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By:

Bennadji Mohammed Fadhl Allah - Salhi Mohammed Nacer - Ramdani Sid Ahmed

Methodology forEvaluation and Intelligent Prediction of Fire and Safety Systems in an Electrical Power Plant Using Artificial Intelligence

JURY MEMBRES :

Ms.Oulad El Hadj Aicha	MAA	University of Kasdi Merbah Ouargla	President
Mr. Touahar Hafed	MCB	University of Kasdi Merbah Ouargla	Examiner
Mr. Belkhir SETTOU	MCA	University of Kasdi Merbah Ouargla	Supervisor

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Dedications

To my dear parents, thank you for your unconditional love, patience, and support. I am also grateful to my friends who stood by me and encouraged me throughout this academic journey.

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To my teachers and professors, thank you for sharing your knowledge, guidance, and valuable advice. Your efforts have played an important role in my learning and personal growth

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General Introduction

By supplying a steady and reliable supply of electricity to a variety of sectors, electrical power plants are one of the most important infrastructures fostering industrial, economic, and social advancement. These plants are classified as high-risk industrial environments, particularly with regard to fire and electrical risks, because of their intricate technical components, which include high-voltage equipment, transformers, cables, insulation systems, combustible materials, and high-temperature devices. Safety and fire protection are therefore top priority in these vital facilities' occupational health, safety, and environmental (HSE) management plans.

Fires are among the most severe hazards in power plants, often resulting from electrical faults such as short circuits, overloading, insulation failure, or partial discharge phenomena, in addition to contributing factors like poor ventilation, aging equipment, and human errors. These incidents may lead to serious human injuries, substantial material damage, power outages, and significant economic and environmental consequences, highlighting the necessity of effective early detection and prevention strategies(NFPA 850, 2015)

Although power plants rely on traditional fire detection systems, such as smoke and heat detectors and automated alarm and suppression systems, these systems generally respond only after a hazard occurs. Moreover, conventional fault detection and diagnosis systems rely on fixed thresholds and mathematical models that may not accurately reflect the dynamic and complex operating conditions of modern power plants. Consequently, these systems may produce delayed responses, false alarms, or failure to detect faults at early stages(Lucchi, 2022)

With the advent of Industry 4.0, artificial intelligence (AI) has emerged as an effective tool for improving industrial safety systems. Machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) techniques can analyze large volumes of operational data, detect abnormal patterns, and predict faults before they occur. Additionally, computer vision applications have demonstrated high effectiveness in the early detection of flames and smoke with greater speed and accuracy than conventional sensor-based systems, thus enhancing overall safety and reducing potential losses(Zhang et al., 2021)

In light of the aforementioned, the primary research questions this study attempts to answer is: in comparison to conventional approaches, how much can artificial intelligence increase the efficiency of fire detection systems and improve safety and dependability in electrical power plants?

Highlighting the significance of safety and fire protection in power plants, examining the origins and causes of electrical risks, assessing the shortcomings of traditional methods, and researching the value-added contribution of artificial intelligence (AI) in early fault detection and predictive maintenance are the objectives of this dissertation. A descriptive-analytical methodology was used to accomplish these goals, which included a review of international standards and scientific literature as well as a comparison of the accuracy, response time, and operational efficiency of conventional and intelligent systems. Proposing a scientific foundation to facilitate the creation of more intelligent and proactive protection systems that save assets and human lives while preserving electricity generation is the ultimate objective.

chapter 1

Fire Safety in Electrical Power Plants

1.1 Introduction

Electrical power plants are fundamental pillars of modern development, given their critical role in supplying energy to various sectors. However, the nature of these facilities combining high-voltage electrical systems with flammable materials makes them particularly vulnerable to fire hazards, which can have severe consequences on human safety, assets, and service continuity.

Therefore, the implementation of an integrated fire safety system becomes essential, encompassing early detection, efficient firefighting systems, regular maintenance, and risk management in accordance with international standards. This work aims to highlight fire hazards in power plants and explore effective measures to mitigate them, ensuring a safe and sustainable operating environment

1.2 What is Energy?

Power plants are complex industrial facilities designed to generate electricity by converting primary energy sources into electrical energy through the conversion of primary energy resources such as fossil fuels, water, or other energy sources. These facilities play a crucial role in supporting economic growth, technological development, and the daily activities of modern societies by ensuring a continuous and reliable energy supply. However, due to the presence of numerous electrical and mechanical systems operating at high capacities, power plants are inherently associated with various risks. These risks may arise from electrical components, mechanical equipment, fuel storage systems, and operational processes, which can lead to hazardous situations such as electrical overloads, equipment failures, fires, or explosions. Therefore, understanding the concept of risks within power plants is essential for ensuring operational safety, protecting employees, maintaining system reliability, and supporting sustainable energy production while complying with environmental and safety regulations.(Belyakov, 2019)

1.3 Electrical Power Plant

A power plant is a complex facility designed for large-scale electricity generation by converting various primary energy sources into electrical energy. The conversion process typically involves thermal, mechanical, or kinetic energy transformations, depending on the type of plant. The generated electricity is then conditioned, stepped up in voltage, and transmitted through power grids to meet residential, commercial, and industrial demand((US), 2011)

1.4 Components of an Electrical Power Plant

The diagram presents the main components of an electrical power plant and their interactions. It highlights the essential units involved in energy conversion and electricity generation, including the production, control, and transmission systems, ensuring efficient and safe operation.




Figure 1.1 Components of an Electrical Power Plant

- **Energy Source**: Represents the primary source of energy (fossil, nuclear, or renewable), providing the thermal or mechanical energy required to initiate the electricity generation process.
- **Boiler / Reactor**: Converts water into high-pressure steam (in thermal power plants) or generates heat (in nuclear plants), forming the basis of thermal energy conversion.
- **Turbine**: Converts the energy of steam or gas into mechanical energy through rotation, serving as a key intermediate stage before electricity generation.
- **Generator**: Transforms the mechanical energy produced by the turbine into electrical energy, typically in the form of three-phase current.
- **Transformer**: Increases the voltage level to reduce power losses during electricity transmission.
- **Transmission System**: Transfers electricity from the power plant to consumption centers through high-voltage lines and substations.
- **Cooling System**: Removes excess heat to maintain the efficiency and safe operation of the plant.

- **Condenser**: Converts steam back into water for reuse in the cycle, thereby improving system efficiency.
- **Control System**: Monitors and controls all plant operations using systems such as SCADA to ensure stable performance.
- **Safety System**: Ensures the protection of the facility and personnel from hazards through systems such as fire protection, alarms, and emergency shutdown.(Drbal et al., 2012)

1.5 Types of Power Plants

Power plants can be classified into several main types based on the energy source used to generate electricity. The most important of these types are:

- **Thermal Power Plants:**

Thermal power plants generate electricity by converting heat energy into mechanical energy. This heat is typically produced by burning fossil fuels such as coal, oil, or natural gas. The generated heat is used to produce steam, which drives a turbine connected to an electrical generator.

- **Gas Power Plants (Natural Gas Power Plants):**

Gas power plants specifically utilize natural gas as the primary fuel. They commonly operate using gas turbines or combined cycle systems (CCGT), where hot exhaust gases are used to produce additional steam and improve efficiency. These plants are widely used due to their relatively high efficiency, lower emissions compared to coal, and operational flexibility.

- **Hydroelectric Power Plants:**

Hydroelectric plants convert the potential and kinetic energy of water into electricity. Water stored in dams or flowing in rivers is directed through turbines, causing them to rotate and drive generators.

- **Nuclear Power Plants:**

Nuclear power plants produce heat through nuclear fission reactions. This heat is used to generate steam, which drives turbines to produce electricity. These plants are characterized by high energy output and low greenhouse gas emissions during operation.

- **Solar Power Plants:**

Solar power plants convert solar energy into electricity using photovoltaic (PV) cells or concentrated solar power (CSP) systems that use mirrors to focus sunlight and generate heat.

- **Wind Power Plants:**

Wind power plants harness the kinetic energy of wind to rotate turbine blades connected to generators, producing electricity without fuel consumption.(Drbal et al., 2012)

1.6 Risks in Power Plants

Power plants must operate continuously and safely because they are extremely complex industrial systems made up of many mechanical and electrical components working under high loads. They are subject to a number of operational dangers as a result of their complexity, including electrical overloads, equipment malfunctions, and even explosion hazards, all of which could jeopardize worker safety and operational dependability.

A balance between efficient energy production and environmental responsibility is necessary to achieve sustainable growth in this context, where the energy industry is rapidly changing due to rising global demand and environmental limits. Therefore, technological advancements in energy systems are crucial for increasing generating efficiency, strengthening distribution networks, and maximizing resource management.

From a scientific perspective, the concept of energy has evolved over time. It was first introduced in mechanics by Sir Isaac Newton through the notions of kinetic and potential energy, but it was not fully established as a unified physical concept until the mid-nineteenth century, representing a major advancement in physics (Belyakov, 2019) In general, energy is defined as the capacity of a system to perform work on another system (Belyakov, 2019)

1.6.1 Electrical hazards

Modern life and industrial advancement depend on electrical energy, but when it is not properly managed, it can also present significant problems. Its invisibility and inability to be detected by human senses make it a "silent hazard," which is one of its primary risks.

Faulty installations, inadequate maintenance, broken insulation, or improper electrical system operation can all result in electrical risks. Electric shocks, fires, or even deadly mishaps might result from these circumstances. These risks are frequently overlooked until a major disaster occurs.

Therefore, to lower electrical dangers and guarantee the safety of people and equipment, correct installation, routine inspection, and stringent safety procedures are crucial... (Kulor et al., 2024)

1.6.2 Power Plant Fire Risks

Because of their sophisticated electrical systems, high operating temperatures, and flammable materials, power plants are considered high-risk industrial workplaces. Any malfunction, including electrical or equipment failures, has the potential to start fires or explosions, which could result in serious material damage, production disruptions, and even fatalities.

Power plant fire threats are caused by a number of interrelated elements, primarily related to electrical systems, thermal stressors, and operational procedures.

1.7 Causes of Fires

1.7.1 Short circuits and electrical contact faults

Fires in power plants are mostly caused by electrical contact defects and short circuits. Unintentional electrical connections between conductive elements can cause these defects by permitting current to flow down low-resistance channels and producing excessive heat. Electrical connectors are essential for sustaining steady current flow, especially in high-energy systems like power batteries. However, Electrical Contact Resistance (ECR) has a significant impact on their performance. ECR dramatically rises when contact quality declines as a result of things like surface roughness, inadequate pressure, environmental variables, or mechanical vibrations.

