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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | مهدي شرقي | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015 | - |
dc.date.available | 2015 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 2437-0215 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.univ-ouargla.dz/jspui/handle/123456789/10320 | - |
dc.description | Algerian Studies of Accounting and Financial Review | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | Agency theory is defined as a contract where by a person or several people, is the president or the principal resort of the services of another person is helping or entrusted to the their name function or a specific job ; includes authorization rights declarative or transfer of specialized knowledge . This relationship creates agency costs, such as lack of asymmetry informational and moral hazard the anti- choice. Agency Theory provides a different look to the Board of Directors as an internal control function minimization of agency costs resulting from the divergence of interests between the presidents and officers (especially between shareholders and executives) and do the required discretion (unrestricted) for agents ; ensure effective control over the executives. It will be addressed to the public economic companies in Algeria; to explain the imbalance in her management and the reasons for the failure to control some of its opportunist executives successfully. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | other | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | numero 01 2015; | - |
dc.subject | Control | en_US |
dc.subject | agency costs | en_US |
dc.subject | ownership structure | en_US |
dc.subject | board of directors | en_US |
dc.subject | economic public companies | en_US |
dc.subject | chief executive officer | en_US |
dc.title | Executives Monitoring in the Agency Theory Situation of economic public enterprises in Algerian legislation | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Volume 1, Numéro 1,2015 |
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