)

Elections 7 March 2010			
Number of registered electors18'900'000Voters Blank or invalid ballot papers62.4%Valid votes			
Political Group	Total	Compensatory seats	Ethnics or sectarian
Iraqi National Movement (INM, Al-Iraqiya Coalition)	91	2	Sunni Arabs, secularists, and other groups.(sectarian)
State of Law coalition	89	2	Shia Arab coalition(sectarian)
Iraqi National Alliance (INA)	70	2	Shia Arab coalition(sectarian)
Kurdish Alliance (Kurdistania)	43	1	Kurdish parties (ethnics)
Goran Movement (for Change)	8	0	Kurdish parties(ethnics)
Tawafoq Iraqi Front (Al-Tawafiqlist)	6	0	Sunni Arab(sectarian)
Iraq Unity coalition	4	0	Iraqi nationalist and pan-Arabist groups.
Al-Rafidian list	3	3	mix of Sunni and Shia Arabs(sectarian)
Kurdistan Islamic Union	3	0	moderate Islamist

			agenda.
Kurdish Islamic Party	3	0	Conservative Kurdish Muslims.
Chaldeo-Assyrian-Syriac Public Council	2	2	Minority communities
Ayazei Movement for Reforming	1	1	Represents a specific sect or ethnic group
Representative of Shabak community	1	1	Shia (ethnic minority)
Representative of Sabean community	1	1	Ethnoreligious group

Distribution of seats according to sex

Men	243
Women	82
Percent of women	25.23%

The parliamentary system in Iraq is affected by three interlinked processes, namely seat allocation, coalition formation, and the voting system. Before an election, independent candidates and political parties must register with the Independent High Electoral Commission. After the election, parliamentary seats are allocated to the candidates with the most votes. If no single party wins more than 50% of the seats, parties form a coalition. However, since 2010, the Supreme Court has ruled that parties that could form the largest coalition would have the right to form the government, regardless of who won the most seats. This ruling has allowed the government formation discussions to take place separately from the election. The discussions focus on the distribution of ministerial and executive-level posts among the Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish parliamentary blocs (Stewart-Jolley).

While both the December 2005 and March 2010 elections were pivotal moments in Iraq's path towards democracy, they were not without their fair share of obstacles and criticisms. Security concerns, sectarianism, and political instability presented significant challenges. Although there were positive developments, including higher voter turnout and decreased violence, the ongoing presence of sectarian divides and political fragmentation remain significant hurdles to achieving lasting stability and consolidating democratic ideals in Iraq.

III.3.3. Quota system

III.3.3.1. Ethno - sectarian "quotas":

The Elections of 2005: The true allocation of power and influence in the cabinet would occur through bargaining in Baghdad, rather than the election, (that Because the vied between UIA,SCIRI,Sadrists), This process was often lengthy and arduous. the cabinet was huge and unwieldy— consisting of thirty-two ministers with portfolios and six ministers of state without, so the result was based on ethnic and sectarian "quotas" in the government ,(see table 03),where Shi'a held at least eighteen seats, followed by Kurds with at least eight and Sunni Arabs with six. However, Shi'i took the important posts(Marr 291).

TABLE 03 results of 2005 election based ethno- sectarian "quotas"

Ethnic And Sectarian	Representers	posts
The KurdS	Jalal Talabani/ The Kurdish alliance	presidency
SHIA	Ibrahim al-Ja'fari/ Da'wa	the prime minister
Sunnis	Tariq al-Hashimi	vice president and

		the Defense Ministry
SHIA	Bayan Jabr/SCIRI	the interior minister

After the elections   2010 formation of a new coalition government in Iraq after a period of political deadlock. Here are the key points:

- **Power Sharing:** The new government included representatives from major ethnic and sectarian groups:

Table 04 results of 2010 election based on Coalitions lead to power division

Ethnic And Sectarian	Representers	posts
The Kurds	Jalal Talabani	presidency
SHIA	Nouri al-Maliki	the prime minister
Secular Shiite	IyadAllawi	Security Committee
Sunni	Osama al-Nujaifi	Speaker of the House

- **Benefits of Coalition Government**

  - **National Unity:** Promotes ethnic and sectarian harmony, particularly between Shiite and Sunni.
  - **Balance of Power:** Ensures representation and avoids domination by any one group.
  - **Improved Security:** Strengthens the relationship with the Iraqi people and security forces.

this coalition government structure offered an opportunity to rebuild Iraq and address its challenges. It's important to note that the effectiveness of such a government can be debated, and there may be other perspectives on its success.

III.3.3.2. Women's Quota in Parliament

Since the 1990s, parliamentary gender quotas have become more common, but there is not enough research on how they affect women's political participation. Iraq's political transformation provides a unique perspective on feminist, democratization, and gender quota research, especially when it comes to women in Middle Eastern politics after the US-led invasion in 2003. Throughout Iraq's history, women's ability to participate in politics has changed with the country's political climate. The 2003 invasion triggered sweeping reforms in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government(Huda Al-Tamimi 41).

Article 49 of the Iraqi'2005 constitution aims to ensure that women hold at least one-quarter of the Council of Representatives' seats. This provision was a topic of significant debate during negotiations, with discussions about its existence, percentage, and duration. The provision was initially proposed in the June 30 Al Mada draft, which would have extended beyond the parliamentary body to decision-making positions and ministries for two stages.

The quota was reintroduced around August 2008 when the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) passed a citizenship law that specifically excluded local Jews from regaining citizenship. Negotiators considered various options, including incorporating the two-term limit but making it subject to possible renewal by law at the end of that period, providing a straightforward allocation of seats, or permitting the COR to review and change the quota by law (S. Deeks& D. Burton 43).

In the process of Iraq's political transformation, the implementation of parliamentary gender quotas offers a distinctive viewpoint on feminist, democratization, and gender quota research. However, there are various crucial elements that require further

analysis and examination to evaluate the actual impact of these quotas on the political empowerment of women in Iraq.

Conclusion

This Chapter provides a valuable vision of the power division and challenges of governance in post-invasion Iraq. It underscores the complexities of ethno-sectarian divisions, constitutional frameworks, and democratization processes shaping the country's political landscape. Moving forward, addressing these challenges will require concerted efforts to build inclusive institutions, promote reconciliation, and empower marginalized groups, including women, in Iraqi society.

Conclusion

The Middle East region is currently facing numerous pressures, some of which are in the form of direct intervention by foreign countries seeking to secure their interests in the region, even if by illegal means. As a result, Arab national security has been subjected to shocks and challenges caused by external interference in internal affairs. This has worsened the economic, security, and political problems in these countries. The impact of foreign interference on national security in the region is highly concerning.

Our dissertation provides a comprehensive understanding of the power division in post-invasion Iraq. It reveals a complex landscape shaped by complex historical legacies, external interventions, and internal struggles. The study sheds light on how the external interference exacerbated existing fault lines, leading to sectarian and ethnic divisions that still persist in Iraq's political system. Through an examination of critical mechanisms such as election procedures and resource distribution, the research reveals the strategies employed by various actors to either promote or hinder inclusive power division. The dissertation highlights that the invasion marked a turning point with lasting effects, rather than a mere historical event. It also brings attention to the aftermath of the invasion, including increased sectarian conflict, the emergence of non-state actors, and prolonged instability. Furthermore, it emphasizes the ongoing struggle for power division in Iraq.

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