This increase leads to localized Joule heating, especially under high current conditions, resulting in abnormal temperature rise, insulation degradation, and potential

thermal runaway. As insulation weakens, unintended contact between conductive components may occur, triggering short circuits and fire hazards (X. Jia et al., 2026)

1.7.2 Overload of Electrical Power

When the current surpasses the electrical conductors' capability, electrical overload happens, resulting in excessive heat production and insulation deterioration.

High temperatures cause polymeric insulation materials like PVC and XLPE to thermally decompose, releasing flammable gasses that might catch fire. Temperature peaks frequently occur between conductors, and insulation degradation occurs before short circuits, according to numerical and experimental research. (Fariz et al., 2026)

Using methods like TGA-FTIR, thermal degradation processes have been thoroughly examined, validating the generation of flammable gases and determining ignition conditions. (Courty & Garo, 2017)
Furthermore, open-access experimental research demonstrates that the combined thermal and electrical strains of overload circumstances greatly raise the risk of fire.

1.7.3 Elevated Temperature and Thermal Stress

High temperatures constitute a major contributing factor to fire hazards in power plants, particularly in confined environments such as underground cable tunnels. Electrical energy losses during transmission generate significant heat, which, if not effectively dissipated, leads to thermal accumulation and increased system vulnerability.

Cable joints are considered critical thermal hotspots due to their relatively higher electrical contact resistance and reduced heat dissipation efficiency compared to the main conductors. This localized heating can result in temperature rises exceeding safe operational limits, thereby accelerating insulation degradation and increasing the likelihood of fire initiation **(Q. Jia et al., 2023)**

To mitigate these risks, several advanced thermal management strategies have been developed. These include forced ventilation systems and integrated heat recovery solutions, which have demonstrated significant effectiveness in reducing thermal stress, improving heat dissipation, and enhancing overall system performance **(Wegner et al., 2021)**

Furthermore, recent numerical and experimental investigations have confirmed that excessive current levels combined with prolonged exposure durations can lead to insulation breakdown and the occurrence of short-circuit events. These conditions significantly elevate the probability of fire incidents in electrical systems **(Y. Li et al., 2025)**

1.7.4 Poor Maintenance and Combustible Dust

Poor maintenance and inadequate hazard identification significantly increase the risk of fires and explosions, especially in environments containing combustible dust.

Safety Data Sheets (SDS) often lack critical parameters such as Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE), Minimum Ignition Temperature (MIT), and Limiting Oxygen Concentration (LOC), leading to underestimation of fire hazards.

Experimental and industrial studies show that ignoring these parameters can compromise safety systems and increase the likelihood of incidents (Fabiano, 2020)

Additionally, electrostatic charging and material handling processes can act as ignition sources in dust-rich environments, further increasing fire and explosion risks(Grashchenkov, 2024)

1.8 Fire Fighting Systems

Fire safety systems are an essential component of the safety infrastructure in industrial facilities, particularly in power plants. These environments contain a large amount of sensitive electrical equipment, which can be exposed to various fire hazards. Such risks may arise from electrical failures, fuel leaks, or sudden increases in temperature.

To reduce these risks and ensure effective protection, fire protection systems are generally designed with three main components that work together to detect and control fire incidents:

- Fire detection systems (detectors), which identify the presence of smoke, heat, or flames.
- Fire suppression systems, responsible for controlling or extinguishing the fire.
- Alarm systems, which alert personnel and trigger emergency response procedure

1.9 Fire Detection Systems (Smoke, Heat, and Flame Detectors)

Fire detection systems are installed in stations to ensure the early detection of fire incidents, which helps minimize potential damage and increases the likelihood of controlling the fire before it spreads. These systems rely on different types of sensors such as smoke detectors, heat detectors, and flame detectors, each designed to identify specific fire-related indicators. As illustrated .fire detectors can be classified into several categories depending on the detection principle and application.

Recent studies indicate that the integration of visual data with artificial intelligence significantly enhances the performance of fire detection systems. For instance, one study reported that deep learning models, such as P-Dense Net-A-TL, achieved a high testing accuracy of 99.06% in detecting and distinguishing fire-related patterns in images. This demonstrates the potential of advanced machine learning techniques to improve the reliability and efficiency of modern fire detection technologies.

“The proposed P-Dense Net-A-TL deep learning model demonstrates strong fire detection capabilities, achieving a test accuracy of 99.06 % for identifying smoke and flame. The model uses attention mechanisms to focus on relevant image regions for rapid and precise detection of fire indicators in complex settings.”***(H. Li et al., 2024)***

Furthermore, detection frameworks based on Transformer architectures have demonstrated greater effectiveness in distinguishing genuine events from errors caused by environmental factors, thereby enhancing the reliability of the system in industrial operating environments.

The transformer-based detection framework enhances the accuracy of early fire detection by effectively identifying both smoke and flame across fires of varying scales. The experimental results demonstrate improved robustness of the system, particularly in its ability to differentiate actual fire incidents from false alarm ***(Cheng et al., 2024a)***

Thus, the integration of computer vision technologies with artificial intelligence not only contributes to early detection but also helps reduce false alarms, which represent a significant challenge in large facilities.




Figure 1.2 Types of Fire Detectors

1.10 Firefighting Systems (Water, CO_2, Foam, Clean Agents)

Firefighting systems constitute the second line of defense against fires after their detection. These systems operate by eliminating one of the essential elements required for combustion, namely heat, oxygen, or fuel. The appropriate firefighting system is selected depending on the nature of the fire and the specific location where it occurs within the power station.

Common firefighting agents include water, carbon dioxide (CO_2), foam, and clean agents, each of which is applied according to the characteristics of the fire risk in the protected area.

1.10.1 Water Mist System

The water mist system works by releasing very fine water droplets capable of rapidly absorbing large amounts of heat, which leads to reducing the temperature of the surrounding environment and weakening the combustion process. These fine droplets also help disrupt the flame structure and reduce its intensity, thereby assisting in controlling and suppressing the fire effectively.

Simulation models and experimental studies have shown that water mist systems significantly reduce flame intensity and limit the rate of fire spread, making them particularly suitable for enclosed spaces within power stations, such as control rooms and electrical equipment areas.

Water mist systems suppress fire by rapid cooling and partial oxygen displacement due to the evaporation of fine water droplets. This mechanism significantly reduces flame temperature and heat release rate, particularly in enclosed spaces***(Lee & Moon, 2020)***




Figure 1.3 Water Mist System Working Principle

1.10.2 Carbon Dioxide (CO_2) Systems

CO_2 systems operate by reducing the oxygen concentration in the air to a level that cannot sustain combustion, thereby extinguishing the fire rapidly. These systems are particularly effective in enclosed areas such as electrical control rooms, where the use of water could damage sensitive equipment.

Carbon dioxide fire suppression systems extinguish fires by displacing oxygen in the protected environment and reducing its concentration below the level required to sustain combustion. In enclosed spaces, CO_2 is discharged to achieve a uniform concentration throughout the compartment, which suppresses flame propagation regardless of the fire location. Experimental and operational studies indicate that a design concentration of approximately 34–36% CO_2 is typically required in total flooding systems to effectively extinguish fires in enclosed environments***(Wen et al., 2022)***




Figure 1.4 CO_2 Flooding Fire Suppression System

1.10.3 Foam Systems

Foam fire suppression systems are widely used to control fires involving flammable liquids, such as those occurring in fuel storage tanks. The foam forms a stable blanket over the liquid surface, which separates the fuel from oxygen and prevents the release of flammable vapors, thereby suppressing combustion. ***(Fire Protection Association, 2020)***

1.11 Comparison of Fire Suppression Systems

The following table provides a comparative assessment of fire suppression systems employed in power plants, with emphasis on their suitability for electrical equipment and their integration potential with AI-based intelligent safety systems.

Table 1.1 Comparison of Fire Suppression Systems

Fire Suppression System	Working Principle	Suitable Fire Type	Suitability for Electrical Equipment	Integration with Smart Systems	Main Limitations	Reference
Water Mist	Fire cooling using fine water droplets and heat absorption	Solid and liquid fires	Moderate	Can be connected to smart detection systems for automatic control	Limited effectiveness in large spaces	(Nfpa, 2023)
Carbon Dioxide (CO_2)	Reduces oxygen concentration to stop combustion	Electrical equipment fires	High	Can be automatically activated through alarm systems	Dangerous for occupants in enclosed spaces	(Guo et al., 2025)
Foam System	Forms an insulating layer that prevents fuel vaporization	Flammable liquid fires	Low	Limited integration with smart systems	Leaves residues and requires maintenance	(Yan et al., 2024)
Clean Agents (FM-200 / Novec 1230)	Absorbs heat and interrupts the chemical combustion reaction	Electronic and electrical equipment fires	Very High	Easily integrated with intelligent fire detection and control systems	High installation and refill cost	(Dong et al., 2024)

1.12 Comparison of Fire Detection Systems

The following table provides a comparative overview of the main fire detection systems used in industrial facilities, highlighting their detection principles, effectiveness, and typical applications.

Table 1.2 Comparison of Fire Detection Systems

Detector Type	Detection Principle	Effectiveness	Typical Applications	Main Limitations	Reference
Smoke Detector	Detects smoke particles in the air using optical or ionization sensors	High in early detection	Control rooms, industrial buildings	False alarms caused by dust or steam	(Hwang et al., 2024)
Heat Detector	Responds when the temperature exceeds a predefined threshold	Moderate	Warehouses and industrial areas	Slower response compared to smoke detectors	(Lv et al., 2022)
Flame Detector	Detects ultraviolet (UV) or infrared (IR) radiation emitted by flames	High and fast	Fuel areas and turbine sections	May be affected by strong light sources	(Bordbar et al., 2022)
AI-Based Optical Detection	Analyzes camera images using deep learning algorithms	Very High	Intelligent industrial monitoring systems	Requires computing power and network infrastructure	(Cheng et al., 2024)

1.13 Conclusion

Although electrical power plants are vital infrastructures for the production of energy, high-voltage systems, thermal stress, and flammable materials put them at serious risk of fire. The primary features of power plants, the various fire threats they encounter, and the primary causes of fire occurrences were discussed in this chapter.

Additionally, it examined contemporary fire safety systems, including technology for detection and suppression, and emphasized the expanding role of artificial intelligence in enhancing early detection and lowering hazards.

In conclusion, to maintain safe and dependable operation, effective fire safety in power plants necessitates an integrated strategy that combines preventative maintenance, cutting-edge protective technologies, and intelligence monitoring.

chapter 2

Artificial Intelligence in Fire and Safety Systems

2.1 Introduction

Process safety is a critical element in managing many industrial sectors, focusing on preventing major incidents such as explosions, fires, and hazardous leaks that pose serious risks to human life and the environment. In this context, artificial intelligence (AI) has emerged as a modern technological approach that integrates advanced digital tools, including digital twins, to detect anomalies and conduct predictive risk assessments, thereby enhancing overall system safety. AI-powered analytical methods have demonstrated promising performance in early fault detection, dynamic risk assessment, and predicting the impact of potential incidents. Furthermore, the adoption of human-machine collaborative decision-making systems is increasing in oil refineries, petrochemical plants, and other chemical production environments to support the selection of appropriate materials and improve process reliability.

However, the application of AI in high-risk industrial environments raises new technical and organizational challenges. These challenges include the limitations of interpreting model correlations, potential uncertainties in results, cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and the need to validate AI functions under uncertain, rare, or unprecedented conditions. These considerations collectively underscore the importance of integrating artificial intelligence applications within existing operational and functional safety frameworks to ensure reliable and safe industrial processes (Selvam et al., 2026a)

The idea of creating intelligent computers has captured researchers' interest since the advent of the first computers; in fact, early references to the concept of artificial intelligence date back even further. Nevertheless, the question remains: What do we mean by artificial intelligence, especially since the concept of "intelligence" itself is difficult to define precisely? The precise definition of intelligence, as well as artificial intelligence, remains a subject of widespread debate, and this has led to a great deal of confusion. For example, one dictionary defines artificial intelligence as a field of study within computer science that focuses on developing computer systems capable of simulating patterns of human thinking, such as learning, reasoning, and self-correction.

2.2 Artificial Intelligence

Designing and creating intelligent systems that can mimic human cognitive abilities—such as learning from data, logical reasoning, decision-making, and environmental adaptation—in order to carry out tasks that normally require human intelligence is the focus of the scientific field of artificial intelligence within computer science.(Kok et al., 2009)

2.3 characteristics of Artificial Intelligence

- **Early Identification of Faults**

Before mishaps like fires or explosions happen, artificial intelligence aids in identifying variations in system and equipment performance.

- **Forecasting Risk**

It makes it possible for industrial data analysis to forecast possible events, promoting preventive safety as opposed to reactive measures following mishaps.

- **Analyzing Data in Real Time**
  Instantaneous processing of sensor and system data allows for quick decision-making in urgent circumstances.

- **Systems for Making Decisions**
  It helps engineers and operators choose the optimal course of action to lower risks and increase safety.

- **Digital Equivalents**
  They make it possible to simulate industrial systems virtually and test dangerous scenarios without endangering the actual site.

- **Complicated Industrial Settings**
  Large, interconnected systems like refineries and power plants with sophisticated machinery can be handled by it.

- **Predictive Maintenance**
  It helps determine the optimal time for equipment maintenance before failures occur, reducing accidents and downtime.

- **Process Safety Enhancement**
  It contributes to reducing major accidents such as fires, leaks, and explosions through continuous intelligent monitoring.(Lan et al., 2026)

2.4 Importance of Artificial Intelligence in Safety

- **Improving Safety and Reliability**
  Artificial intelligence helps improve safety through continuous monitoring of systems and operations, detecting faults and anomalies, and predicting failures before they occur. Techniques such as neural networks, fault trees, and Bayesian networks are used to assess system reliability and reduce industrial risks.

- **Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HCAI)**
  The concept of human-centered AI focuses on supporting humans rather than replacing them, as it helps save time, reduce workload, and improve work quality, while maintaining human supervision to ensure safety and reliability.

- **The Role of Machine Learning in Safety**
  Machine learning relies on data analysis to make accurate decisions and predict risks and failures. The more data used, the more accurate and reliable AI systems become in improving the performance of safety systems.

- **Risk and Failure Prediction**
  Artificial intelligence contributes to estimating the probability of system failures before accidents occur by analyzing historical and real-time data and using probabilistic modeling and neural networks, which helps reduce risks and improve industrial system reliability.

- **Importance of AI in Critical Sectors**
  Artificial intelligence plays an important role in many fields such as healthcare, industry, transportation, and cybersecurity, where it helps improve safety, reduce errors, and enhance system efficiency.

- **Challenges Related to AI Safety**

Despite its importance, AI still faces challenges affecting its safety and reliability, such as data bias, cybersecurity risks, lack of transparency, and data privacy issues, which require the development of safer and more reliable systems.

- **The Future of AI in Safety**

The study indicates that the importance of AI will increase in the Industry 5.0 era, where collaboration between humans and intelligent systems will become a key element in improving protection and reducing risks in sensitive industrial environments.(Nguyen et al., 2024)

2.5 Artificial Intelligence Techniques




Figure 2.1Artificial Intelligence Techniques

2.6 Machine Learning

Machine learning is a technology that's used to extract knowledge from data, known also as predictive analytics or statistical learning, where I machine model is developed to analyze data which has multiple features, making it an intersection of statistics, artificial intelligence (AI) and computer since, machine learning has already multiple application from commerce to data-driven research in industrial context such as predictive maintenance, smart monitoring…, making the new era of industry 4.0.(Rasheed et al., 2020)

The innovation of machine learning is the ability of making models that can learn the data deeply, making it able to make decisions without human intervention instead of the classical if, else approach, another advantage of machine learning is replacing human expert by a model which more reliable then human in psychological aspects such as: forgetfulness (Rasheed et al., 2020)

In industrial context, where there is massive data generated every day from sensors to reports, process companies started integrating machine learning to solve their problems, one of which is the deterioration of their critical equipment, therefore multiple concepts have been emerged which are preventive and now predictive maintenance (Zonta et al., 2020)

Predictive maintenance uses machine learning techniques to learn from the data to identify the patterns of failure, instead of following machine life cycle parts in classical maintenance, thus data driven approach of predictive maintenance making as able to predict future failures resulting 39 on lower to none down times and reduce costs and improve the overall system reliability serving as a preventive layer (Müller & Guido, 2016)

2.6.1 Types of machine Learning

2.6.1.1 Supervised Learning

Supervised learning is perhaps the easiest type of machine learning to understand. Its goal is to learn to make predictions from a list of labeled examples, meaning each example is accompanied by the value to be predicted (see Figure). The labels act as a "teacher" and supervise the algorithm's learning process. (Müller & Guido, 2016)




Figure 2.2 Supervised Learning Process

2.6.1.2 Unsupervised Learning

In unsupervised learning, the data are not labeled. The goal is to model the observations to better understand them (Müller & Guido, 2016)



Figure 2.3 Unsupervised Learning

2.6.1.3 Reinforcement Learning

"In reinforcement learning, an agent learns by interacting with an environment. The agent receives rewards or penalties based on its actions and uses this feedback to improve its performance over time."(Müller & Guido, 2016)

2.7 AI Applications in Fire and Safety Systems

2.7.1 Predictive Maintenance

One of the most significant uses of artificial intelligence is predictive maintenance, which uses industrial data analysis to anticipate failures before they happen.
Large volumes of data (such as temperature, vibration, and pressure) from equipment can be gathered by AI systems, which can then use machine learning techniques to evaluate the data and identify unusual trends.
This method aids in:
* Early identification of faults

- Minimizing unplanned downtime
- Increasing the remaining useful life (RUL) of equipment

Predictive maintenance uses machine learning models that have been trained on past data to predict when a failure is likely to occur, enabling proactive measures to be implemented. (Çınar et al., 2020)

2.7.2 Intelligent Fire Detection

Intelligent fire detection systems (SFF systems) rely on a combination of sensors such as flame sensors, gas sensors, and temperature sensors installed within a building. Multiple readings from these sensors are used to determine whether a real fire has occurred, rather than depending on a single sensor alone.

The results show that the system achieves an accuracy of more than 95%, except in some unusual cases where a real fire may be misclassified as a false or deceptive fire hazard. This is mainly due to the system's reliance on multiple inputs to confirm the event.

However, the system includes a warning mechanism that triggers alerts even in uncertain cases, allowing safety teams to take precautionary measures. In addition, a servo motor is used to locate the fire, assess flame intensity, and test the alarm system, which enhances the overall efficiency of fire monitoring inside buildings.(Mobin et al., 2016)

2.7.3 Risk Assessment and Hazard Prediction

In order to extract valuable information and enhance safety analysis, artificial intelligence solutions in the safety domain rely on analyzing massive amounts of data. These technologies make it possible to find abnormalities and trends in data, which contributes to a better understanding of the circumstances surrounding accidents.

By evaluating data pertaining to a variety of variables, including human behavior, environmental circumstances, and system status, AI models are also utilized to forecast accidents and lessen their severity. These models aid in the analysis and detection of accident causes as well as the creation of prediction systems that use past data to foresee future occurrences.(Tselentis et al., 2023)

2.7.4 Emergency Response Optimization

In order to safeguard individuals and employees during significant catastrophes, emergency response planning and optimization are crucial. A number of solutions, including shelter-in-place tactics, evacuation, and the use of protective gear, can be implemented. However, choosing the best course of action depends on a number of factors, such as social repercussions, financial expenses, and health effects.

Using a multi-objective optimization technique, emergency response optimization focuses on evaluating several options and choosing the optimal one. This method supports decision-making in emergency situations while assisting in the identification of practical solutions that strike a balance between risk reduction and adverse effects.(Georgiadou et al., 2010)

2.8 Benefits and Limitations of Artificial Intelligence in HSE Systems

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is considered one of the most prominent modern technologies that has brought significant transformation across various industrial sectors, particularly in Health, Safety, and Environment (HSE) systems within electrical power plants. It contributes to enhancing safety levels through its ability to analyze data, predict potential risks, and support fast and accurate decision-making. However, despite these advantages, the use of AI is not without challenges and limitations that must be taken into account. In this context, this section discusses the main benefits of AI, such as improving safety and reducing accidents, as well as its limitations related to cost and accuracy.

2.8.1 Benefits

2.8.1.1 Early Fire Detection and Safety Improvement

Early fire detection is considered a key factor in improving safety levels within high-risk industrial environments, such as electrical power plants. Traditional fire detection systems mainly rely on heat sensors and smoke detectors, which often respond only after the fire has reached a relatively advanced stage, leading to delayed intervention and increased potential damage. In contrast, modern technologies based on visual data analysis, such as images and video streams, enable the detection of fire indicators at early stages, including smoke patterns and flame characteristics, which significantly reduces response time (Cheng et al., 2024).

Moreover, deep learning techniques contribute to improving the accuracy of detection systems by automatically extracting relevant features from data without relying on predefined rules. This capability allows these systems to distinguish between actual hazards and non-threatening environmental factors such as dust or fog, thereby reducing false alarms and enhancing system reliability (Cheng et al., 2024). In addition, these systems operate in real time, allowing for fast and effective decision-making, which is essential to limit fire spread and reduce risks to both personnel and infrastructure. Studies have shown that some modern detection systems can achieve accuracy rates exceeding 95% in detecting fire and smoke (Dogan et al., 2022)

Overall, the development of early fire detection systems represents an essential step toward enhancing safety management by reducing response time, improving detection

accuracy, and enabling industrial facilities to proactively manage risks, thereby increasing overall safety levels within electrical power plants.

2.8.1.2 Reducing Accidents

Reducing accidents is a major objective in industrial safety, especially in high-risk environments such as electrical power plants. Many industrial accidents are often caused by unexpected equipment failures or human errors, which can lead to serious consequences if not addressed in time. In this context, modern technologies such as machine learning offer effective solutions to minimize these risks.

Machine learning techniques are widely used in predictive maintenance, where they analyze historical and real-time data collected from industrial equipment to identify patterns that may indicate potential failures. This allows maintenance operations to be carried out before faults occur, reducing the likelihood of accidents and improving overall system reliability (Theissler et al., 2021) .

In power plants, for example, machine learning models can monitor critical components such as transformers and generators by analyzing parameters like temperature, vibration, and pressure. Detecting abnormal behavior at an early stage helps prevent serious incidents such as overheating or mechanical failure.

In addition, machine learning contributes to reducing human error by providing real-time alerts and decision support for operators. Instead of relying solely on manual monitoring, intelligent systems can automatically detect abnormal conditions and notify operators, allowing for faster and more accurate responses (Elkateb et al., 2024). This reduces the chances of mistakes that could lead to accidents.

Furthermore, machine learning can be used for risk analysis by evaluating large volumes of operational data to identify hazardous situations and predict potential risks. This proactive approach enables industries to move from reactive responses to preventive strategies, significantly improving safety performance.

2.8.2 Limitations of AI Use

2.8.2.1 Cost

The implementation of artificial intelligence systems in industrial environments involves significant costs that may limit their adoption. One of the main factors contributing to these costs is the need for advanced computational resources, particularly in applications such as real-time video analysis, where powerful hardware like GPUs and high-performance servers are required to process large amounts of data efficiently (Cheng et al., 2024). In addition, machine learning models rely heavily on large datasets for training, which requires considerable effort in data collection, annotation, and storage, further increasing both time and financial expenses (Cheng et al., 2024) , (Theissler et al., 2021).

Moreover, the deployment of AI-based systems requires the installation of multiple sensors and data acquisition devices to continuously monitor industrial equipment. These components must be maintained and integrated into the system, which adds to the overall operational cost (Theissler et al., 2021). Another challenge is the integration of AI technologies with existing industrial infrastructure, as many facilities operate with legacy systems that require upgrades or modifications to support intelligent solutions, leading to additional investment in both hardware and software (Paolanti et al., 2018).

Furthermore, systems based on the Internet of Things (IoT) and machine learning depend on interconnected devices and communication networks, which increase installation and maintenance costs, especially in large-scale industrial environments (Elkateb et al., 2024). Therefore, despite the benefits of AI in improving safety and reducing accidents, its implementation requires substantial financial resources, making cost a key limitation that must be carefully considered

2.8.2.2 Accuracy

Despite the promising performance of artificial intelligence in fire and safety systems, several limitations still affect its accuracy and reliability. One of the major constraints concerns data quality and data scarcity, especially in rare fire events, where limited or imbalanced datasets can reduce model performance and lead to unreliable predictions. In safety-critical environments, this may result in both false alarms and missed detections, which directly affect system credibility and operational safety.(Selvam et al., 2026)

Another limitation is the difficulty of maintaining high accuracy under dynamic industrial conditions. Variations in temperature, smoke characteristics, sensor noise, and harsh operating environments can reduce the robustness of AI models when transferred from laboratory conditions to real applications. Models with high reported accuracy may therefore experience reduced performance in practical deployment.(Selvam et al., 2026)

Moreover, some advanced machine learning models suffer from the black-box problem, where predictions may be accurate but difficult to interpret. This lack of explainability limits trust in AI decisions, particularly in fire and safety systems where transparent and justifiable decisions are essential. Explainable AI has been proposed to mitigate this issue, but interpretability remains a challenge in many complex models.(Shadi et al., 2025)

Therefore, although AI improves detection and prediction capabilities, its effectiveness remains constrained by data dependency, false alarm risks, reduced generalization, and explainability limitations, which require continuous validation and human supervision.(Selvam et al., 2026) (Shadi et al., 2025)

2.9 Conclusion

In conclusion, because of its capacity to evaluate vast volumes of data, anticipate hazards, identify early failures, assist in decision-making, and improve emergency response, artificial intelligence is a crucial technology for enhancing industrial safety. Additionally, it helps to improve system reliability and lower accident rates, especially in delicate industrial settings like power plants.

Notwithstanding these benefits, there are still a number of obstacles to the application of artificial intelligence, such as problems with data quality, a lack of transparency, expensive costs, and cybersecurity difficulties. To guarantee dependability and operational safety, it should be integrated with conventional safety systems under constant human supervision.

All things considered, artificial intelligence is a significant step toward the creation of more intelligent and effective safety systems while

preserving the vital balance between technological advancement and operational safety.

chapter 3


Evaluation and Prediction Methodology

Introduction

Given the technical and operational complexity of gas-fired power plants, the investigation of gas-fired power plant accidents is an essential part of the creation and enhancement of industrial safety systems. Using a thorough analytical method that is not restricted to a particular kind of incident, this chapter looks at a number of notable incidents that have happened both nationally (Algeria) and internationally. Rather, it covers a broad spectrum of situations, such as gas leaks, explosions, fires, as well as operational mistakes and technical malfunctions. This method makes it possible to comprehend the variety and nature of dangers related to gas-based power generation systems in a comprehensive way.

This chapter seeks to determine recurrent causes and common risk patterns by a methodical and thorough investigation of these case studies. It also assesses the efficacy of emergency response tactics used during these disasters. This evaluation identifies the event management system's advantages as well as its current shortcomings. In order to detect possible risks and improve safety procedures, the results are also used to the Sonelgaz HMN3 power plant. In this regard, the chapter also examines how artificial intelligence approaches might be integrated as a novel way to enhance risk prediction, prevention, and overall safety system performance in gas-fired power plants.

3.1 Methodological Framework



3.2 Classification of Accident Types in Gas Power Plants

The statistical analysis presented in this chapter is based on a review of multiple industrial accident reports (CSB, IEEE, NFPA, IOGP), with data reclassification according to the nature of accidents in gas power plants




Figure 3.1 Classification of Accident Types in the World

Figure 3.1 illustrates the relative distribution of accident types in gas power plants. The results show that gas explosions represent the largest share of accidents compared to other types, followed by gas turbine failures and electrical fires.

It should be noted that these values represent an approximate distribution, derived from a review of several industrial reports and safety studies. They are not fixed values from a single source, due to variations in databases and operational environments.

3.2.1 Gas Leakage Explosion

Gas explosions occur due to leakage of flammable gas and its accumulation in confined areas, followed by ignition from electrical sparks or hot surfaces.
They are among the most dangerous events due to their potential to cause large-scale blast damage and fatalities.

Main Causes

- Corrosion and aging of pipelines
- Excessive gas pressure in transmission systems
- Failure of isolation valves or emergency shut-down systems

- Poor maintenance and leakage from joints or flanges
- Human error during operation or maintenance

3.2.2 Gas Turbine Failures

These failures are mainly mechanical or thermal, caused by vibration, rotor imbalance, overheating, lubrication problems, or blade damage.
They usually lead to performance degradation, forced shutdowns, or severe mechanical breakdown.

Main Causes

Rotor imbalance and mechanical vibration

Lubrication system failure

Excessive operating temperature

Blade erosion, fatigue, or cracking

Poor maintenance or delayed inspection

3.2.3 Transformer Fires

Transformer fires result from insulation failure, overheating, overload, or internal short circuits.
Once the insulating oil ignites, fires can spread rapidly and cause major equipment loss and long outages.

Main Causes

Electrical overload

Insulation degradation

Oil leakage or contamination

Internal short circuits

Poor cooling system performance

3.2.4 Hydrogen Explosions

Hydrogen explosions occur in generator cooling systems due to hydrogen leakage and mixing with air.
Because hydrogen is highly flammable, even small ignition sources can trigger violent explosions.

Main Causes

Hydrogen leakage from generator casing

Seal or gasket failure

Poor ventilation in generator housing

Cooling system malfunction

Maintenance errors

3.2.5 Electrical Arc Flash Incidents

Arc flash incidents are caused by insulation failure, human error, or electrical faults. They release extremely high thermal energy in milliseconds, causing severe burns, pressure waves, and equipment destruction.

Main Causes

Human error during switching operations

Insulation failure or degradation

Poor maintenance of electrical equipment

Accidental contact with energized parts

Faulty installation or equipment defects

3.2.6 Analysis of Gas Power Plant Accidents

This section is based on a review and analysis of documented studies related to accidents occurring in gas power plants at both global and local levels. These cases were selected in order to identify recurring causes of failure patterns, as well as the technical and organizational factors involved, in addition to highlighting the main risk indicators associated with the operation of this type of facility. This analysis provides a structured and systematic understanding of accident behavior in gas power plants and helps identify the key weaknesses that frequently appear in this industrial sector.

3.3 Risk analysis and assessment at the HMN3 power plant

In our previous discussion about accidents that occurred, if we assume that such accidents could take place in the HMN3 power plant, the first step would be to raise a set of critical questions:

To answer these questions, a table was provided that addresses the questions raised.

3.4 Presentation of the station HMN3

The HMN3 power plant, located in Hassi Messaoud, southern Algeria, is a gas turbine-based power generation facility operated by Sonelgaz. The plant primarily uses natural gas as its main fuel, with backup fuels available to ensure continuous production.

The plant comprises three generating units with a total capacity of approximately 660 megawatts (MW). Its primary purpose is to support the national electricity grid and meet the growing demand for electricity, particularly in areas with high industrial activity.

The plant's location in the Hassi Messaoud region was strategically chosen due to its proximity to industrial and oil facilities, enabling it to supply the necessary electricity to these facilities and contribute to the development of the energy infrastructure in southern Algeria.

3.5 Comparative Analysis of Industrial Incidents – HMN3 Risk Assessment

Table 3.1 Comparative Analysis of Industrial Incidents – HMN3 Risk Assessment

Name of the Incident	Type of Accident	Scene	Similarities with HMN3	HMN3 Incidence Rate	Basis for Determining the Percentage	How to Deal with the Accident
Muskingum River Power Plant Hydrogen Explosion (2007)	Hydrogen explosion during refueling	Beverly, Ohio, USA	Gas systems, pressure, and maintenance similar to CCGT stations	Medium to high	The presence of highly flammable gas, similar global incidents, and maintenance errors.	Shut down the H_2 source, perform an emergency shutdown, isolate the area, activate ventilation, use gas detectors, and apply LOTO and PTW.
Power Station Generator – Hydrogen Fire from Improper Purging Procedure	Hydrogen fire during maintenance	USA	The same hydrogen generator cooling system and purging processes	Medium	Possibility of H_2 gas remaining inside the pipes during maintenance	Ensure complete purging, measure H_2 concentration before opening the pipes, and isolate the system electrically and mechanically.
Ware River Power Plant Arc Flash (2016)	Arc Flash inside an electrical panel	Massachusetts, USA	The presence of a similar MCC switchgear in the HMN3	High	Frequent switching and electrical maintenance work	Feeding separation, LOTO application, PPE use, worker distancing, panel inspection before operation.

Name of the Incident	Type of Accident	Scene	Similarities with HMN3	HMN3 Incidence Rate	Basis for Determining the Percentage	How to Deal with the Accident
Oklaunion Power Station Arc Flash (2019)	Arc Flash during Fuse Check	Vernon, Texas, USA	Similar electrical inspections are performed within live panels.	High	Errors in working under live effort	Prohibiting work on energized equipment, using insulated equipment, and training workers.
Dave Johnston Power Plant Arc Flash (2020)	Arc Flash due to voltage measurement error	Glenrock, Wyoming, USA	Use of MCC measuring devices inside the station	Medium	Human errors during electrical measurement	Verify the settings of measuring devices, use remote testing, and implement safety procedures.
LANL TA-53 Arc Flash Accident (2015)	Arc Flash inside Switchgear 13.8 kV	Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA	The presence of a medium voltage switchgear similar to that in HMN3	Medium to high	Danger of working near under-voltage equipment	Zero Energy verification, LOTO application, and prohibit spraying or cleaning near live equipment.
Hsinta Power Plant – Taiwan	Gas turbine fire due to fuel/gas leak	Taiwan	Gas Turbine and similar Fuel Gas systems are available	High	Potential gas leak from the flange or gasket	Fuel shut-off, turbine isolation, fire suppression, early leak detection.

Name of the Incident	Type of Accident	Scene	Similarities with HMN3	HMN3 Incidence Rate	Basis for Determining the Percentage	How to Deal with the Accident
Thermal Power Plant – France	Turbine fire caused by a crack in the fuel pipe	France	The presence of fuel pipes and similar combustion systems	Medium	Pipe aging and thermal vibrations	Turn off the unit, cool the area, inspect the pipes periodically, and monitor the temperature.
Hydraulic Oil Leakage Fire – France	Fire caused by hydraulic oil leak	France	The presence of hydraulic systems inside the turbines	Medium	Possibility of oil leakage near hot surfaces	Shut down the system, use fire extinguishers, clean up the leak immediately, and monitor the area.
Kleen Energy Systems Power Plant – USA	Explosion and fire during gas purging	USA	Gas purging operations are similar to those at gas stations.	High	Gas buildup during purging and poor safety procedures	Stop the process, ventilate the area, monitor gas concentration, and prevent ignition sources.
Thermal Power Plant – Japan	Fire caused by incorrect gasket installation	Japan	The presence of flanges and gaskets in fuel systems	Medium	Installation and maintenance errors	Gasket inspection, leak monitoring, routine maintenance, and pressure testing after installation.

Name of the Incident	Type of Accident	Scene	Similarities with HMN3	HMN3 Incidence Rate	Basis for Determining the Percentage	How to Deal with the Accident
Kleen Energy Explosion (2010)	Gas explosion	USA	Same gas refueling system + same operating principle CCGT	High	HMN3 uses the same high-pressure gas system + the same	Prevent purges inside buildings + gas monitoring + automatic shut-off in case of leaks.
Naphtha Explosion (1996)	Explosion inside enclosure	Britain	The presence of high-pressure fuel pipes + a similar enclosure	Average	Due to the possibility of poor ventilation or leaks in the connections	Improved ventilation + leak monitoring + connection maintenance.
GT Exhaust Explosion (2013)	Explosion / fire	Asia	Same gas turbine + same re-ignition scenario	Average	Depends on the number of ignition attempts and the behavior of the system.	Force purge before restart + combustion monitoring.
Enclosure Fires (64 cases)	Fires inside the turbine	Global	Same turbine casing + same causes (leaks + oils)	High	Global statistical study (64 incidents) + same technology	Predictive maintenance + thermal cameras + automatic shutdown.
Heathrow Substation Fire (2025)	Electrical transformer fire	Britain	The same high voltage transformers (400 kV)	Average	Similarity in voltage level + risk of equipment obsolescence	DGA monitoring + humidity maintenance + fire suppression systems.

Name of the Incident	Type of Accident	Scene	Similarities with HMN3	HMN3 Incidence Rate	Basis for Determining the Percentage	How to Deal with the Accident
Peru CT Explosion (2018)	Transformer explosion	Peru	Same high voltage level + insulation problems	Average	Depending on the quality of insulation and the environment (dust, pollution)	Monitoring partial discharge + improving insulation.
Perth Substation Fire (2010)	Fire caused by grounding	Australia	The same grounding systems in the stations	Low	Grounding systems are usually monitored, but risk remains.	Grounding monitoring + early warning.
Canadian Transformer Failures	Fires / Transformer failures	Canada	The same problem of transformer aging after years of operation	Medium to high	Based on operational lifespan (> 15 years)	Condition monitoring + early warning + planned replacement.

3.6 Accident Types in Gas Power Plants

3.6.1 Gas Leakage Explosion Incidents in Gas-Fired Power Plants (CCGT)

All incidents involve gas-fired CCGT power plants or facilities with identical gas turbine fuel systems. Technical causes and AI solutions are directly applicable to HMO3 (Hadjret En Nouss, Algeria) which operates GE Frame 9FB gas turbines.

Table 3.2 Gas Leakage Explosion Incidents in Gas-Fired Power Plants (CCGT)

Accident / Incident	Location	Technical Cause	Consequences	Existing Solutions	Proposed AI Solution	Source
Kleen Energy Systems — 620 MW CCGT Plant Explosion (2010)	Middletown, Connecticut, USA View on Maps	High-pressure natural gas used to purge fuel pipelines indoors during commissioning of a 620 MW Siemens CCGT plant — 400,000 ft³ released near workers and ignition sources (gas blow procedure). Identical fuel supply system to HMO3.	6 dead + 50 injured + turbine hall destroyed + OSHA fines $16.6M. Explosion felt 30 miles away. CSB determined it was entirely preventable.	CSB ban on indoor natural gas purging; new NFPA fuel gas code; mandatory outdoor venting; worker involvement in safety procedures.	AI real-time gas concentration monitoring during commissioning + automated shutdown on flammable gas accumulation + smart protocol enforcement blocking indoor purging of CCGT fuel lines	CSB Official Report | Wikipedia — 2010 Connecticut Explosion

Accident / Incident	Location	Technical Cause	Consequences	Existing Solutions	Proposed AI Solution	Source
CCGT Plant — Naphtha Explosion at Fuel Changeover (1996)	North East England, UK View on Maps	Naphtha released from a pipe joint during fuel changeover in a large CCGT plant ignited inside the gas turbine acoustic enclosure — complex high-pressure fuel pipework leaked into a poorly ventilated enclosure. HSE investigations found inadequate ventilation in multiple CCGT plants across the UK.	1 worker seriously injured + 600 m³ acoustic enclosure lifted from its foundations by explosion overpressure + significant plant damage. Prompted HSE safety review of all CCGT enclosures in the UK.	HSE mandatory enclosure ventilation requirements; NFPA 37 explosion relief for turbine enclosures; improved fuel pipe joint inspection; computational fluid dynamics (CFD) ventilation modelling.	AI continuous gas leak monitoring inside turbine acoustic enclosures + smart ventilation control system with AI-driven CFD modelling for real-time enclosure safety assessment	IChemE — Explosion Hazards at CCGT Plants (PDF) | ASME — Gas Turbine Explosion Hazards
Gas Turbine Generator (GT1) Exhaust	Southeast Asia (Gas Power Plant) View on Maps	After 11 failed ignition attempts, unburned natural gas accumulated in the exhaust ducting of	Explosion in exhaust ducting + structural damage to exhaust system + emergency shutdown of the unit. Risk of	Purge cycle protocols before re-ignition attempts; limit on consecutive ignition attempts;	AI combustion monitoring using flame detector signals to detect lean blow-out +	Approved Group International — GT Explosion Investigation | IEOMSOCIETY

Accident / Incident	Location	Technical Cause	Consequences	Existing Solutions	Proposed AI Solution	Source
Duct Explosion (2013)		Gas Turbine Generator Unit 1. On the 12th attempt, the accumulated gas ignited causing a loud bang and explosion in the exhaust duct — a combustion instability event (lean blow-out then re-ignition).	fire spread to adjacent systems.	exhaust duct explosion relief panels.	automatic gas purge enforcement after failed ignition + predictive ignition system health monitoring	— Fire & Explosion Hazards at Gas Turbines (PDF)
CCGT & CHP Plants — Survey of 64 Enclosure Fires Over 20 Years	Worldwide (CCGT Power Plants) View on Maps	Systematic survey by UK insurers of 64 fires inside gas turbine acoustic enclosures over 20 years — causes include: fuel gas leaks from flanges and pipe joints, lube oil releases onto hot surfaces, and inadequate	64 enclosure fires across worldwide CCGT fleet — equipment damage, unplanned outages, and fire risk to adjacent systems. Many incidents under-reported due to lack of mandatory reporting.	NFPA 37 explosion relief; API 616 turbine enclosure standards; mandatory ventilation; fixed fire suppression inside enclosures; periodic pipe joint inspection.	AI-based predictive maintenance for fuel supply flanges and joints + thermal camera monitoring inside enclosures + smart fire suppression activation linked	IChemE Symposium 141 — CCGT Explosion Hazards (PDF) | HSE — Explosion Hazards at Gas Turbine Plants (ASME)

Accident / Incident	Location	Technical Cause	Consequences	Existing Solutions	Proposed AI Solution	Source
		enclosure ventilation. All causes directly applicable to GE Frame 9FB turbines at HMO3.			to AI gas sensor network	

3.6.2 Gas Turbine Fire Incidents and AI-Based Prevention

Gas turbine fires are commonly caused by fuel leakage, hydraulic oil leakage, combustion instability, piping failures, and improper maintenance. Artificial Intelligence technologies can significantly improve early detection and fire prevention in gas turbine systems.

Table 3.3Gas Turbine Fire Incidents and AI-Based Prevention

Accident / Incident	Location	Cause of Fire	Technical Description	Consequences	Proposed AI-Based Prevention	Source
Hsinta Power Plant Gas Turbine Fire (2025)	Kaohsiung, Taiwan View on Maps	**Fuel / Gas Leakage**	Incorrect gasket installed on a flange of the gas turbine heater (Unit 2-2). During trial operation, the gasket failed at ~300°C, causing natural gas to leak and ignite.	Fire in turbine Unit 2-2 + equipment damage. Unit unavailable during investigation and repair.	AI-based gas leak detection + smart flange condition monitoring + thermal anomaly alerts during commissioning	Hsinta Power Plant Fire
Thermal Power Plant Fire — Fuel Return Pipe Crack (2006)	France (Thermal Power Plant) View on Maps	**Fuel Return Pipe Crack**	A crack in the fuel supply return pipe of Unit G6, caused by motor vibrations, projected domestic fuel oil onto the hot right-hand turbocharger, creating a fireball at 10:05 AM.	Fireball + fire spread to compressor room and control room. 2 workers hospitalized. Unit 5/8 unavailable for 12–14 months.	AI pipe integrity monitoring using vibration sensors + thermal cameras to detect hot surface contact before ignition	ARIA Report #32177 (French Ministry)
CCGT Power Plant — Hydraulic Oil Leakage Fire (France)	France (CCGT Power Plant) View on Maps	**Hydraulic Oil Leakage**	During turbine shaft rinsing, 8.1 m³ of hydraulic oil leaked onto the ground. Due to a temporary drainage connection unknown to the night shift, oily water overflowed into an uncontained area, creating a fire and environmental risk.	Severe turbine fire risk + major oil spill + environmental contamination. Heavy equipment damage.	AI-based oil leakage sensors + real-time drainage system monitoring + automated shutdown on abnormal oil flow detection	ARIA Report #57878 (French Ministry)

Accident / Incident	Location	Cause of Fire	Technical Description	Consequences	Proposed AI-Based Prevention	Source
Kleen Energy Systems Power Plant Explosion (2010)	Middletown, Connecticut, USA View on Maps	**Unsafe Gas Purging Operation (Gas Blow)**	During commissioning, workers used high-pressure natural gas to purge debris from fuel pipelines ("gas blow"). ~400,000 ft³ of gas were released near the building in the final 10 minutes, accumulating in an enclosed area and igniting from an undetermined source.	Catastrophic explosion (equivalent to a seismic event) + fire. 6 workers killed + 50 injured. Plant severely damaged. OSHA fines: $16.6 million.	AI gas concentration monitoring with automated emergency shutdown + smart commissioning protocol enforcement	CSB Investigation Report | EHS Today (2010)
Gas Turbine Fire — Improper Gasket Installation (Japan)	Japan (Thermal Power Plant) View on Maps	**Improper Gasket Installation**	A non-compliant gasket was installed on a fuel system flange. Under operating temperature and pressure, the gasket failed, causing fuel to leak around the turbine system and creating a fire risk.	Fuel leakage around turbine system + fire hazard + emergency shutdown. Risk of equipment damage and worker injury.	AI predictive maintenance using pressure and temperature sensors to detect gasket degradation + smart material compliance verification during installation	NITE Japan — Accident Database | IChemE Symposium — CCGT Explosion Hazards

3.6.3 Transformer and Substation Fire Incidents

Major transformer and substation fire incidents with AI-based prevention strategies. All incidents involve HV/UHV transformers and switchgear equipment identical to those in HMO3's step-up substation (400 kV grid connection).

Table 3.4Transformer and Substation Fire Incidents

Accident / Incident	Location	Technical Cause	Consequences	Existing Solutions	Proposed AI Solution	Source
Heathrow Airport — North Hyde 275 kV Substation Fire (March 2025)	Hayes, London, UK View on Maps	Catastrophic failure of a 275 kV transformer bushing due to moisture ingress — elevated moisture detected in July 2018 but never repaired. Fire suppression system inoperable since 2022. No firewall between adjacent transformers. HMO3's step-up transformers face identical aging and monitoring risks.	1 transformer destroyed + 1 damaged + 66,919 customers lost power + Heathrow Airport closed 16+ hours + 1,351 flights cancelled + 290,000 passengers affected. Losses: $85M+.	NESO 12 recommendations; Ofgem enforcement; mandatory oil sampling program; bushing replacement schedule; firewall between transformers.	AI continuous dissolved gas analysis (DGA) + predictive bushing moisture monitoring + smart fire suppression self-test + automated alert on moisture threshold breach	NESO Final Report (July 2025) | Wikipedia — Hayes Substation Fire
500 kV Current Transformer Explosion — Peru Substation (2018)	Peru (500 kV Substation) View on Maps	Current transformer (CT) failure caused by electric field concentration from contaminated insulation (pollution creepage) + improper physical layout of 500 kV equipment — insulation degraded to the point of internal arc and explosion. Step-up transformers at HMO3 operate at similar voltages and face the same insulation degradation risks.	CT explosion and fire + equipment destruction + substation outage + risk of cascade failure across the 500 kV bus. Root cause: inadequate international standards for physical layout of HV equipment.	Updated insulation coordination standards; increased creepage distances; contamination monitoring; improved physical layout spacing.	AI electric field monitoring sensors on HV equipment + AI-based partial discharge (PD) detection for early insulation degradation + predictive contamination level monitoring	ScienceDirect — CT Failure at 500 kV Substations | IEEE Xplore — Substation Fire Protection

Accident / Incident	Location	Technical Cause	Consequences	Existing Solutions	Proposed AI Solution	Source
Perth Substation Fire — 11 kV Indoor Switchgear Destruction (2010)	Perth, Western Australia View on Maps	Earthing fault caused by failure of the earthing arrangement inside the substation — fault ignited 11 kV indoor switchgear and destroyed it beyond repair. Midnight occurrence delayed detection and response by 45+ minutes.	1,500 residences and businesses lost power + 11 kV switchgear destroyed + traffic lights and boom gates failed requiring emergency generators + 45 customers identified with transfer voltage hazards.	Emergency generator backup for traffic infrastructure; earthing arrangement review across all zone substations; transfer voltage assessment; working group established.	AI real-time earthing continuity monitoring + fault location detection to identify early signs of earthing degradation + automated nighttime alert system to reduce detection delay	IEEE Xplore — Earthing Substation Fire (2016) | NFPA 850 — Power Plant Fire Protection
Canadian UHV Transformer Failures — 20-Year Statistical Study (1965–1985)	Canada (Multiple Power Plants) View on Maps	Operating voltage >300 kV with high fault levels — systematic failure patterns in aging UHV power plant transformers over 20 years. Internal insulation aging, oil degradation, and absence of online condition monitoring identified as primary causes. HMO3's step-up transformers will face similar aging risks after 15+ years of operation.	Multiple transformer failures and fires across Canadian grid — significant equipment losses, long unplanned outages, and high replacement costs over the 20-year study period.	NFPA 850/851 space separation and oil containment; fire barriers; periodic oil sampling; voltage protection systems.	AI online DGA (Dissolved Gas Analysis) + TDCG trend monitoring for early internal fault detection + AI-based remaining useful life (RUL) estimation for aging HMO3 step-up transformers	ScienceDirect — HV Transformer Safety Review | IEEE Xplore — Fires and Explosions in Substations

3.6.4 Hydrogen Explosion Incidents in Electrical Power Plants

Hydrogen gas is widely used as a coolant in large electric power generators due to its high heat capacity (14× that of air). Although hydrogen cooling systems are not currently integrated in HMO3's CCGT operations, these documented incidents highlight critical safety risks relevant to future green hydrogen integration in gas-fired power plants. The AI-based solutions proposed below represent a proactive safety framework for such future developments.

Table 3.5 Hydrogen Explosion Incidents in Electrical Power Plants

Accident / Incident	Location	Cause of Explosion	Technical Description	Consequences	Proposed AI-Based Prevention	Source
Muskingum River Power Plant — Hydrogen Explosion During Routine Delivery (2007)	Beverly, Ohio, USA View on Maps	**Hydrogen Relief Device (Rupture Disk) Failure During H_2 Delivery**	During routine H_2 delivery to cool the 585 MW generator, a rupture disk — replaced 6 months earlier without the required fusible bismuth plug — failed prematurely. Hydrogen escaped under an overhead awning not designed for H_2 ventilation and was ignited by an unknown source. At least 17.7 kg of H_2 were released in the final 10 seconds before ignition.	1 worker killed (delivery driver) + 10 injured + multiple buildings destroyed. OSHA issued 18 citations. Court awarded $13M in damages against AEP for deliberate negligence. Note: Although this is a coal-fired plant, the H_2 generator cooling system is identical to that used in gas-fired CCGT power plants.	AI real-time H_2 pressure and flow monitoring during delivery + smart rupture disk integrity verification + automated emergency shutoff valve on abnormal H_2 release + AI-based awning ventilation adequacy assessment	Power Magazine (2009) | WHA International Case Study
Power Station Generator — Hydrogen Fire from Improper Purging Procedure	USA (Power Station)	**Incomplete H_2 Purge Before Maintenance — Residual Hydrogen Ignition**	A large H_2-cooled generator at a power station was being maintained. The H_2 cooling loop was purged with CO_2, then with air. Workers assumed the loop was safe and cut a ½-inch pipe to install new instrumentation. Residual pressurised hydrogen	Fire in the H_2 cooling loop + equipment damage + emergency shutdown of the generator unit. The densitometer reading (100% CO_2 at top of generator) gave a false sense of safety — H_2	AI multi-point H_2 concentration sensing throughout the entire cooling loop before any maintenance access + smart PTW (Permit-to-Work) system physically blocking pipe opening until all sensors confirm	(Guo et al., 2024)

Accident / Incident	Location	Cause of Explosion	Technical Description	Consequences	Proposed AI-Based Prevention	Source
			remained undetected in the loop and ignited on contact with a spark, causing a fire. Root cause: inadequate multi-point H_2 concentration verification before opening the system.	remained in lower sections of the loop.	H_2 = 0% + AI false-reading detection alert	

3.6.5 Electrical Arc Flash Accidents

Table 3.6Electrical Arc Flash Accidents

Accident / Incident	Location	Technical Cause	Consequences	Existing Solutions	Proposed AI Solution	Source
Ware River Power Plant Arc Flash (2016)	Ware, Massachusetts, USA View on Maps	Switching error + mechanical failure inside 600 V electrical panel	Severe burns to 2 workers (30% of body surface) + equipment damage + external transformer fire	PPE + Lockout/Tagout (LOTO) + protection system upgrade	AI anomaly detection for switchgear and electrical panels	ISHN (2016) EC&M (2016)
Oklaunion Power Station Arc Flash (2019)	Vernon, Texas, USA View on Maps	Unsafe fuse inspection inside an energized 600 V electrical panel while the panel remained live	Severe burns to hands and face — worker hospitalized	Improved safety procedures + mandatory worker training + NFPA 70E compliance	Smart electrical panel monitoring using AI with real-time hazard alerts	(Kowalski-Trakofler & Barrett, 2007)
Dave Johnston Power Plant Arc Flash (2020)	Glenrock, Wyoming, USA View on Maps	Incorrect voltage measurement on 4160 V MCC using Fluke 87 multimeter incorrectly set to AC mode	Electrical burns to both hands, face, and neck — hospitalization required	Remote diagnostics + safer voltage testing procedures + insulated tools	Predictive maintenance using AI sensors to monitor MCC voltage and alert anomalies	NAFPA 70E Standard
LANL TA-53 Arc Flash Accident — Los Alamos National Laboratory (2015)	Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA View on Maps	Cleaning fluid sprayed into the air gap between an energized 13.8 kV switchgear bus and the grounded enclosure, creating an arc-flash path to ground — root cause: inadequate control implementation and failure to verify zero-voltage state	9 employees affected, 2 hospitalized — severe arc flash burns + equipment destruction in high-voltage switchgear	Zero-energy verification procedures + LOTO enforcement + physical barriers between energized and de-energized zones	AI-based real-time monitoring of switchgear energy state + intelligent LOTO verification system to prevent accidental re-energization	DOE JAIT Report PDF (energy.gov) DOE Article

3.7 Root Cause Analysis of Accidents

In order to structure the analysis of accidents occurring in power plants, the following table presents a comprehensive classification of root causes. It highlights the associated incidents, detection indicators, and corresponding control measures. This approach provides a systematic framework for understanding accident mechanisms and improving risk prevention strategies.

Table 3.7 Root Cause Analysis of Accidents

Cause Category	Concrete Examples	Associated Accidents	Detection Indicators	Control Measures
Electrical Cause	Overvoltage, phase imbalance, grounding fault	Arc flash, electrical panel fire	Voltage fluctuations, harmonics	Power quality analysis
Technical Cause (Equipment)	Insulation wear, mechanical fatigue, corrosion	Short circuit, loss of containment	Contact temperature, vibrations	Condition-based maintenance
Maintenance Cause	Lack of lubrication, improper tightening, failure to replace components	Bearing fire, overheating	CMMS history, thermography	Strict maintenance procedures
Human Cause	Lockout/tagout error, negligence, bypassing safety procedures	Electric shock, fire outbreak	Behavioral audits	Training and HSE certifications
Organizational Cause	Lack of supervision, unclear procedures, workload pressure	Uncontrolled hot work incidents	Non-compliance rate in documentation	Management system (SMS/SME)
Environmental Cause	Extreme temperature, excessive dust, humidity	Insulation failure, smoldering fire	Temperature and humidity sensors	Air conditioning, dust removal

Inadequate Protection	Obsolete fire extinguishers, clogged smoke detectors	Uncon trolled fire spread	Periodic inspection reports	Regular testing of fire safety systems (SSI)

3.8 AI System Architecture — End-to-End Pipeline

The AI safety system for HMN3 is structured as a four-layer pipeline, from raw sensor acquisition through intelligent decision output. Each layer is designed for real-time operation with fault tolerance.



3.9 Layer 1 · Data Acquisition

3.9.1 General Function

Layer 1 represents the interface between the intelligent system and the physical reality of the station. It is responsible for the continuous and simultaneous capture of all physical, chemical, and mechanical signals indicative of the operational condition of critical assets. It operates on the principle of Multi-Modal Sensing Integration: rather than relying on a single type of sensor, it employs a distributed network covering all potential fault pathways without gaps.

3.9.2 Adopted Sensing Components

Table 0.1Adopted Sensing Components

Sensor	Technology Used	Installation Location	Detection Role
Temperature Sensors	Pt100/Pt1000 RTDs and thermocouples	Transformer windings, HV panels, cable trays	Monitoring thermal degradation in insulation systems (~40% of transformer faults)
Smoke / Flame Detectors	Optical point detectors + dual-tech UV/IR	HV and LV areas	Secondary confirmation at onset of combustion — reducing false alarms
Gas Sensors	Electrochemical cells	All distribution zones	Measuring SF_6, CO, H_2 — early warning of insulation breakdown
Current Transformers (CTs)	Measurement transformers on all circuits (IEC 60044)	Main feeder panels	Measuring active current and total harmonic distortion (THD)
Vibration Sensors (MEMS)	MEMS accelerometers	Rotating equipment (fans, pumps) + transformer cores	Detecting mechanical loosening and bearing wear before it develops

3.9.3 Detailed Analysis of Sensor Roles

A. Temperature Sensors

Temperature sensors are the most widely deployed in the sensing network, since thermal degradation is the most common fault pathway for transformers, causing approximately 40% of faults according to specialized technical studies. Pt100/Pt1000 RTDs operate on a near-linear platinum-resistance correlation with accuracy up to 0.1°C over the range −200°C to +850°C.

- Coverage: primary and secondary transformer windings, HV panel connection points, cable trays.
- Sampling rate: 1 Hz (one reading per second) — enables real-time tracking of sharp thermal transients.

- Thermocouples: used in zones with very high temperatures (> 400°C) where RTDs lose accuracy.

B. Smoke / Flame Detectors

These operate as a secondary confirmation layer, activated when the incident transitions from silent degradation to actual combustion. Optical detectors measure light scattering caused by smoke particles, while dual-tech UV/IR detectors monitor both ultraviolet and infrared spectra for visible and invisible flames — reducing false alarms caused by steam or industrial dust.

C. Gas Sensors — SF_6, CO, H_2

These represent the most sensitive early-warning tool, detecting chemical decomposition products of insulation before any tangible thermal symptoms appear:

- SF_6 (Sulfur Hexafluoride): insulating gas in GIS switchgear — its leakage is an indicator of gaseous insulation breakdown and arc flash risk.
- CO (Carbon Monoxide): decomposition product of organic insulation materials — a critical indicator of smoldering combustion (< 150°C).
- H_2 (Hydrogen): transformer oil decomposition product — the primary gas in Dissolved Gas Analysis (DGA) per IEC 60599.

D. Current Transformers (CTs)

These provide quantitative electrical data enabling the model to distinguish subtle electrical faults: phase imbalances, low-level earth current, and Total Harmonic Distortion (THD) that warns of transformer degradation. Measurement accuracy: effective RMS current + harmonic components up to the 13th order at 50 Hz.

E. Vibration Sensors (MEMS)

MEMS accelerometers are compact and low-power yet highly sensitive, ideal for continuous monitoring without human intervention. They detect mechanical degradation through vibration signature changes:

- Rotating equipment: bearing wear produces distinctive frequency peaks — imbalance appears as a synchronous (1×) component.
- Transformer cores: mechanical loosening of laminations produces an anomalous 100 Hz component (double line frequency) and its harmonics.

3.9.4 Scientific Justification — Full Fault Pathway Coverage

Fault pathway distribution in electrical distribution stations (IEEE Gold Book / CIGRÉ TB 642):

Thermal Degradation: ~40% · Electrical Faults: ~25% · Chemical Insulation Breakdown: ~20% · Mechanical Faults: ~15%

Layer 1 sensors cover each of these pathways with one or more specialized sensors, with strategic overlap ensuring double verification.

3.10 Layer 2 · Data Preprocessing

3.10.1 General Function and Methodological Necessity

This layer transforms raw, noisy, and irregular signals into clean, structured, and normalized feature vectors that form the actual inputs to the machine learning model. This

layer is not a secondary procedure but a fundamental scientific necessity: a model trained on raw data will learn patterns of industrial noise, not genuine fault signatures, leading to poor generalization and disappointing performance.

HMN3 data faces four simultaneous challenges: (1) broadband mechanical noise in vibration signals, (2) sensor drift over time in temperature and gas readings, (3) short communication interruptions producing data gaps, and (4) a radical disparity in measurement ranges across channels (°C vs. mA vs. g). Layer 2 addresses each challenge through a dedicated processing stage.

3.10.2 The Five Preprocessing Stages

Stage 1: Noise Filtering

Band-pass filtering applied to vibration signals to isolate diagnostically relevant frequency bands while suppressing mechanical broadband noise. Thermal and gas channels receive moving-average smoothing to eliminate sampling spikes without introducing lag into the feature extraction step.

Stage 2: Min-Max Normalization [0–1]

Min-Max scaling is applied to all seventeen channels according to: $x_{norm} = (x - x_{min}) / (x_{max} - x_{min})$, where limits are set from the training set with a 1% two-tail clipping for outlier resistance. Without this step, temperature values (in degrees Celsius) would dominate a model that compares them with current levels (in milliamperes), regardless of their actual diagnostic importance.

Stage 3: Feature Extraction

Statistical features are extracted from each channel within a 30-second sliding window: mean, maximum, standard deviation, RMS, trend (linear regression slope), and ratio to historical baseline. Vibration channels additionally have kurtosis computed — a fourth-order statistic highly sensitive to bearing fault impulses. Electrical channels yield THD and phase imbalance index. The result is a compact 47-element vector preserving maximum diagnostic information density.

Stage 4: Missing Data Imputation

- Short gaps (< 5 seconds): Forward-Fill — preserves the last valid reading without distorting the distribution.
- Medium interruptions (5 – 30 seconds): local window median — more outlier-resistant than mean.
- Long interruptions (> 30 seconds): raise a data-quality flag + automatic alert to the control room — inference continues with a cautionary caveat.

Stage 5: Historical Log Integration

Incident and preventive maintenance logs from the station's SCADA historian (5 years) are merged with the live stream for two purposes: (1) providing labeled annotations for supervised model training, and (2) encoding seasonal load patterns (winter peak loads, maintenance seasons) that affect the baseline of all channels.

3.10.3 Feature Vector Summary — 47 Features per Window

Table 0.2 Feature Vector Summary

Feature Group	Raw Channels	Extracted Features	Total
Thermal	5 channels	10 features (mean, max, std, RMS…)	15
Gas / Smoke	4 channels	8 features (trend, ratio…)	12
Electrical	6 channels	12 features (FFT bins, THD, imbalance)	18
Vibration	2 channels	2 features (kurtosis, RMS)	4
Total	17 raw channels	32 extracted features	47 features

3.11 Layer 3 · AI Engine — Random Forest Classifier

3.11.1 General Function and Model Architecture

Layer 3 receives the 47-feature vector from Layer 2 and performs probabilistic classification in under 3 seconds. The model uses the Random Forest Classifier algorithm, an ensemble learning algorithm built on the principle of diversification through bootstrapping (Bagging + Random Feature Subspace).

The forest consists of 300 independent decision trees, each trained on a random bootstrap sample of the 5-year dataset with random selection of the square root of the number of features at each split. The final output is the probability P(event) derived from the proportion of trees voting for the "fault" class — a calibrated probabilistic estimate rather than a hard binary decision.

3.11.2 Model Performance Metrics

Table 0.3 Model Performance Metrics

Metric	System Value	Traditional System	Difference
Overall Accuracy	96.4%	78.2%	↑ +18.2 points
False Alarm Rate	−70%	Baseline 100%	Significant improvement
Detection Time	< 3 seconds	3 – 15 minutes	↑ 300× faster
Training Data Volume	5 years historical	—	—
Model Architecture	300 trees / depth 15	—	—

3.11.3 Scientific Justification for Choosing Random Forest — Comparative Analysis

The Random Forest model was selected after a systematic evaluation against its main alternatives across five criteria relevant to the HMN3 context:

Interpretability: Random Forest provides SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations) feature importance values, enabling the control engineer to understand why each alert was triggered — a regulatory requirement in critical infrastructure environments.

Handling mixed data types: natively handles the mix of statistical features (continuous) and binary flags (categorical) without encoding.

Robustness to noise: the averaging across 300 trees cancels out individual-tree overfitting to sensor noise.

Training efficiency: trains on 5 years of SCADA data in under 2 hours on standard industrial hardware.

Calibrated probabilities: Platt scaling post-processing ensures P(event) is a true probability useful for threshold logic in Layer 4.

3.12 Layer 4 · Decision & Output

3.12.1 General Function and Design Philosophy

Layer 4 forms the link between the system's probabilistic intelligence and the human and operational infrastructure stakeholders who must act on its outputs. It receives P(event) from Layer 3 and translates it into a multi-dimensional decision object specifying: risk level, incident type, geographic zone, and response protocol — delivering it to all relevant parties in under 60 seconds.

The design of Layer 4 rests on two principles: (1) response proportional to confidence level — intervention depth is directly proportional to P(event); (2) output completeness — each output packet contains full information for autonomous field action without wasted time gathering data.

3.12.2 Risk Level Classification Matrix — 4 Levels

Table 0.4 Risk Level Classification Matrix

•	Risk Level	P(Alert) Range	Required Response	Allowed Time
🟢	Low	P < 0.40	Log only, no immediate action	—
🟡	Medium	0.40 – 0.60	Notify duty engineer immediately	< 15 minutes
🟠	High	0.60 – 0.75	Dispatch maintenance team to site	< 5 minutes
🔴	Critical	P > 0.75	Immediate alarm + automatic equipment isolation	< 60 seconds

3.13 Incident Type Classification — 7 Categories

The system goes beyond simple binary classification (incident / normal) to detailed classification into seven categories, each with distinctive sensor indicators and a tailored response protocol:

Table 0.5 Incident Type Classification

#	Incident Type	Sensor Indicators	Response Protocol
1	Electrical Fault	Sudden current surge, phase imbalance > 10%, voltage deviation	Trip circuit + isolate busbar section + log in SCADA
2	Thermal Overload	Sustained temperature > 95°C on two or more adjacent RTD channels	Reduce feeder load + activate backup cooling + monitor for 15 minutes
3	Insulation Breakdown	H_2 rise + gradual thermal degradation across multiple windows	Isolate transformer + schedule Dissolved Gas Analysis (DGA) within 4 hours

#	Incident Type	Sensor Indicators	Response Protocol
4	Mechanical Fault	Anomalous FFT peaks, kurtosis coefficient > 6	Shut down equipment + inspect bearings + perform LOTO procedure
5	Gas Leak	Gas concentration exceeding IEC safe limits in two or more cells	Evacuate zone + activate emergency ventilation + deploy PPE team
6	Incipient Fire	CO rise + optical smoke signal with no visible flame yet	Activate pre-action suppression system + notify fire brigade + isolate supply
7	Active Fire	CO rise + UV/IR flame confirmation + thermal rise > 20°C/min	Full alarm + immediate automatic isolation + evacuation + emergency services

3.14 Geographic Zone Identification within HMN3

Every output includes a precise geographic zone label derived from the active sensor set through probabilistic analysis: each sensor has zone coordinates in the station database, and the zone with the highest weighted sum of SHAP contributions is identified as the primary location. Secondary zones are also flagged when there are significant contributions from neighboring sensors — alerting response teams to the possibility of fault propagation.

3.14.1 Structured Action Sheet

With every alarm, the system automatically issues a structured action sheet containing:

Isolation sequence: a numbered list of breaker and isolator operations in the correct verified order per the HMN3 switching schedule.

PPE requirements: personal protective equipment specification per incident type (arc flash suits for electrical faults; respirators for gas incidents).

Incident escalation chain: a hierarchical contact list per risk level — shift supervisor for Medium; site manager for High; general manager and emergency services for Critical.

Estimated time to critical state: derived from the instantaneous rate of change of P(event) — reduces decision burden on the duty engineer when multiple simultaneous alarms occur.

3.14.2 Integration with SCADA/DCS via OPC-UA

All Layer 4 outputs are published to HMN3's operational infrastructure via the OPC-UA protocol (OLE for Process Control — Unified Architecture), which is the IEC 62541 standard for secure, platform-independent exchange between industrial control systems:

SCADA integration: risk level, incident type, zone label, and action sheet appear on the HMI screen with geographic identification on the single-line diagram — no new infrastructure required.

Automatic DCS isolation: at Critical level, OPC-UA write commands trigger the predefined isolation sequence in the DCS within 60 seconds, independent of operator intervention.

Historian archiving: all prediction and alarm events and operator acknowledgment records are written to the SCADA historian for audit, regulatory reporting, and retraining data enrichment purposes.

3.15 Comparative Analysis: Traditional vs AI-Based Fire Detection Systems

This section presents a comprehensive comparison between conventional fire detection systems and modern AI-based solutions. The analysis covers functional performance, operational characteristics, and approximate costs in the Algerian market (DZD).

Criterion	Traditional System	AI-Based System
Detection Approach	Reactive (after fire starts)	Predictive (before fire occurs)
Response Speed	Slow – waits for clear fire signs	Instantaneous / Real-time
Human Intervention	Always required	Semi-automatic / Minimal
Accuracy	Moderate	Very High
Initial Cost (Installation & Hardware)	50,000 – 150,000 DZD	200,000 – 600,000 DZD
Annual Maintenance Cost	20,000 – 50,000 DZD	30,000 – 80,000 DZD
Expected Lifespan	10 – 15 years	7 – 12 years
Long-term Savings	Limited	High (reduced losses & incidents)
Data Analysis	None	Continuous monitoring & analytics
Scalability	Difficult to scale	Easily scalable

Table 0.6 Comparative Analysis: Traditional vs AI-Based Fire

3.16 Conclusion

This chapter highlighted the main risks associated with gas-fired power plants through the analysis of several real industrial accidents. The results showed that technical failures, human errors, inadequate maintenance, and equipment degradation are the primary causes of major incidents. The assessment conducted for the HMN3 power plant demonstrated the importance of proactive risk management and continuous monitoring. Furthermore, the proposed AI-based safety system offers an effective solution for early fault detection, predictive maintenance, and real-time decision-making, contributing to improved safety, reliability, and operational performance of the power plant.

General Conclusion

This dissertation focused on the analysis and assessment of industrial risks in gas-fired power plants, with particular emphasis on the HMN3 power plant. Through the study of numerous national and international accident cases, it was possible to identify the main causes of incidents, including technical failures, human errors, inadequate maintenance practices, and organizational deficiencies. These accidents demonstrate the complexity of power plant operations and the necessity of implementing effective risk management strategies to ensure personnel safety, equipment integrity, and operational continuity.

The risk assessment conducted for HMN3 highlighted several critical areas requiring continuous monitoring and preventive measures. The application of structured methodologies enabled the identification of potential hazards and the evaluation of their likelihood and severity, providing a solid basis for improving safety performance within the plant.

In addition, this work explored the integration of Artificial Intelligence technologies as an innovative approach to industrial safety management. The proposed AI-based system, relying on real-time data acquisition, advanced preprocessing techniques, and a Random Forest predictive model, demonstrated significant potential for early fault detection, predictive maintenance, and intelligent decision-making. Such technologies can substantially reduce accident probability, improve response times, and enhance the overall reliability of power generation systems.

Ultimately, the transition from traditional reactive safety practices to predictive and intelligent safety management represents a major opportunity for modern power plants. The implementation of these advanced solutions at HMN3 and similar facilities can contribute to safer operations, reduced economic losses, and greater sustainability of the energy sector in Algeria and worldwide.

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